Manjusha B. Pawagi

An Indigenous child came into the care of a child protection agency shortly after birth due to maternal drug addiction and prenatal substance exposure.

The agency sought an extension of statutory timelines under section 122(5) of the provincial Child, Youth and Family Services Act to maintain the child in interim care for an additional three months beyond the one-year limit applicable to children under six.

The extension was sought to allow the child to remain in a placement within the child's First Nation community on Christian Island, thereby facilitating the development of relationships with family and community members and increasing the likelihood of a permanent kinship or community-based placement.

The court granted the extension, applying the enhanced best interests test under the federal An Act Respecting First Nations, Inuit and Metis Children, Youth and Families.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a motion seeking a temporary order placing two children (ages 7 and 12) in the mother's care subject to society supervision, due to substantial school absenteeism over three years.

The motion proceeded on consent after the mother ensured consistent school attendance.

The court granted the order with conditions for both parents and the society, emphasizing that educational neglect is a serious child protection concern that societies must address promptly.

The applicant father sought the return of the parties' child to Portugal under the Hague Convention, alleging wrongful removal by the respondent mother.

The child was born in Portugal in 2020 and removed to Canada by the mother in June 2022.

The court found that while the child's habitual residence was Portugal, the father did not have custody rights under Portuguese law that would render the removal wrongful.

Even if the removal were wrongful, the court found two exceptions to mandatory return applied: the father acquiesced to the child remaining in Canada, and there was a grave risk of harm to the child if returned to Portugal due to the father's pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour against the mother.

The father's application was dismissed.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a summary judgment motion.

The respondent mother, F.G., sought to retract her consent to a final custody order placing her 21-month-old son with the maternal grandmother, D.N., which had been made pursuant to an agreed statement of facts.

The court denied the mother's request to retract consent, finding that her arguments did not meet the criteria under Rule 25(19) of the Family Law Rules for setting aside an order, and the alleged "new evidence" was not a valid ground.

The court also found that the Society met the test for summary judgment under Rule 16(6) of the Family Law Rules, as there was no genuine issue for trial regarding disposition and access.

The final order for custody with the maternal grandmother remained in effect, and the final order regarding access to the mother was granted as sought by the Society.

The father brought a motion seeking a temporary change in the primary residence of his two children (ages 8 and 10) from the mother to himself.

This was based on disclosures made by the children to their counsel regarding the mother's verbal abuse and excessive punishment.

The mother opposed the motion and sought the children's immediate return.

The court dismissed the father's motion, finding that the disclosures, while concerning, did not amount to "compelling circumstances" to justify disturbing the six-year status quo.

The court ordered the children to resume primary residence with the mother, with protective terms regarding parental conduct and discipline.

This motion, brought by Wahgoshig First Nation and supported by Native Child and Family Services of Toronto (NCFS), sought to transfer a child protection proceeding from Toronto to Timmins.

The child, nearly 9 years old, had resided in Wahgoshig First Nation for 8 years under a Customary Care Agreement, which was recently terminated.

Kunuwanimano Child & Family Services (Kunu) opposed the transfer, arguing Toronto was the proper venue and raising concerns about service capacity.

The court found a preponderance of convenience favored Timmins, given the child's long-term residence, connections, and the location of current protection concerns.

Despite NCFS initially lacking territorial jurisdiction to file in Toronto, the court, relying on the Family Law Rules, ordered the transfer to Timmins to ensure the child's best interests and avoid legal limbo.

This protection application concerned three children whose mother was murdered.

The Children's Aid Society sought a finding that the children were in need of protection and final custody to their maternal aunt, with whom they had resided since their mother's death.

The respondent father (MH) of two of the children sought custody of his daughters.

The court found the children in need of protection due to physical harm (dental neglect), risk of physical harm (neglect of immunizations, exposure to domestic violence), risk of emotional harm (domestic violence, housing instability, risk of removal from long-term caregiver), and inadequate provision for care after the mother's death.

The court dismissed the father's bid for custody, finding his plan not viable and his credibility lacking, and granted final custody of all three children to the maternal aunt, emphasizing the children's best interests, continuity of care, and the aunt's demonstrated ability to meet their needs.

This is a sentencing ruling following a finding that the Applicant father was in contempt for failing to facilitate access between the parties' 11-year-old son and the Respondent mother.

The court considered the principles of contempt sentencing in family law, aiming for remedial and punitive outcomes while prioritizing the child's best interests.

The court ordered make-up access for the child with the Respondent mother, to continue until in-person school classes resume, and a monetary penalty of $5,000.00, along with costs.

The court balanced the need to enforce court orders and punish contempt against the child's stability, particularly regarding schooling.

The respondent brought a motion to change a 2007 child support order, seeking to terminate support for his 30-year-old intellectually disabled son and rescind all arrears.

The applicant opposed, seeking ongoing support and fixed arrears.

The court found the son was unable to withdraw from parental charge due to disability, entitling him to ongoing support under the amended Family Law Act.

The court determined the son's monthly needs, ordering the parents to contribute equally.

Arrears were significantly reduced due to Family Responsibility Office (FRO) inaccuracies and the applicant's delay in seeking Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) benefits, but not fully rescinded.

The applicant father sought the return of his six-year-old daughter to Norway pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction after the respondent mother removed the child from Norway to Canada in February 2017 without his consent.

The respondent mother argued that the Convention did not apply because the child's habitual residence was Canada, not Norway, and that the father had no custodial rights.

Alternatively, she argued that exceptions to the Convention applied based on grave risk of harm and the child's objection to return.

The court found that the child's habitual residence was Norway, that the father had custodial rights under Norwegian law, and that the removal was wrongful.

The court rejected both exceptions, finding that the mother's evidence of grave risk of harm was insufficient and that the child's objections were not based on substantial reasons but rather on parental influence and preference for her current life.

The court ordered the child's return to Norway.

The applicant father sought to assume jurisdiction in Ontario to change custody of the parties' nine-year-old daughter from the respondent mother to himself, and to find the mother in contempt for failing to comply with access orders.

The child had been living with the mother in Florida for three years pursuant to a consent order, but the mother had substantially failed to provide the ordered access to the father in Ontario.

The father obtained an emergency pick-up order in Florida and brought the child to Ontario.

The court declined to assume jurisdiction, finding that Florida was the child's habitual residence and that it would be more appropriate for the Florida court to exercise jurisdiction to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.

However, the court made an interim order requiring the child's return to Florida conditional on the mother's undertakings regarding the child's safety and access to the father.

The applicant mother sought recognition of a Kuwaiti custody order and return of the parties' seven-year-old son to her care in Kuwait.

The respondent father opposed recognition, arguing that Kuwaiti law did not require consideration of the child's best interests and that the child's habitual residence had changed to Ontario.

The court recognized the Kuwaiti custody order, finding the respondent father failed to prove grounds for non-recognition.

The court also rejected arguments that habitual residence had changed or that serious harm would result from return, applying the hybrid approach to habitual residence and finding the child's habitual residence remained Kuwait.

This case concerns the proper interpretation of "access at the discretion of the society" orders under the Child and Family Services Act.

The Children's Aid Society moved a child from one family friend's care to another under the guise of an "extended access visit" without prior court authorization or notice to the child's counsel.

The court granted the motion to vary the interim supervision order but expressed significant concerns about the society's interpretation of discretionary access orders.

The judgment provides guidance that "extended access visits" which constitute a change in placement require prior judicial authorization and cannot be unilaterally implemented by the society, even when access is left to the society's discretion.

In this child protection matter under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act, the Children's Aid Society sought a protection finding on summary judgment based on drug abuse concerns at the time of apprehension two years prior, while seeking only an order for the child to remain with the respondent mother with no supervision order.

The respondent mother opposed the summary judgment motion and sought dismissal of the application.

The court addressed the critical issue of whether the timing for determining if a child is in need of protection is at the date of apprehension or at the date of the hearing.

The court rejected the restrictive approach limiting consideration to the hearing date and held that courts have discretion to consider circumstances at the apprehension date, the hearing date, or other dates depending on circumstances.

Both summary judgment motions were dismissed as there remained a genuine issue for trial.