Lauren Speers

The Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a motion to vary an existing access order, seeking unsupervised access for V.F. with his children S.F. and L.F. The motion was supported by V.F. and the mother (T.M.) but opposed by W.O. (father of other children with T.M.) and the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

The court reviewed expert assessments regarding V.F.'s risk as a convicted child pornography offender and the mother's protective capacity.

The motion was dismissed, as the court found the Society had not met its onus to demonstrate that unsupervised access was in the children's best interests, citing concerns about the untested nature of the evidence, inconsistencies in V.F.'s disclosures, and the mother's lack of insight into the risks.

A motion by the respondent father (VF) to split a child protection status review application into two separate cases was dismissed.

The application involved three children with two different fathers and a common mother.

VF sought to separate the case involving his child from the case involving the other father's children, citing privacy concerns regarding his criminal history involving child pornography convictions.

The court found that splitting the cases would not result in fairness to all parties, would not protect the interests of all children, and would not save time and expense.

The central issue of VF's criminal convictions, rehabilitation, and ongoing risk to all children required unified proceedings.

A costs decision arising from a motion for custody and return of a child.

The applicant (mother) sought custody of five children and the return of her 14-year-old son who had been removed from Toronto to Sudbury by the respondent (father) without consent or court order.

After multiple adjournments and temporary consent orders, the mother was successful on the motion, obtaining custody of all children including the son.

The court awarded costs to the mother on a full recovery basis, finding the father's conduct unreasonable though not rising to bad faith, and that the mother's offer to settle was as good as the final order.

This is a motion to change a 2012 consent custody and child support order.

The mother sought sole custody of the minor child (Daineil, age 13) citing parental conflict and inability to communicate.

The father sought sole custody or alternatively joint custody with shared parenting arrangements.

The court found a material change in circumstances based on heightened parental conflict and inability to make joint decisions.

The court awarded sole custody to the mother while maintaining the father's access on alternating weekends.

Regarding child support, the court found that the 2012 order was based on imputed income of $24,000 to the father.

The court determined that Dainique ceased being a dependant in September 2013, Dante in July 2016, and that DJ remained a dependant despite moving to the father's care in February 2015.

The court declined to award retroactive child support for DJ or to order repayment of overpayments, but ordered prospective support commencing January 1, 2019 with a net set-off under section 8 of the Guidelines.

The court imposed detailed communication protocols between the parents regarding Daineil's care.

In a child protection proceeding, the court determined motions regarding medical decision-making authority and school placement for a child with ADHD and learning disabilities.

The mother sought to retain decision-making authority based on her historical involvement in medical decisions, while the father sought authority to make medical decisions, particularly regarding ADHD medication (Biphentin).

The court found both parents had acted contrary to the child's best interests by allowing parental conflict to cloud their judgment.

The court ordered both parents to jointly consult with an ADHD specialist and follow that specialist's recommendations.

The child was to remain in his current school pending further order.

The issue of which parent should have final medical decision-making authority was not determined on the motion but was to be resolved through further court process if the parties could not agree.

This case concerns the proper interpretation of "access at the discretion of the society" orders under the Child and Family Services Act.

The Children's Aid Society moved a child from one family friend's care to another under the guise of an "extended access visit" without prior court authorization or notice to the child's counsel.

The court granted the motion to vary the interim supervision order but expressed significant concerns about the society's interpretation of discretionary access orders.

The judgment provides guidance that "extended access visits" which constitute a change in placement require prior judicial authorization and cannot be unilaterally implemented by the society, even when access is left to the society's discretion.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a motion to transfer a child protection case involving four children to Native Child and Family Services (NCFS) based on the grandmother's claim of Metis heritage.

The court found that while it had implied jurisdiction to order such a transfer to accomplish the statutory purpose of recognizing Aboriginal heritage in child protection proceedings, the motion was dismissed because the transfer would cause unacceptable delay and disruption at an advanced stage of the case.

The court treated the children as Aboriginal for purposes of the proceeding and noted that the Society could still provide culturally appropriate services while retaining the case.

The moving party father brought a motion to change a final joint custody order, seeking sole custody of the parties' seven-year-old child.

The father alleged that the mother used physical discipline and that the child required more stability due to an ADHD diagnosis.

The court found no material change in circumstances that would warrant altering the existing parenting arrangement.

Evidence from the Office of the Children's Lawyer and collaterals indicated the child's behaviour and emotional well-being had improved significantly since his ADHD diagnosis and medication.

The motion to change was dismissed, and the father was ordered to pay costs of $7,000.

Unmarried parents of a child born in Mexico brought the child to Chicago, Illinois in June 2015.

The mother left with the child in July 2015 and entered Canada, claiming she was fleeing an abusive relationship.

The father applied under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction for the child's return to Illinois.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the child had no habitual residence because the mother did not have a settled intention to reside in Illinois when she entered the United States.

Additionally, even if Illinois were the habitual residence, the removal was not wrongful because the father had no custody rights under Illinois law at the time of removal, and the emergency protection order he obtained was issued after the child had already entered Canada.

Following earlier parenting motion proceedings, the respondent sought recovery of litigation costs.

The court considered Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and the presumption that a successful party is entitled to costs.

The judge found the opposing party had acted unreasonably in the litigation, including denying access, failing to comply with court orders, and causing repeated court attendances.

The court determined that substantial indemnity costs were appropriate and awarded a reduced amount after reviewing the bill of costs and accounting for a prior “no costs” order.

The respondent father moved to set aside or vary a warrant of committal issued for non-payment of child support arrears of $170,505, and a final default order.

The respondent did not attend the committal hearing on September 24, 2012, despite having notice.

The court considered whether the motion should be granted under Rule 25(19) of the Family Law Rules or Rule 19.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that while the respondent failed to meet all three prongs of the traditional test for setting aside a default order, the interests of justice favoured varying the committal order to reflect time served, particularly given serious doubts about the validity of the underlying support order that was the subject of enforcement.

A summary judgment motion brought by the Children's Aid Society seeking a finding that two young children were in need of protection and an order making them Crown wards without access for the purpose of adoption.

The mother opposed the finding but agreed to Crown wardship with access.

The court found that the children were in need of protection due to exposure to domestic violence and parental substance abuse.

The court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial.

The children were made Crown wards without access, as the mother failed to meet the statutory test for access to Crown wards under section 59(2.1) of the Child and Family Services Act.