AC v. The Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo, 2026 CFSRB 70

CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES REVIEW BOARD

BETWEEN:

AC Applicant

-and-

The Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo Respondent

DECISION

Adjudicators: Donna Wowk, Tracy Foster, Rupinder Hans Date: May 06, 2026 Citation: 2026 CFSRB 70 Indexed as: AC v The Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo (CYFSA s.109)

APPEARANCES

AC, Applicant Amanda Taerk, Counsel Madeleine Emmanuel, Counsel

The Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo, Respondent Harjot Jagpal, Counsel Jeff Boich, Counsel

OVERVIEW

1This is an Application filed with the Child and Family Services Review Board (“CFSRB”) under section 109 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act 2017, SO 2017, c.14, Sched.1 (the “Act”).

2The Applicant is the foster parent of AA (“the Child”). She seeks a review of the Respondent’s decision to remove the Child from her care. The Child was removed from the Applicant’s home on November 24, 2025.

3A hearing on the merits was held by way of videoconference on April 10th, 17th, and 24th, 2026.

4Both parties filed affidavits for everyone they called as witnesses with the exception of one of the Respondent’s witnesses. All deponents of affidavits gave oral evidence at the hearing including undergoing cross-examination.

5The Applicant testified. The Applicant called two additional witnesses:

i. SJ, the biological mother of the Child; and ii. LS, the Applicant’s social worker/psychotherapist.

6The Respondent called Constable ZS, a police officer with the Ontario Provincial Police as a witness. The Respondent also called the following witnesses, all of whom were employees of the Respondent with the exception of CM:

i. TK, Child Protection Supervisor; ii. GP, Children’s Services Worker; iii. SM, Supervisor for Foster Care, Kinship and Adoption Services; and iv. CM, Child Protection Worker for the Children’s Aid Society of Oxford County (“Oxford CAS”).

ISSUE

7The issue in dispute is:

1. Is it in the Child’s best interests to confirm the Respondent’s removal of the Child from the Applicant’s care or to direct the Respondent to return the Child to the Applicant’s care?

RESULT

8It is in the Child’s best interests to be returned to the Applicant’s care, benefiting from the continuity of placement with the only family she has known her entire life, and to enable permanency planning to continue with a view to her remaining in the long term care of the Applicant.

JURISDICTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES

9There are two procedural issues, and the Respondent raised a jurisdictional issue.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Procedural Issue #1: The Respondent Failed to Provide the Applicant with Statutorily Required Notice Under Subsection 109(7)(a)

10The evidence of TK was that the Respondent was notified by the Outside Paid Resource (“OPR”) on November 24, 2025, that the Child was removed from the Applicant’s foster home and placed in respite care following a domestic dispute between the foster parents.

11The Respondent took the position that the Applicant’s foster home is an OPR foster home, not a Society foster home. It submits that it was not the Respondent’s decision to close the Applicant’s foster home but, rather, the decision of the OPR, just as it was the OPR that made the decision to remove the Child from the Applicant’s foster home on November 24, 2025.

12The roles and responsibilities for a child in extended care are set out in subsection 111(1) of the Act. It states:

Where a child is in extended society care under an order made under paragraph 3 of subsection 101(1) of clause 116(1)(c), the Crown has the rights and responsibilities of a parent for the purpose of the child’s care, custody and control, and the Crown’s powers, duties and obligations in respect of the child, except those assigned to a Director by this Act or the regulations, shall be exercised and performed by the society caring for the child.

13Subsection 111(1) clearly indicates that the Crown has delegated its rights and responsibilities to act as a parent of a child in extended care to the Society caring for the child.

14Subsection 109(6) of the Act indicates that it is the Society that proposes the removal of a child from a foster home where it believes it is in the child’s best interests to do so. There is no provision for any other decision-maker or authority to propose a child’s removal. Further, subsection 109(7) is clear that it is the Society who has the authority to propose the removal.

15Furthermore, the letter to the Applicant dated January 14, 2026 providing notice that the Child would not be returned to her care, came from the Respondent, not for the OPR. That letter did not suggest that the decision to remove the Child had been made by anyone other than the Respondent. The Respondent also sent a letter to the OPR on January 13, 2026 informing the resource that it would not be returning the Child to the care of the Applicant.

16The Service Contract between the OPR and the Respondent is also informative in its delineation of roles and responsibilities. This includes the following excerpts:

“Recognizing the mandate and obligations of the Society, it is incumbent upon the Society to ensure that the placement and individual needs of children in its care are met.”

“The Society Agrees:

1. To provide a worker for the children to act as a liaison between the Resource and the Society. This worker maintains case management responsibility for the child.”

“The Resource Agrees:

1. Children placed in one residence will not be transferred to another residence also operated by the Resource without the expressed approval of the Society.

2. To consult with the Society in advance in order to obtain approval for any plans to move a child from one residence to another with the service system.

3. To include discharge planning in the child’s Plan of Care.

4. To include a minimum of seven days written notice to the Society of its intention to discharge the child from the Resource, unless the child, other children or staff in the residence are at risk.

5. To consult with the Society and negotiate a mutually acceptable plan of discharge.

17The Panel finds that from November 24, 2025 when it received notice that the Child had been moved to a respite home and forward, the decisions that were made with respect to the Child’s placement were decisions made by the Respondent and not by the OPR as was suggested by the Respondent.

18Subsection 109(7)(a) of the Act sets out the requirements for a society’s notice of proposed removal of a child from a foster parent as follows:

109(7) If a child is in extended society care under an order made under paragraph 3 of subsection 101(1) or clause 116(1)(c) and has lived continuously with a foster parent for two years and the society proposes to remove the child from the foster parents under subsection (6), the society shall,

(a) Give the foster parent at least 10 days notice in writing of the proposed removal and of the foster parent’s right to apply for a review under subsection (8).

19The notice requirements in s. 109 of the Act are mandatory. They serve several important purposes including providing foster parents with notice of decisions that significantly impact their lives and the lives of children in their care and advising foster parents that they have a right to have those decisions reviewed by the CFSRB.

20The Respondent did not provide the Applicant with the requisite notice and advise her of her rights to a review until approximately one month and three weeks after the Child had been removed from her care.

21The notice requirements in the Act promote the best interests, protection and well-being of children by ensuring their placements are disrupted as little as possible prior to the review period expiring or a decision being rendered by the CFSRB. It impacts not only the rights of the foster parent but also impacts the best interests of the child involved. The intent of the statutory scheme is to avoid the very situation that has occurred here.¹

22The Panel finds that the Respondent failed to provide the Applicant with notice as required by subsection 109(7) of the Act when it did not return the Child to the Applicant’s foster home on November 24, 2025. We note that the child protection investigation by Oxford CAS was concluded on December 22, 2025. The letter providing the Applicant with notice that it would not be returning the Child to her care and advising her of a right to a review by the CFSRB was sent on January 14, 2026.

Procedural Issue #2: Removal of the Child from the Applicant’s Foster Home Contrary to [Subsection 109(16)](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/so-2017-c-14-sch-1/latest/so-2017-c-14-sch-1.html#sec109subsec16_smooth) of the [Act](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/so-2017-c-14-sch-1/latest/so-2017-c-14-sch-1.html)

23Subsection 109(16) of the Act is clear that, subject to s. 109(17), a Society shall not carry out the removal of the child unless,

(a) The time for applying for a review of the proposed removal under subsection (8) has expired and an application is not made; or

(b) If an application for review of the proposed removal is made under subsection (8), the Board has confirmed the proposed removal under subsection (15).

24Subsection 109(17) of the Act provides the exception as follows:

109(17) A society may remove the child from the foster home before the expiry of the time for applying for a review under subsection (8) or at any time after the application for a review is made if, in the opinion of a local director, there is a risk that the child is likely to suffer harm during the time necessary for a review by the Board.

25The Respondent did not obtain an opinion of the local director that the Child was likely to suffer harm during the time necessary for a review by the CFSRB. The Panel notes that, at the time the Child was removed from the Applicant’s foster home, the Applicant and KC had separated, and KC was no longer living in the foster home. As will be discussed further below, the domestic incident was an isolated event, the Respondent had not previously had any significant concerns regarding the Applicant’s care of the Child, and the plan of the Respondent was for the Child to remain in the long term care of the Applicant and KC.

26Counsel for the Respondent suggested that the letter to the Applicant dated January 14, 2026 constituted the opinion of the local director required by s. 109(17). We find it did not meet the statutory requirements. The January 14, 2026 correspondence was sent approximately one month and three weeks after the Child had been removed from the foster home and more than three weeks after the investigation into the allegations about the Applicant had concluded. Furthermore, the letter did not state that, in the opinion of the local director, the Child was likely to suffer harm during the time necessary for the CFSRB to conclude this review.

27The Panel finds that the Respondent did not meet the mandatory statutory requirements of s.109(17) of the Act for an opinion of the local director that there was risk that the Child was likely to suffer harm in the time necessary for the CFSRB to conclude its review. Instead, the Child was abruptly removed from her long-term foster home and has not since had contact with the Applicant. She has, thus far, been placed in two different homes. The Respondent’s failure to give notice and its improper removal of the Child from the Applicant’s foster home created a situation that was not in the Child’s best interests.

JURISDICTION

28Issues with respect to the jurisdiction of the CFSRB are expected to be raised early in the proceeding and not at the final hearing. No reason was provided by the Respondent for its delay in raising this issue. Nonetheless, now that it has been raised, it is incumbent on the CFSRB to consider the issue as, if the CFSRB does not have jurisdiction, that is the end of the matter.

29During the course of her opening statement, counsel for the Respondent submitted that the CFSRB did not have jurisdiction as the Applicant’s foster home was closed and the CFSRB did not have the authority to reopen the foster home. The Respondent further argued that the Applicant’s foster home was not one of ‘its’ foster homes, the home was closed by the OPR and the CFSRB does not have jurisdiction over an OPR.

30The Panel finds that the issue raised by the Respondent is not one of jurisdiction and instead relates to the CFSRB’s remedial authority and mootness. The statutory requirements to the CFSRB taking jurisdiction are that the child is in extended society care and has been in the continuous care of the foster parent for two years. The requirements are met in this case.

31The Respondent had contracted with the OPR to have the Child placed in one of the OPR’s foster homes. The foster home in question was one operated by the Applicant and her then partner, KC. As previously stated, the Applicant’s foster home was closed by the OPR after the Respondent informed it that the Respondent would not be placing the Child back in the care of the foster parents and would not be moving forward with a permanency plan for the Child with the foster parents.

32It is the Respondent’s position that the CFSRB does not have the authority to order that a child be returned to a closed foster home. Even if that is wrong, the Respondent’s argument is that the CFSRB does not have the authority to order that a child be returned to an OPR foster home that is closed.

33Respondent’s counsel argued that, unlike a foster home that has a direct relationship with a Society, a different framework applies for a foster home approved through an OPR with whom the Respondent contracts services as it did in this case. The Respondent submits that, as it was the OPR and not the Respondent that closed the Applicant’s foster home and as the CFSRB does not have the authority to compel the OPR to do anything, the CFSRB cannot make an order that the Applicant’s foster home be reopened.

34It was the submission of Respondent’s counsel that other recourses were available to the Applicant in relation to the removal of the Child from her care. However, when asked by the Panel to identify the other recourses, counsel’s response was that she was not sure, and she then suggested there may be a legislative gap.

35There is no ‘other recourse’ as there is no body other than the CFSRB that has the authority to confirm a removal of a child from a foster home or to direct a society not to remove the child, if the criteria for the operation of s.109 are met. This was confirmed in Applicants v. Jewish Family and Child Services of Toronto, 2011 CFSRB 16 in which Justice Curtis states:

The Board is the only body with the authority to confirm a removal order or to direct the Society not to carry out the removal of a child under section 61 of the Act. The Court has no such authority. (paragraph 57)

36Respondent’s counsel advised the Panel that the number of OPR foster homes is increasing and that they now outnumber Society foster homes. If the Respondent’s argument is correct, it would mean that a Society could effectively eliminate all rights of foster parents to a CFSRB review of a removal of a foster child simply by removing the foster child and closing the foster home, particularly in the case of children it places in OPR foster homes. There would be no accountability for a removal and for not respecting the statutory rights of the foster parents, nor would a Society be subject to any oversight. Despite this, if the Respondent is correct in its argument about a legislative gap, it is not one the CFSRB has the authority to ‘fill’.

37In Family, Youth & Child Services of Muskoka v. D.M. and C.M.², the Ontario Divisional Court considered the test to be applied by the CFSRB when reviewing a decision by a Society to refuse an application to adopt a particular child made by a foster parent or other person, or a decision by a Society to remove a child who has been placed with a person for adoption. The findings in that case are applicable to reviews of s.109 proposed removals of a foster child from a placement.

38The Ontario Divisional Court provided a detailed analysis of the CFSRB’s mandate when making a decision in the best interests of a child. It held:

The language of this section expressly requires a Board to make a determination as to what action is in the best interests of the child. If the decision under review is a refusal of an adoption application, the action relates to the entire adoption application process, which involves a number of distinctive steps. Although the action must be interpreted in the context of the decision under review (adoption application or removal from placement), it gives the Board broad authority to determine what should be done in the best interests within the confines of the decision/action under review [emphasis in original].

39In Family, Youth & Child Services of Muskoka v. D.M. and C.M., supra, Justice Sachs, writing for the Court, stated that the starting point for considering the mandate of any tribunal is the language of the statute conferring jurisdiction. The statutory provisions must be interpreted in light of its plain wording, within the context of the overall scheme and purpose of the legislation.³

40The CFSRB does not have parens patriae jurisdiction to determine the best interest of a child in relation to any action. The determination is confined to the parameters of s.109. The CFSRB must determine whether the foster placement from which the child was removed was in the child’s best interests having regard to the criteria in s.74(3) of the Act. If the placement is in the child’s best interests, the CFSRB will rescind the Society’s removal and, if not, it will confirm the Society’s decision.⁴

41In Family, Youth & Child Services of Muskoka v. D.M. and C.M., supra, the Divisional Court held that this interpretation was supported by the terms preventing a Society from removal pending expiry of the review period or confirmation of its decision by the CFSRB. The interpretation was also found to be consistent with the underlying purpose of the Act, to promote the best interests, protection and wellbeing of children. Justice Sachs wrote that it was also in keeping with the underlying purpose of the review provision which were directed to establish a process via the CFSRB, for the independent review of certain decisions or actions of Societies.⁵

42The CFSRB is provided with broad, remedial authority under section 109(15) of the Act, as confirmed by the Ontario Divisional Court in Family, Youth & Child Services of Muskoka v. D.M. and C.M., supra. Writing for the court, Justice Sachs states:

First, the use of the word “action” bestows broad authority on the Board to determine best interests within the parameter of the decision under review. Second, the comprehensiveness of the statutory review process supports the Board making a substantive decision concerning the child’s best interests. It is a complex, quasi-judicial process that would not be necessary if the Board’s mandate was restricted to ensuring procedural fairness in the Society’s adoption application process. Third, s.144 would not explicitly refer to the best interests of the child if it did not intend the Board to make a substantive “best interests” determination.⁶

43It is well settled that where a Society fails to comply with the statutory notice requirement to foster parents in s.109 of the Act, the CFSRB has the jurisdiction to order the child returned to the home of the foster parents including on an interim basis, even though the Act does not expressly provide for this, and including when a Society has removed a child after it has made a determination of risk.⁷

44There is also case law whereby the CFSRB has ordered a Society to not carry out a removal or rescinded the removal of a child from a foster home with the direction or expectation that the Society would do what is necessary to comply with that order. This includes re-opening a foster home that has been closed.⁸

45The Child is in the extended Society care of the Respondent. It is the Respondent, and not the OPR, that makes the placement and service decisions for the Child. The evidence of TK was that the OPR made the decision to close the Applicant’s foster home. The OPR contracts with the Respondent to provide residential care to children for whom the Respondent is responsible. It is hardly surprising that the OPR closed the Applicant’s foster home after the Respondent informed it that it had verified child protection concerns in relation to the Applicant, that it would not place the Child back into the foster home, and that it would not proceed with permanency planning for the Child with the Applicant.

46The Respondent did not call as witnesses anyone from the OPR. The Respondent did not lead any evidence that it asked the OPR to keep the Applicant’s foster home open. The Panel finds it significant that the OPR did not close the Applicant’s foster home until after the Respondent informed the OPR that it would not place the Child, and presumably any child, back in the Applicant’s foster home. There is no evidence that the Applicant’s foster home would have been closed had the Respondent advised the OPR it had determined it to be in the best interests of the Child for the Child to be placed back in the Applicant’s care. There is no evidence that the OPR would not re-open the Applicant’s foster home if asked to do so by the Respondent.

47The Panel finds that there is no legislative gap and that it has the authority to rescind the decision by the Respondent to remove the Child from the Applicant’s foster home.

48The combined effect of a finding by the CFSRB that it is in a child’s best interests to be returned to a foster placement and an order by the CFSRB rescinding the removal of the child from the foster home, is that the Respondent is required to take all necessary steps to implement the order.⁹

BACKGROUND

The Child

49The Child is 32 months of age and is of South Asian heritage. She has lived with the Applicant since she was 9 days old.

The Foster Mother

50The Applicant is a single parent. She has two biological children and a foster child over the age of 16 in her foster home. At the time of the Child’s removal, she was married to KC. They have since separated. KC no longer lives in the home and does not have contact with the Applicant.

51The Applicant testified she has been a foster parent with the OPR for three years and has fostered 16 children as well as children for respite care.

52She is employed by the University of Western Ontario as a Special Constable but is on a leave and has enrolled in full-time studies to complete her social service diploma. Her intention is to continue to attend full-time schooling for the next two to three years to stay home as a full-time caregiver to the Child.

The Biological Parents

53The biological parents are both South Asian. SJ is Hindu and the father is Muslim. The panel received no evidence of the father’s continued involvement with the Child.

54Since the Child’s placement in the Applicant’s foster home, SJ has maintained contact with the Child through access visits, videocalls, and communications with the Applicant who consistently sends her pictures of the Child. The evidence was that the relationship between the Applicant and SJ is positive. The Applicant described her relationship with SJ as “very positive and meaningful”. In her affidavit and through her testimony, SJ expressed her strong support of the Child remaining with the Applicant.

55SJ has consistently expressed she does not want the Child to be placed in a South Asian home due to her own experience of the stigma in her community of being born out of wedlock. SJ indicates that she would like to be the one teaching the Child about her cultural background.

Permanency Planning

56The Child was placed in extended Society care in March 2025.

57SJ was inconsistent in her wishes as to whether or not she wished to parent the Child, have her placed for adoption or some other arrangement.

58According to the evidence of TK, the OPR advised her that the Applicant and KC expressed an interest in caring for the Child on a long term basis be it by way of custody or adoption. At that juncture, the matter was still before the courts.

59In her affidavit, TK states that in July 2025, she updated the OPR clinician that it (the Respondent) was receiving “mixed messages” from SJ regarding permanency planning for the Child and stated that “as an agency, we are required to seek out family and cultural matches first as taking into consideration best interests of the child.” The Respondent found 10 culturally matched homes to be presented to SJ, outside of the Applicant’s foster home. As previously noted, SJ was not supportive of the Child being placed in a culturally matched home.

60In August 2025, the Applicant and KC provided a letter to GP from JS indicating she wanted the Applicant and KC to have full custody of the Child.

61TK stated in her affidavit that due to the continued mixed messaging, it was determined an Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) conference would be held “to ensure transparency and addressing concerns with all parties present together.” The initial mediation took place on November 20, 2025. The purpose of the mediation was to discuss permanency planning, including the Applicant’s adoption of the Child. Four days later, the Child was removed from the Applicant’s care.

The incident leading to the removal of the Child and closing the foster home

62The foster home investigation was completed by CM, a child protection worker employed by Oxford CAS.

63The parties disagree on the particulars of the domestic incident between the Applicant and KC. Several witnesses testified regarding the incident, including the Applicant, Constable ZS, and CM, and additional particulars were provided in the affidavits of the Applicant and CM, the notes of Constable ZS, the Serious Occurrence Report Summary dated November 24, 2025, and Serious Occurrence Updates dated November 24, 2025, December 1, 4, 9, 10, 16 and 24, 2025, and January 13, 2026.

64In considering the evidence, we gave more weight to the evidence of the Applicant in her oral and affidavit testimony, and the testimony of Constable ZS who relied upon his contemporaneous notes that were presented to the Panel, and who spoke with both the Applicant and KC shortly after the domestic incident. This was subject to caution with respect to statements made by KC to Constable ZS. We also gave weight to the Ontario Provincial Police CPA Referral, dated November 26, 2025, and OPP Undertaking signed by the Applicant on November 25, 2025.

65We gave less weight to the affidavit and testimony of CM who had no direct knowledge of the incident and did not provide any contemporaneous notes upon which she based her testimony. Her affidavit included substantial hearsay including double and triple hearsay. It largely consisted of her conversations with employees of the OPR and KC. The Respondent chose not to call anyone from the OPR or KC. Given the circumstances that gave rise to the end of the relationship between the Applicant and KC, we gave no weight to the untested hearsay evidence of KC. The ability to challenge evidence is important. At CFSRB hearings, a party is expected to call direct evidence, which is subjected to cross-examination, at least insofar as the central issues are concerned. The incident that resulted in the decision to remove the Child is a central issue.

66We also gave less weight to the Serious Occurrence Report Summary, dated November 24, 2025, and various Serious Occurrence Updates, and note the Respondent did not take part in the criminal investigation.

67The incident occurred on or about November 23, 2025, when the Applicant became aware that KC was engaged in an extramarital affair, and an argument ensued between them. At one point, the argument continued between them in the bedroom on the second floor while the children were in the kitchen on the first floor. During the argument, the Applicant broke a photo frame causing glass to shatter, and she attempted to physically remove KC’s wedding ring from her finger. When KC stated the Applicant was hurting her, the Applicant stopped and left the ring on her finger. There were multiple scratches on KC’s hand. The Applicant denies the scratches were caused by her.

68At another point, the Applicant took KC’s phone from her hands and tried to read her messages, and KC tried to wrestle it back. The Applicant ran to her car and KC chased her and slammed the door on the Applicant’s leg causing a laceration. At another point, the Applicant packed luggage to leave the home.

69In her affidavit, the Applicant states, “Later that day, I attended the police station voluntarily to report the allegations and seek guidance. I was interviewed and my spouse was interviewed.” The Applicant was charged with mischief in relation to the broken picture frame, and a no-contact order was put in place. The Applicant was subsequently charged with breach of the no-contact condition. The Applicant states, “Prior to this incident, I had never been charged with any offence” and there is no evidence to the contrary.

70The Ontario Provincial Police CPA Referral states, in part, “There was a physical altercation between the two but police were unable to identify the primary aggressor due to conflicting statements. Both parties sustained injuries. Three child (sic) have already been removed by [redacted] … No violence against the children.” Constable ZS testified the primary aggressor could not be established, he did not attend the foster home at the time of the incident, and his information was based on speaking with the Applicant, KC and an older child in the home.

71On January 8, 2026, the mischief charge against the Applicant was withdrawn. On February 13, 2026, the breach of conditions charge against the Applicant was also withdrawn. KC had also been charged with several offences and those were also withdrawn. The parties are in agreement that there are no pending charges against the Applicant at this time.

72As a direct result of the incident, on November 24, 2025, the OPR staff removed the Child and other foster children in the home, with the exception of the oldest foster child who did not wish to leave, and placed them in respite care while a foster home investigation was being completed by Oxford CAS. The Applicant remained in the home with her biological children and the oldest foster child, while KC left the residence.

73TK states in her affidavit that the Respondent received notification of the removal via an email and a Serious Occurrence Report from the OPR.

74In her affidavit TK indicates that, on December 22, 2025, Oxford CAS completed its investigation. With respect to the Applicant, “the verified concern was coded as a 3.3.H. Emotional Harm, Child Exposure to Partner Violence, Risk of Mental/Emotional Harm or Developmental Condition – Partner Violence.” In a March 18, 2026 letter to the Applicant, the Respondent states that the verification was, “child exposure to partner violence, which pose risk of physical and emotional harm to the children in your family.”

75CM acknowledges in her testimony that she did not have any direct conversations with the Respondent regarding her investigation into the domestic incident.

76The Serious Occurrence Update dated January 13, 2026 states the placing agency (the Respondent) has terminated the placement with the Applicant and KC, and the OPR will be closing the foster home for placement. The next day, in a letter dated January 14, 2026, the Respondent provided formal notice to the Applicant and the OPR that the Child would not be returned to the Applicant’s care, and the Respondent would not move forward with the proposed permanency plan for the Child given the Respondent was “unable to mitigate the reported and verified concerns by Oxford CAS.”

ANALYSIS

77We do not intend to reference all the evidence presented at the hearing. That is not to say that evidence not specifically mentioned in the Decision was not a factor in our decision-making. The Panel heard from 8 witnesses and reviewed over 200 pages of documentary evidence. It is simply not practical to discuss all the evidence in the Decision.

The Respondent’s concerns regarding an incident pre-dating the Child’s removal

78The Respondent indicated it had a concern about the Applicant that pre-dated the incident which precipitated the Child’s removal. The incident concerned a breach by the Applicant of the Respondent’s social media policy, specifically, her posting of a picture of the Child that did not conceal the Child’s face, without the Respondent’s consent.

79The Panel affords little weight to this incident given that it was resolved quickly, and there was no investigation or verification of harm, or risk of harm. Notably, during cross-examination, TK agreed the social media behaviour of the Applicant was not a child safety concern.

The Respondent’s concerns post-removal of the Child

80Since the Respondent’s notification letter to the Applicant in January 2026, after the Child had already been removed from the care of the Applicant, the Respondent’s evidence was there were additional concerns regarding the activities of the Applicant, including her not providing the Child’s Lifebook and allowance savings. In addition, in her affidavit TK states, the Applicant posted on Facebook “photos of the child, including confidential information without explicit permission or knowledge by the Society” in an effort to garner sympathy in the community and seeking funds towards payment of increasing legal fees. The Respondent presented a Serious Occurrence Report Summary of the incident, dated March 16, 2026, and Serious Occurrence Update, dated March 19, 2026.

81Further, it was TK’s evidence that, “As of March 19, 2026, there was a Go Fund Me page created by [the Applicant] called “[the Applicant]’s Legal Fees.”” The Respondent concedes the “post did not include any confidential details, however, it suggested that those who know her can contact her" for more information. There was also an anonymous call and email received by the Respondent regarding the Applicant’s ability to care for the Child and her actions.

82The Panel notes these events occurred after the removal of the Child from the Applicant’s foster home and were not part of the determination to remove the Child.

83In addition, the Panel gave no weight to the information from the anonymous source which was not verified, and the information has not been tested or subject to examination.

84As to the other concerns, the Panel notes that, in her testimony the Applicant advised she is preparing the Child’s Lifebook and needs time to do so, and all the pictures that would be included have been provided to the OPR. She testified the OPR has not asked for the allowance to be returned. The Applicant further testified her Facebook post was private to her family and friends and was not accessible by the public.

THE APPLICABLE TEST

85The CFSRB’s task when reviewing a decision to refuse an adoption application or remove a child from a long-term foster placement was explained by the Divisional Court in Family Youth & Child Services of Muskoka v. DM and CM, supra, as follows:

The language of this section expressly requires the Board to make a determination as to what action is in the best interests of the child. If the decision under review is a refusal of an adoption application, the action relates to the entire adoption application process, which involves a number of distinct steps. Although action must be interpreted in the context of the decision under review (adoption application or removal from placement), it gives the Board broad authority to determine what should be done in the child’s best interests within the confines of the decision/action under review.

86In a s.109 review, the CFSRB must make a determination as to whether the Respondent’s decision to remove the Child from the Applicant’s care is in the Child’s best interests. This requires the CFSRB to consider the governing principles of the Act set out in the Preamble, the purposes of the Act in section 1, and the enumerated best interests factors in subsection 74(3) of the Act.

87The Panel was guided by the overall purposes of the Act, the paramount purpose of which is to promote the best interests, protection and wellbeing of children.

88The Panel also considered the other purposes of the Act as set out in s. 1(2), and particularly the following paragraphs, so long as they were consistent with the best interests, protection and well-being of the Child, that:

2. The least disruptive course of action that is available and is appropriate in a particular case to help a child …should be considered; and

3. Services to children and young persons should be provided in a manner that:

i. respects a child’s or young person’s need for continuity of care and for stable relationships within a family and cultural environment;

ii. takes into account physical, emotional, spiritual, mental and developmental needs and differences among children and young persons; and

iii. takes into account a child’s or young person’s race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, family diversity, disability, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression.

89The Panel is required to make a substantive decision in the best interests of the Child and, to that end, we considered all of the best interest factors as set out in s. 74(3) of the Act as detailed below:

(3) Where a person is directed in this Part to make an order or determination in the best interests of a child, the person shall,

(a) consider the child’s views and wishes, given due weight in accordance with the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;

(b) in the case of a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child, consider the importance, in recognition of the uniqueness of First Nations, Inuit and Métis cultures, heritages and traditions, of preserving the child’s cultural identity and connection to community, in addition to the considerations under clauses (a) and (c); and

(c) consider any other circumstance of the case that the person considers relevant, including,

(i) the child’s physical, mental and emotional needs, and the appropriate care or treatment to meet those needs,

(ii) the child’s physical, mental and emotional level of development,

(iii) the child’s race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, family diversity, disability, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression,

(iv) the child’s cultural and linguistic heritage,

(v) the importance for the child’s development of a positive relationship with a parent and a secure place as a member of a family,

(vi) the child’s relationships and emotional ties to a parent, sibling, relative, other member of the child’s extended family or member of the child’s community,

(vii) the importance of continuity in the child’s care and the possible effect on the child of disruption of that continuity,

(viii) the merits of a plan for the child’s care proposed by a society, including a proposal that the child be placed for adoption or adopted, compared with the merits of the child remaining with or returning to a parent,

(ix) the effects on the child of delay in the disposition of the case,

(x) the risk that the child may suffer harm through being removed from, kept away from, returned to or allowed to remain in the care of a parent, and

(xi) the degree of risk, if any, that justified the finding that the child is in need of protection.

Best Interests of the Child

90The Panel considered all of the factors in s. 74(3) of the Act, and found that the factors discussed below were most relevant to our determination.

(a) The child’s views and wishes, given due weight in accordance with the child’s age and maturity

91In considering what weight to give the Child’s views and wishes, the Panel is mindful of the Child’s young age. However, as held by the Ontario Divisional Court in JE and KE v. Children’s Aid Society of the Niagara Region, 2020 ONSC 4239 at paragraph 49, while the Child’s age is a factor in the determination of the weight to be given to a child’s wishes, it does not obviate the need to consider this factor at all. The CFSRB has held on numerous occasions that a child’s views and wishes may be inferred from evidence of the child’s circumstances.

92There is no evidence before the Panel to suggest the Respondent made any inquiry or considered the Child’s views and wishes regarding her placement when removing the Child.

93In cross-examination, TK acknowledged the Respondent had not conducted an analysis of attachment between the Child and the Applicant or the impact of a removal of the Child from the Applicant’s foster home.

94The evidence is that there is a close and nurturing relationship between the Applicant and the Child. There were no concerns about the care the Child received from the Applicant.

95In her Affidavit the Applicant states, the Child has “consistently looked to me for comfort, reassurance, and support. She would seek me out when upset, tired, or in need of care, and responded positively to my presence.”

96Given the evidence, the Panel finds that the Child would wish to remain with the only parent she had ever known rather than be uprooted and sent to live with strangers. The Panel notes this is in keeping with the caregiver role the Applicant has played in the Child’s life since her birth. The affidavit and oral testimony of the Applicant was persuasive in demonstrating the strong relationship the Child has with the Applicant. However, given the Child’s age and level of maturity, the Panel places little weight on this criterion.

(c)(i) The child’s physical, mental and emotional needs, and the appropriate care or treatment to meet those needs, and (c)(ii) the child’s physical, mental and emotional level of development

97There was no evidence that the Child has any special physical, mental and emotional needs.

98In his affidavit, GP states, the Child “is healthy and developing at an age-appropriate level. There are currently no immediate, developmental, physical or health needs.”

99The Respondent presented no evidence regarding the Child’s current placement, how her physical, mental and emotional needs are being met, or specifics as to the care she is receiving at the placement. Furthermore, there was no evidence as to the Respondent’s long-term plan of care for the Child and how that would meet her physical, mental and emotional needs.

100It was the Applicant’s uncontroverted evidence that, when the Child was in her care, she “actively supported and observed strong developmental progress across all areas. [The Child] surpassed expected milestones, as reflected in the Nipissing District Developmental Screening completed by our [OPR] caseworker and documented in her file.” The Applicant’s evidence was that the Child, “demonstrated advanced development in language, cognitive, physical, and social domains. She was increasingly able to communicate her needs, follow instructions, engage in play, and interact appropriately with others.” The Applicant testified, “As of the last time I saw her in November 2025, she was walking, running, and confidently climbing up and down stairs. She was speaking in short sentences, asking purposeful questions, and consistently naming animals, objects, and familiar people. She was also able to sing songs, count to 10, and recite her ABCs.” She continued, the Child “demonstrated age-appropriate emotional development while in my care.”

101It was evident from her testimony that the Applicant has a good understanding of the Child’s physical, mental, developmental and emotional needs.

102The Respondent did not lead any evidence to suggest that the Applicant was not meeting the Child’s physical, mental, developmental or emotional needs or that it was unlikely she would do so prospectively. In fact, the evidence of GP was that the Child was well cared for in the Applicant’s foster home.

103The panel finds that the Child’s physical, mental and emotional needs were being met by the Applicant. The evidence and testimony by both the Applicant and Respondent show that the Child was healthy and developing at an age-appropriate level with no impediments.

(c)(iii) The child’s race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, family diversity, disability, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression, and (c)(iv) the child’s cultural and linguistic heritage

104The Applicant is not racially matched with the Child. However, SJ testified in her affidavit that the Applicant spoke to her “about the importance of ensuring that [the Child] understands my cultural background and heritage, as a Hindu who practices Hinduism.”

105SJ testified that she did not want the Child placed with a South Asian family and was very supportive that the Child remain in the long-term care of the Applicant. Her evidence was that “Based on my cultural and personal experiences, I also believe it is important that [the Child] be raised in an environment that protects her from stigma and judgment, and that supports her cultural and religious identity in a respectful and healthy way. [The Applicant] has demonstrated understanding, respect, and support throughout this process and I believe she will continue to raise [the Child] in a positive and supportive environment.” She continues, “. . . [the Applicant] has demonstrated understanding and respect for my cultural background . . . I also believe [the Applicant] would support and guide [the Child] in learning about her cultural and religious heritage in a positive and respectful manner.”

106TK testified that, in early 2025, well before the Child was removed, the Respondent performed a search for homes that were more culturally aligned to the Child’s heritage, to provide information to SJ regarding other options for placement. TK further testified SJ did not express interest in securing a home more closely aligned with the Child’s heritage, and instead, advised she would herself continue to share culturally appropriate information with the Child.

107The evidence of SJ was that the Respondent “has continued to pursue kin placements, disregarding the cultural risks this poses to me and (the Child).” She strongly expressed that she did not wish the child to go to kin, fearing consequences and risking never seeing [the Child] again”.

108The Panel considered as a factor in this matter SJ’s testimony that she does not want the Child placed in a South Asian home for reasons that include the social stigma associated of being a child born out of wedlock.

109Based on the foregoing, we find the Child’s race, ancestry, colour, and ethnic origin are recognized, honoured and celebrated in the Applicant’s foster home.

110Given the above, the Panel finds this factor favours the Applicant.

(c)(v) The importance for the child’s development of a positive relationship with a parent and a secure place as a member of a family, and (c)(vi) The child’s relationships and emotional ties to a parent, sibling, relative, other member of the child’s extended family or member of the child’s community

111The Child has effectively been placed in the Applicant’s foster home since birth. The uncontroverted evidence before the Panel is that the Child has a strong attachment to the Applicant. In their closing remarks, the Respondent acknowledged this attachment. From the perspective of the Child, the Applicant is her primary attachment figure.

112The Applicant states in her affidavit that she was the Child’s “primary caregiver throughout the time she lived with us. I was responsible for meeting all [the Child’s] daily needs and ensuring their safety, stability, and well-being.” The Applicant’s evidence was that she believed the Child was securely attached to her, “as demonstrated by her behaviour, comfort level, and reliance on me as her primary caregiver. [The Child] displayed clear indicators of a strong and secure attachment.” The Child “was able to play independently, which reflected a sense of security, but consistently sought me out when she needed help, reassurance, or support. This balance of independence and connection is consistent with secure attachment and demonstrated that she viewed me as a safe and reliable caregiver.” The Applicant also testified, “[the Child] demonstrated attachment to me through consistent, everyday behaviours that showed trust, comfort, and reliance on me as her primary caregiver.”

113The evidence of SJ in her affidavit was, “I do not agree with the decision to remove [the Child] from [the Applicant’s] care. In my view, the removal disrupted a stable, consistent, and positive caregiving relationship that developed between [the Applicant] and [the Child]. [The Applicant] had provided a nurturing and supportive environment, and [the Child] appeared secure and well cared for in her care. It is evident to me that [the Child] formed a strong emotional attachment to [the Applicant], and I believe it is in [the Child’s] best interests to return to and remain in [the Applicant’s] care.”

114During cross-examination, SJ testified that she had directly observed the Child’s attachment to the Applicant during access transitions, during videocalls with the Applicant and the Child, and in pictures of the Applicant and Child together.

115GP made monthly visits to the Applicant’s foster home from October 2024 until the removal of the Child in November 2025. In his affidavit, GP states that during monthly home visits with the Child, caregivers and the OPR resource worker, he observed the Child “to be healthy and well cared for during these visits. [The Child] was observed to be comfortable and have a positive attachment to the caregivers during my visits.” In his affidavit, he also acknowledges that Applicant’s desire to adopt the Child.

116It was also GP’s evidence that, at present, the Child’s needs are being met by the current caregivers and she “has adapted to her new environment and routines over the past several months.” The evidence was that the Child was initially placed in a respite home and then moved to another foster home. It is unclear when this move was effected or how the Child reacted to it. GP’s evidence was that he saw the Child every 30 days. It is not known when he last saw the Child in the context of this additional placement change.

117According to SJ, the Applicant helped her maintain contact with the Child through, among other things, frequent videocalls and pictures of the Child. The evidence was that the relationship between the Applicant and SJ was positive. SJ testified that she has not seen the Child since she was removed from the Applicant’s foster home. It was SJ’s evidence that she did not know where the Child was placed, and that she has not received updates on how the Child is doing.

118In cross-examination, SJ acknowledged that the Respondent has offered her access. However, she has not followed up with the Respondent and provided a variety of reasons for not doing so. The Respondent has ‘paused’ her access.

119From the Child’s perspective, when she was placed in the Applicant’s foster home, she had the benefit of contact with SJ. The Applicant and SJ had an amicable relationship in which the Applicant kept her informed of the Child’s progress. Since her removal from the Applicant’s foster home, there has been no contact between the Child and SJ or between the Child’s current caregiver and SJ. This relationship is a significant one for the Child, including providing a connection to her culture and heritage.

120Subsection 109(5)(b) of the Act requires a Society having care of a child to ensure that the wishes of any parent who is entitled to access to the child are taken into account in the Society’s major decisions concerning the Child. Neither party entered the order placing the Child in extended society care and it is not known if there is any provision for access. The evidence, however, was clear that there was access by SJ and the Child. During cross-examination, TK acknowledged that, at all times, SJ supported the Applicant being the long term caregiver for the Child, and the Respondent understood the Applicant wanted to adopt the Child, hence the reason for setting up the ADR in November 2025.

121There was no evidence the Respondent considered SJ’s wishes when it removed the Child from the Applicant’s foster home. Even if there is no access order and subsection 109(5)(b) does not apply, the Panel would have still found that the loss of contact between the Child and SJ as a consequence of the removal is a loss of a significant relationship for the Child and a factor to be considered.

122Based on the totality of the evidence, we find the Applicant has been a primary caregiver to the Child and a consistent parental figure in the Child’s life since birth. The Child has strong emotional ties to the Applicant. The Applicant is committed to caring for the Child on a long term basis supported by SJ and, up to the date of the Child’s removal from the Applicant’s foster home, supported by the Respondent which was pursuing permanency planning for the Child with the Applicant.

123The Panel placed significant weight to this factor and finds it favours the Applicant.

(c)(vii) The importance of continuity in the child’s care and the possible effect on the child of disruption of that continuity

124As noted earlier, one of the other purposes of the Act at subsection 1(2)2 is that “the least disruptive course of action that is available and appropriate in a particular case to help a child, including the provision of prevention services, early intervention services and community support services, should be considered”.

125In JE and KE v. Children’s Aid Society of the Niagara Region, supra at paragraph 80, the Ontario Divisional Court noted that the CFSRB should not engage in the use of “reverse reasoning” in its analysis of continuity of care “…by focusing on whether the Child could survive or overcome the trauma of being uprooted from her family, rather than focusing on whether there is sufficient reason to impose this trauma and disruption upon her in the first place”.

126The Child has been in the Applicant’s foster home since she was nine days old. The Applicant and KC were the only family the Child has known her entire life.

127The evidence of the Respondent’s witnesses is that its plan was for the Applicant, and her former partner, to care for the Child on a long-term basis. While supportive of the Child remaining in the care of the Applicant and her former partner, SJ had been ambivalent as to whether this should be by way of adoption, custody or something else. As of the date the Child was removed from the Applicant’s foster home, the plan had been for the Child to be adopted by the Applicant and her former partner. In this regard, the parties had attended for a mediation with SJ four days prior to the Child’s removal to discuss long term placement planning. A further mediation was to be scheduled to continue those discussions.

128During cross-examination, TK testified that the purpose of the mediation was to arrive at an understanding of what the Applicant, KC and SJ wanted and make sure they aligned. The end goal was to agree on a plan for permanency such as adoption of the Child with the Applicant and KC.

129The Panel notes the Respondent appears to have acted with little regard of the impact of its actions on the Child in relation to this factor. There is no evidence that the Respondent gave any consideration to the impact on the Child of removal and then withholding all contact between the Child and the Applicant. The evidence of TK is that the Respondent did not conduct an attachment assessment or an assessment of the impact on the Child of removing her from the Applicant’s foster home.

130It was TK’s evidence that, “during an active foster home investigation, when a child has been temporarily removed from the foster home and placed elsewhere, there is not to be any contact between the caregiver and the child. This is to protect the integrity of the investigation, the child, and the caregiver, so that there is no possibility of discussion about the incident in question between the involved parties while the investigation is being completed. The child and caregiver are interviewed separate from each other to give their own account of the incident. In this particular case, we could not interview the child due to their age, so we have to rely on the investigative process to determine if it is safe to return the child.”

131The Child was 25 months old at the time she was removed from the Applicant’s care. As far as the “integrity of the investigation” is concerned, at 25 months of age, the Child was not going to be interviewed for the foster home investigation. As far as waiting for the investigation to conclude to determine if it was safe to return the Child, whether or not the Child was to be returned, this does not explain the reason for not maintaining at least some measure of continuity for the Child by providing her with contact with the Applicant, her primary attachment figure.

132As previously stated, SJ testified in her affidavit, “I believed, and continue to believe, that adoption by [the Applicant], and continuing to be [the Child’s] primary caregiver, would be in [the Child’s] best interests, as it would provide permanence and stability in a familiar and nurturing environment.” She continues, “I advised [the Respondent] of my support for [the Applicant] adopting [the Child]. I shared my observations with [the Respondent], highlighting the strong and positive relationship between [the Applicant] and [the Child], as well as the benefits of maintaining a permanent placement with [the Applicant] for [the Child’s] overall well-being.” We accept and place weight on this testimony.

133The evidence before us is that the Child has had at least two placements since her removal from the Applicant’s foster home. There is no evidence that the plan is for the Child to remain in her current placement. No evidence was led by the Respondent as to its plan of care for the Child moving forward.

134The Panel finds that maintaining continuity for the Child is a significant factor in the determination of this matter.

(c)(viii) The merits of plans for the child’s care proposed by a Society

135There was no evidence as to the Respondent’s plan of care for the Child and, as such, the Panel can not make any findings on this factor.

(c)(ix) The risk that the child may suffer harm through being removed from, kept away from, returned to or allowed to remain in the care of a parent

136The Respondent takes the position that the Child is at risk of harm in the Applicant’s care based on the November 23, 2025 altercation between the Applicant and her former partner (“the incident”). Oxford CAS verified child exposure to partner violence against the Applicant.

137The evidence is that the incident that resulted in the OPR removing the Child from the foster home was an isolated incident. There was no evidence of a prior history of severe conflict between the Applicant and KC, or of the Applicant having anger management issues.

138Prior to the incident, the only other negative reports in the file against the Applicant and KC involved their posting a photograph of the Child on social media. These concerns were resolved quickly and did not result in an investigation or verification by the Respondent.

139The evidence with respect to the Child’s exposure to the incident was minimal other than that the Child was in the foster home. An older foster child in the home was interviewed and denied there was any physical violence. That child refused to leave and remains in the Applicant’s care. The Applicant and KC separated immediately following the incident leading to removal, and do not have contact with each other such that the risk of a similar incident is minor. This, in and of itself, is a mitigating factor with respect to risk.

140During cross-examination, when asked by the Applicant’s counsel what efforts the Respondent made to mitigate any concerns, TK testified that the Respondent wanted to discuss this with the OPR, but it did not provide any information on how it could mitigate concerns. The Panel finds that the Respondent did not make serious effort to determine if its concerns could be mitigated.

141TK acknowledged in her testimony she did not have any direct conversations with Oxford CAS regarding its investigation into the November 2025 incident.

142In cross-examination, TK testified that she relied on the assessment of the OPR that the concerns could not be mitigated. As the Applicant’s foster home was not an internal foster home, she testified that Respondent cannot work with the Applicant directly, and instead it was the role of the OPR to determine whether the concerns could be mitigated and to determine if they can continue with the foster placement. This suggests a misunderstanding of the roles and responsibilities of a child protection agency as compared with an OPR. The Child was not in the care of the OPR. She was, and remains, in the care of the Respondent. It is the responsibility of the Respondent to assess the needs of children in its care and to ensure they are in placements that accord with their best interests, and that children and their caregivers are receiving services they require.

143TK acknowledged the Respondent did not assess the Applicant as a sole caregiver and, as previously noted, there was no information on the impact on the Child of removal from her primary caregiver.

144During cross-examination, TK testified that the Respondent did not consider allowing the Child to remain in the home nor did it consider the impact the removal would have on the Child because the OPR had already made the decision to put the Child in respite care until the investigation was completed. She did not consider other options. As previously stated, the Child’s placement was a decision to be made by the Respondent not its OPR. There was no evidence of any discussion by the Respondent with the OPR requesting the Child’s return to the Applicant’s foster home and of the OPR refusing that request.

145The Applicant has proactively taken steps to address the Respondent’s concerns arising from the November 2025 incident. In this regard, the Applicant presented a stability plan to CM on December 3, 2025, during Oxford CAS’s investigation. The stability plan outlined the steps the Applicant is taking to ensure ongoing safety, emotional regulation, consistency and healthy functioning within her home. These measures included continuing to attend counseling and participating in an anger management program.

146The Applicant acknowledged the domestic incident within the home created concerns regarding her emotional regulation and decision-making under stress. She expressed her commitment to ongoing therapy and has already completed 22 sessions focused on trauma, emotional regulation, communication skills and relationship patterns, has completed anger management programming, participated in an Indigenous healing circle and working with Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT) strategies to bolster her ability to manage stress, regulate emotions and respond effectively to challenging situations. It was the Applicant’s evidence that there is no conflict in the home given her separation from KC.

147There is no history of violence, aggression or unsafe behaviour by the Applicant towards the Child or towards any other person, leaving aside the incident.

148The Applicant testified as to her willingness to comply with any additional conditions or recommendations from the Respondent, CFRSB or the court.

149The Applicant’s therapist since March 10, 2024, LS, testified that the Applicant was “highly motivated, insightful and makes appropriate and meaningful use of therapy. She has consistently complied with therapeutic recommendations. [The Applicant] actively participates in treatment planning and demonstrates sound judgment in applying therapeutic strategies”.

150It is not disputed by the Respondent that it had no concerns about the Applicant’s care of the Child prior to the November 2025 incident. Indeed, and as noted above, the Respondent intended to implement a long-term placement of the Child with the Applicant, likely by way of adoption.

151During the course of the Respondent’s case, it raised other issues it had with the Applicant’s breach of its policies including, for example, with respect to her posting a photograph of the Child on a social media account. The Respondent acknowledged that these issues were not safety issues, and they were all addressed with the Applicant and resolved. The Respondent suggested that the Applicant’s circumstances had changed in that she would be a sole caregiver rather than one of two parents caring for the Child. There was no evidence presented that suggested the Applicant was incapable of caring for the Child without a partner.

152During cross-examination, GP testified that during his monthly visits he observed the Child was comfortable, healthy and attached to the Applicant. He testified he is not aware of any harm to the Child as a result of the domestic incident, and that it was hard to say if the Child’s situation has improved since removal as she has always been a healthy child and she has developed age appropriately. He testified he did not recommend the removal, and he is not aware of any efforts by the Respondent to mitigate its concerns in relation to the November 2025 incident. GP, the child protection worker with the most contact with the Child, was not consulted about her removal from the Applicant’s foster home.

153Having regard to the totality of the evidence, the Panel concludes that the risk that the Child may suffer harm through being kept away from the Applicant is greater than her being returned to the Applicant’s foster home.

CONCLUSION

154Having considered the best interests of the Child in this matter, the Panel finds that it is in the Child’s best interests to be returned to the care of the Applicant.

155In terms of the Child’s physical, mental, and emotional needs, we find that these needs can be best met through a return to the Applicant’s care, and through preserving the Child’s over two-year attachment to the Applicant. The Panel notes the Applicant is committed to caring for the Child on a long-term basis and wishes to adopt the Child with the support of SJ.

156The Applicant and Child are not racially matched however, we find that the Applicant, with the assistance of SJ, will support the Child’s racial and cultural identity.

157The Panel gives significant weight to the importance of the Child developing a positive relationship with a parent and a secure place as a member of a family. The Panel finds these needs are best met through the Child’s return to the Applicant’s care.

158The Panel also places significant weight on the importance of maintaining continuity in the Child’s care.

159The Panel finds that the risks to the Child of confirming her removal from the Applicant’s care exceed any risk of her suffering harm if returned to the Applicant’s care.

160Based on the totality of the evidence, the CFSRB finds that it is in the Child’s best interests to be returned to the Applicant’s care.

ORDER

161The Respondent’s decision to remove the Child from her foster placement with the Applicant is rescinded.

162The Respondent shall take all necessary steps to complete whatever processes may be required, be it with the OPR or otherwise, to effect a return of the Child to the Applicant’s care.

163Pending the Child’s return to the Applicant’s care, the Respondent shall immediately arrange for meaningful access for the Child with the Applicant.

164The CFRSB will remain seized with respect to the implementation of this order.

CONFIDENTIALITY ORDER

165Pursuant to Rules 9.3 and 9.4 of the CFSRB’s Rules of Procedure, parties and their representatives must not use, share, discuss or disclose any CFSRB documents or decisions, or any other documents or information provided or used in this Application, with anyone including through the media or online. The CFSRB prohibits the use of any of this information for any purpose outside of the CFSRB’s proceedings, except with an order of the Court or the CFSRB, as appropriate.

Donna Wowk

Donna Wowk Vice-Chair

Tracy Foster

Tracy Foster Adjudicator

Rupinder Hans

Rupinder Hans Vice-Chair

Footnotes

1. 1GM v. KM v. Child and Family Services of Grand Erie, 2024 CFSRB 97 / NC v. Kunuwanimano Child and Family Services, 2018 CFSRB 28
2. 22010 ONSC 6018 at paragraph 21
3. 3Paragraph 19
4. 4Paragraph 22
5. 5Paragraph 24
6. 6Paragraph 27
7. 7KF and RF v. Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton and LS, AS, KM and CM, 2018 CFSRB 10; PM and LM v. Highland Shores Children’s Aid Society, 2014 CFSRB 45; Applicants v. Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton; RI and GI v. Brant Family and Children’s Services, 2021 CFSRB 81
8. 8Applicants v. Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton, 2014 CFSRB 48; GM and KM v. Child and Family Services of Grand Erie, 2024 CFSRB 97
9. 9Family, Youth & Child Services of Muskoka v. D.M. and C.M., supra, paragraphs 44-45