Tammy Law

The Applicant Mother brought a motion to set aside a separation agreement, alleging it was signed under duress and without adequate financial disclosure from the Respondent Father.

She also sought interim child and spousal support, and further disclosure.

The court found triable issues regarding the agreement's validity under the Miglin analysis, particularly concerning the conditions of negotiation and the Respondent Father's lack of financial disclosure.

The court granted interim child and spousal support based on an imputed income of $150,000 for the Respondent Father and ordered him to provide outstanding disclosure.

The Applicant Mother was deemed wholly successful on the motion.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal in a child protection case.

The appellant, T.M., sought partial indemnity costs against the individual respondents (parents and aunt) and the Oneida Nation of the Thames.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario, guided by the Family Law Rules, declined to award costs against the individual respondents but found it appropriate to order costs against the Oneida Nation.

The court noted that the Oneida Nation's costs submissions contained unsworn, unproven, and disrespectful statements attacking the appellant's character, and that the appellant had to bring a contested motion for continued access pending appeal.

The court ordered the Oneida Nation to pay $10,000 in costs to the appellant.

This protection application concerned three children whose mother was murdered.

The Children's Aid Society sought a finding that the children were in need of protection and final custody to their maternal aunt, with whom they had resided since their mother's death.

The respondent father (MH) of two of the children sought custody of his daughters.

The court found the children in need of protection due to physical harm (dental neglect), risk of physical harm (neglect of immunizations, exposure to domestic violence), risk of emotional harm (domestic violence, housing instability, risk of removal from long-term caregiver), and inadequate provision for care after the mother's death.

The court dismissed the father's bid for custody, finding his plan not viable and his credibility lacking, and granted final custody of all three children to the maternal aunt, emphasizing the children's best interests, continuity of care, and the aunt's demonstrated ability to meet their needs.

The appellant father (B.K.) appealed a final order from the Ontario Court of Justice that placed his children in the care and custody of the respondent mother (D.A.) subject to the Society's supervision.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's findings regarding who had pre-intervention charge of the children and the children's true wishes, and alleged misconduct by the Society and the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL).

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings of fact and mixed fact and law, emphasizing the high degree of deference owed to trial judges in child protection proceedings.

The court also dismissed the appellant's motion to admit fresh evidence, finding it did not meet the required standard of being highly relevant and decisive to the children's best interests.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto (CAS) sought leave to withdraw its protection application concerning three children (G., Y., L.) after two years of litigation.

The father (M.H.) opposed the withdrawal, citing ongoing protection concerns related to the maternal aunt's (L.M.) care and alleged parental alienation.

The maternal aunt supported the withdrawal, having initiated a private Children's Law Reform Act (CLRA) application for sole decision-making responsibility.

The court dismissed the CAS's motion to withdraw, finding serious ongoing protection concerns, potential prejudice to the father and children in a private domestic proceeding, and that withdrawal would usurp the court's function to determine if the children are in need of protection.

This is a costs decision in a child protection proceeding under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The respondent mother and father sought costs of $5,819.50 against the Catholic Children's Aid Society following a motion for disclosure of case notes from a meeting between society counsel, society staff, and doctors from the Hospital for Sick Children.

The society initially claimed litigation privilege over the notes but waived privilege prior to the hearing, rendering the motion moot.

The court dismissed the costs claim, finding that the society acted reasonably in claiming privilege, provided appropriate disclosure to the parents through a subsequent meeting with medical personnel, and that the parents' counsel became unnecessarily fixated on the privileged meeting and engaged in inappropriate conduct toward society counsel.

The applicant father brought a motion for an uncontested trial and divorce after the respondent mother abducted their child to South Korea without notice or consent.

The court granted the applicant sole custody of the child, ordered the respondent to pay child support based on imputed income, issued restraining orders preventing the respondent from communicating directly with the child or approaching the applicant's residence or the child's school, and granted the divorce.

Due to the respondent's unreasonable conduct and bad faith, the court awarded the applicant full recovery costs.

The mother brought an urgent motion seeking in-person access to her infant son, who was placed in the care of the maternal grandparents following serious non-accidental injuries sustained while in parental care.

The child was hospitalized with traumatic brain injuries, including subdural hemorrhage, retinal hemorrhage, and bruising.

The society opposed the motion, seeking to maintain virtual-only access due to COVID-19 pandemic concerns, particularly given the child's medical vulnerability.

The court dismissed the mother's motion and upheld the suspension of in-person access, finding that the child's fragile medical condition and the evolving pandemic risks outweighed the benefits of face-to-face contact at that time.

The appellant mother, A.T., brought a motion to extend the time for filing an appeal against protection orders issued by the trial judge concerning her two children, A.T-W. and N.T. The trial judge had found the children in need of protection due to the mother's unfounded allegations of sexual abuse, mental health issues, and breaches of a supervision order, placing them with their respective fathers.

The motion judge applied the four-factor test for extending time for appeal: reasonable explanation for delay, prejudice to the respondent, merits of the appeal, and the justice of the case, with the children's best interests being paramount.

While the mother provided a reasonable explanation for the delay as a self-represented litigant dealing with a two-part judgment, the court found the appeal lacked merit and that allowing it would cause prejudice to the respondents and be contrary to the children's best interests by prolonging litigation.

The motion to extend time was dismissed.

This is a child protection proceeding concerning two children.

The court addressed trial readiness issues and the appointment of amicus curiae for the unrepresented mother.

The mother had cycled through three lawyers and was unable to retain counsel despite having a legal aid certificate.

The court appointed amicus to assist in presenting the mother's case at trial, ensuring the proceedings could move forward without further delays and that the children's interests would be protected through a fair and organized trial process.

A temporary care and custody motion under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 concerning a two-month-old infant.

The Children's Aid Society sought to maintain the child in its care, citing concerns about the parents' mental health, substance misuse, and medication non-compliance.

The parents proposed a plan for the child to be placed in the joint care and custody of the mother and maternal grandmother in Toronto, with various terms and conditions.

The court found the parents' plan adequate to mitigate identified risks and ordered the child's return to the parents' care with supervision, rejecting the Society's reliance on unreliable drug testing evidence and emphasizing the importance of family reunification principles under the legislation.

This appeal addressed habitual residence under Article 3 of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction after a parent retained children in Canada beyond a time-limited consent period.

The Court adopted a hybrid, multi-factor approach that evaluates all relevant circumstances, including but not limited to parental intent and the child's links to each state.

The Court also endorsed a non-technical approach to Article 13(2), requiring proof of sufficient maturity and a genuine objection before discretion is exercised.

Although the matter was moot, the appeal was resolved to clarify national law and emphasize expeditious handling of return proceedings.

A temporary care and custody motion under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act concerning child N.H., whose twin sibling died from inflicted injuries.

The Children's Aid Society sought placement of the child with the paternal great-aunt subject to supervision.

The parents sought return of the child to their care or alternatively placement with the paternal uncle with parental residence in that home.

The court found credible and trustworthy evidence of inflicted trauma to both children and determined that the child could not be returned to parental care even with supervision.

The court ordered the child remain in the temporary care and custody of the paternal great-aunt with supervised access to the parents at the society's discretion.

The appellant, a father in child protection proceedings, appealed a Superior Court decision that upheld an Ontario Court of Justice order varying his access to children from unsupervised to supervised pending trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the Superior Court order was interlocutory in nature, dealing with interim access pending trial, and therefore the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The court declined to transfer the matter to the Divisional Court, finding that section 19(4) of the Courts of Justice Act precluded such an appeal.

The appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction.

This is a costs decision following a child protection trial.

The respondent parents sought costs against the Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto following a trial in which the court granted an order substantially in favour of the parents.

The father had a prior conviction for sexual assault and was diagnosed with pedohebephilia.

The Society sought an order removing the children from the home and restricting the father's contact to supervised access by someone other than the mother.

The parents sought an order permitting the father to remain in the home with supervised contact, based on expert evidence.

The court granted the parents' order with limited exceptions.

The parents claimed costs totalling approximately $24,700 each, arguing the Society acted unreasonably and unfairly in its conduct of the case.

The court dismissed the costs claim, finding that although the Society had made certain errors in judgment and failed to adequately reassess its position, the case involved complex expert evidence on which reasonable disagreement was possible, and the Society did not act in a manner that would be perceived as patently unfair or indefensible.

This is a child protection case under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act involving two children whose father, G.C., is a convicted child sexual offender with diagnoses of pedohebephilia and exhibitionism.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society sought an order removing the father from the home with only supervised access outside the home.

The parents sought to continue the existing arrangement where the father resides in the home during daytime hours but sleeps elsewhere at night, with the mother providing supervision.

The court found that the children could be adequately protected while remaining in an intact family unit with appropriate supervisory conditions, rejecting the Society's more restrictive proposal as unnecessarily disruptive to the children's best interests.

A nine-day trial concerning a child protection application under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto sought a finding that a three-year-old child was in need of protection and sought a disposition of crown wardship without access for purposes of adoption.

The father opposed this and sought placement of the child in his care, subject to a supervision order.

The mother supported the father's plan.

The court found the child was in need of protection under section 37(2)(b) of the Act based on the mother's past parenting history, her current level of functioning following a severe aneurysm, the father's insistence on parenting with the mother, and the father's failure to cooperate with the child welfare agency.

The court ordered crown wardship without access, finding that a supervision order would be ineffective given the father's pattern of non-compliance, dishonesty, and inability to work cooperatively with professionals regarding the child's complex medical and developmental needs, including autism.

The applicant sought an order for state-funded counsel under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 7, for a child protection trial where the Children's Aid Society sought a supervision order.

The applicant's section 7 rights to security of person were engaged because the proposed supervision order would significantly restrict her parental role, force her to become a single parent, and subject her family to ongoing state intrusion.

The court found the applicant was indigent and ordered the state to provide counsel, establishing that section 7 protections extend beyond cases involving loss of custody to include highly intrusive supervision orders.

This is a costs decision in a child protection matter under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act.

The mother sought trial costs of $21,919.39 against the Catholic Children's Aid Society.

The court found that while the society's overall conduct did not warrant a full costs award, the society engaged in serious unfair dealing by injecting unsubstantiated risk factors (alcohol and drug abuse, mental illness) into its risk assessment documents regarding the mother.

The court awarded partial costs of $5,000 to the mother, finding that this misrepresentation constituted a "smearing" of the parent that violated principles of fair dealing required under child protection law.

The court emphasized that child protection agencies must maintain proportionate intervention, provide fair disclosure, and avoid manipulating risk calibration through false information.

A temporary care and custody motion concerning a three-month-old child apprehended at birth due to security concerns at the hospital involving the mother's family and the mother's own developmental disabilities.

The mother sought return of the child to her care under a supervision order, with an alternate plan for placement with her godmother.

The court dismissed the mother's primary plan, finding that her functional deficits—including illiteracy, short-term memory challenges, and poor judgment in personal relationships—combined with her demonstrated inability to cooperate with the child protection agency, meant that no supervision order could adequately protect the child from risk of harm.

The court granted the mother's alternate plan, placing the child in the temporary care and custody of the godmother under a supervision order with specified terms and conditions.