Alan Honner

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking retroactive and ongoing spousal and child support, and an adjournment due to alleged misleading financial disclosure by the respondent father.

The respondent opposed the adjournment and argued the motion's scope was limited to retroactive spousal support.

The court dismissed the adjournment request, finding no dishonesty by the father regarding his financial disclosure.

The court also limited the motion's scope to retroactive spousal support, finding the broader claims unsuitable for a one-hour motion.

Applying the DBS framework for retroactive support, the court found that three of four factors did not favour the applicant, particularly regarding her delay in seeking support and insufficient efforts towards self-sufficiency.

Consequently, the claim for retroactive spousal support was dismissed.

The court did order ongoing and retroactive child support based on the father's agreement.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

The respondent brought a motion for the sale of the matrimonial home.

The applicant opposed, seeking to buy out the respondent's share and arguing that financial disclosure was delayed.

The court found that the respondent's pleading was sufficient to invoke the Partition Act.

While acknowledging the respondent's prima facie right to sale, the court delayed the sale to allow the applicant time to secure financing for a buyout, given the recent receipt of financial disclosure and the children's best interests.

If financing is not secured by a set date, the home must be listed for sale.

The defendant, Theodorus Deboer, pleaded guilty to mischief after evidence was led at trial regarding his participation in the Ambassador Bridge blockade.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted a conditional discharge, but the Court rejected this, finding it contrary to the public interest and that it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Court emphasized the gravity of the offence, the significant disruption caused, and the need for denunciation and deterrence, particularly given the defendant's defiant conduct and the late plea.

The Court imposed a suspended sentence with 12 months probation and 20 hours of community service, including a term prohibiting impeding international border crossings.

The applicant, a tenant operating a medical office, brought an urgent motion to compel the respondent landlord to repair and remediate the building due to significant disrepair, including a leaking roof, mold, and pests.

The applicant also sought an order for base rent to be paid into court and a commercial business standards reconciliation.

The respondent denied the allegations, stating repairs were underway, and questioned the applicant's motives, noting the application was commenced after he refused an offer to purchase the building.

The court granted the motion in part, ordering specific remedial work to be completed by the respondent.

However, the requests for rent payment into court (based on constructive eviction or security for costs) and forensic accounting were dismissed, as the court found the high bar for constructive eviction was not met and the other issues were not urgent or properly pleaded.

The applicant, an elderly woman in long-term care, sought a writ of possession to evict her nephew from her home so it could be sold to fund her care.

The nephew argued he had an oral agreement granting him a life interest in the property in exchange for helping his aunt and paying her $50,000, which he claimed was part consideration.

The court found the $50,000 was repayment of a prior debt and that the nephew's actions did not constitute part performance unequivocally referable to an agreement for an interest in land.

The court rejected the nephew's claims of proprietary estoppel and granted the writ of possession, staying the eviction for three months to allow him to relocate.

The plaintiff, Ontario, brought a motion for leave to amend its statement of claim to increase damages, provide further particulars of alleged kickback schemes, and add additional defendants in a civil fraud action.

The defendants and proposed added defendants opposed the motion, arguing the proposed amendments lacked particularity, used vague 'and/or' formulations, and failed to meet the minimum level of material fact disclosure.

The court agreed that several proposed paragraphs were deficient as they did not clearly identify which allegations were made against which specific defendants.

The motion was dismissed, but the plaintiff was granted leave to renew its motion with a properly drafted amended pleading.

The Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on loans due and payable by the Defendants, who were engaged in a real estate business.

The loans, totaling $70,000 in principal, plus 12% annual interest, were evidenced by promissory notes.

The Defendants did not dispute the existence of the loans but raised concerns about the interest rate and the priority of these claims relative to a separate, related action (Piccioni v. Viktyuk).

The court found no real controversy regarding the 12% interest rate, as one defendant assumed it and the other definitively admitted it.

The court granted full summary judgment to the Plaintiffs, concluding that the issues of liability were distinct from the Piccioni action and that a priority dispute at the enforcement stage did not preclude judgment on the loans.

Enforcement of the judgment was stayed pending resolution of the priority issue.

The plaintiff moved under Rule 37.14 to set aside an order by Master McGraw that had previously set aside a 20-year-old default judgment obtained by the plaintiff.

The court found that the defendants had failed to provide proper notice to the plaintiff for their motion to set aside the default judgment and had not made full and frank disclosure regarding their knowledge of the original action and the plaintiff's contact information.

Considering additional evidence, the court determined that Master McGraw's order ought not to have been issued.

The plaintiff's motion was granted, and the original default judgment and writ of execution were restored.

The plaintiffs appealed a Master's decision upholding the defendant's refusal to answer certain questions at an examination for discovery.

The underlying action involved a claim for negligent security after the deceased was fatally shot outside the defendant's building.

The Superior Court of Justice partially allowed the appeal, finding that the Master made a palpable error in refusing production of patrol officer records and event permit information, as these were relevant to the plaintiffs' pleaded allegations of inadequate security.

The defendant was ordered to answer the specific questions for the one-year period prior to the incident.

John Doe A, a former confidential police informer, brought a motion seeking a sealing order, publication ban, and amendment of pleadings to use pseudonyms in his civil action against the police, Crown, and former defence lawyers for alleged breach of informer privilege.

The court found that John Doe A was a confidential informer and that informer privilege is mandatory and absolute, subject only to the "innocence at stake" exception.

The court granted interim orders for a sealing order, a publication ban limited to the informer's identity, and the use of initials for the plaintiff and his family, applicable to pre-trial proceedings.

The court emphasized that civil accountability for breaches of informer privilege supports the rule's objectives and that the Dagenais/Mentuck test for discretionary publication bans does not apply to mandatory informer privilege.

The plaintiff in a personal injury claim moved for partial summary judgment to strike the defendants' Limitations Act defence.

The plaintiff argued she did not discover her "threshold injuries" until almost three years after the motor vehicle accident, commencing her claim within a year of that discovery.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues for trial regarding the discoverability of the claim, particularly concerning the "permanent serious impairment" threshold under the Insurance Act.

The judge declined to exercise enhanced fact-finding powers under Rule 20.04(2.1) due to the risk of duplicative proceedings, inconsistent findings of fact, incomplete medical evidence, and issues with the plaintiff's cross-examination affecting credibility assessment.

The moving party father brought a motion to change a final joint custody order, seeking sole custody of the parties' seven-year-old child.

The father alleged that the mother used physical discipline and that the child required more stability due to an ADHD diagnosis.

The court found no material change in circumstances that would warrant altering the existing parenting arrangement.

Evidence from the Office of the Children's Lawyer and collaterals indicated the child's behaviour and emotional well-being had improved significantly since his ADHD diagnosis and medication.

The motion to change was dismissed, and the father was ordered to pay costs of $7,000.