Bruce Hutchison

The appellants, two school boards and several employees, appealed a motion judge's refusal to strike the respondent's statement of claim.

The respondent, a mother involved in a bitter custody dispute, sued the school boards for misfeasance of public office, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and breach of her section 7 Charter rights, alleging they failed to provide records, notify her of incidents, and impeded access to her son.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding it plain and obvious that the claims disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court held that school employees do not owe a duty of care to parents that conflicts with their duties to students, and the conduct alleged did not meet the high thresholds for the intentional torts or Charter breaches pleaded.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Parayeski J., dated August 18, 2022.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal.

Liability for costs of the motion was reserved to the panel hearing the appeal, with the quantum fixed at $5,000.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his 77-page statement of claim as an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01, alleging malicious prosecution against his ex-partner and others after criminal harassment charges were withdrawn via a peace bond.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's discretionary decision, finding no misdirection or clear error, and affirmed that the claim and the appellant's communications constituted an abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant school board sought an order requiring the respondent insurer to defend and indemnify it in an underlying action concerning historical sexual abuse.

Neither party could locate the original insurance policy from the 1979-1980 school year.

The court held that the applicant met its burden of proof using secondary evidence, including an excess policy schedule and standard policy wordings from the era, to establish the existence and terms of the missing policy.

The application was granted.

The applicant commenced two applications for judicial review of decisions made by the Social Benefits Tribunal.

The Tribunal requested that the applications be dismissed under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing the applicant failed to exhaust his statutory appeal rights.

The Divisional Court directed the registrar to issue a notice to the applicant under Rule 2.1.01, giving him an opportunity to explain why the applications should not be dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process, and stayed the proceedings in the interim.

The applicant, a former student, sought judicial review of the school board's alleged historical failure to diagnose and accommodate his learning disability.

The court noted that the Divisional Court's jurisdiction on judicial review does not include awarding compensation for historical wrongs.

The court directed the registrar to issue a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring the applicant to provide written submissions explaining why the application should not be dismissed as frivolous or vexatious.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review of a decision by an insurance company denying his claim against a school board for failing to identify his learning disability.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure considering dismissal of the application.

The court found that judicial review is only available for decisions made by public bodies exercising state authority.

As the insurance company was not a public body, the application had no chance of success and was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The applicant sought judicial review of an insurance company's decision to deny his claim against a school board for failing to recognize his learning disability.

Following a case conference, the court noted that judicial review is only available for exercises of state authority, not decisions by private corporations.

The court directed the registrar to issue a notice under Rule 2.1.01 that it is considering dismissing the application as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process, and stayed the application pending the applicant's written submissions.

The plaintiff in a personal injury claim moved for partial summary judgment to strike the defendants' Limitations Act defence.

The plaintiff argued she did not discover her "threshold injuries" until almost three years after the motor vehicle accident, commencing her claim within a year of that discovery.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues for trial regarding the discoverability of the claim, particularly concerning the "permanent serious impairment" threshold under the Insurance Act.

The judge declined to exercise enhanced fact-finding powers under Rule 20.04(2.1) due to the risk of duplicative proceedings, inconsistent findings of fact, incomplete medical evidence, and issues with the plaintiff's cross-examination affecting credibility assessment.

The appellant sued her former solicitors in professional negligence.

The firm successfully brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing the action.

On appeal, the appellant argued she was denied procedural fairness, the retainer dispute was not res judicata, and the motions judge erred in dismissing the negligence claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness, that the fee dispute was settled and res judicata, and that the appellant failed to provide evidence that the alleged negligence caused her damages.

No costs were awarded due to the appellant's impecuniosity.

The defendant retailer appealed a master's order refusing further inspection and testing of ski bindings that were alleged to have malfunctioned and caused a skiing accident.

The master had concluded that the prejudicial effect of destructive testing outweighed its probative value and that direct expert evidence was required to justify the testing.

The court held that the master erred in law by requiring direct expert evidence and by rejecting admissible hearsay evidence permitted on motions under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The master also misapprehended the evidentiary record when assessing the qualifications of the proposed technician and the technical assertions contained in the affidavits.

Applying the correct Rule 32.01 test, the court found a reasonable possibility that further testing could reveal useful evidence and that its probative value outweighed the potential prejudice.

The appeal was allowed and testing of the binding was permitted.

The moving parties, defendant solicitors in a professional negligence action, sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion to stay the action.

The plaintiff had previously settled a family law dispute with her husband and signed a release protecting him from third-party claims.

The solicitors issued a third-party claim against the husband for contribution and indemnity and sought to stay the plaintiff's action based on the release.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no legal basis for the third-party claim against the husband, as contribution under the Negligence Act applies only to joint tortfeasors, not to concurrent breaches of contract and tort.

The appellant brought a motion to set aside an order of the Registrar dismissing his appeal for delay and to restore the appeal.

The underlying action involved a section 38 Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act proceeding regarding allegedly fraudulent conveyances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the appellant failed to act diligently after receiving the notice of intention to dismiss, that restoring the appeal would prejudice the respondents by delaying companion actions, and that the appellant had not appealed a subsequent order staying the trial of the main action.

The appellant, a former Superintendent of Education, had his position declared redundant during a restructuring of the respondent School Board.

He was transferred to a project officer position and subsequently commenced an action for wrongful dismissal more than a year later.

The respondents sought to dismiss the action based on the six-month limitation period under s. 7 of the Public Authorities Protection Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the limitation period did not apply because the appellant's claim related to the internal implementation of the reorganization, which is incidental to the Board's public mandate and predominantly of a private character.

The appeal was allowed and the action permitted to proceed.

The appellant school superintendent sued after a school board declared his position redundant and transferred him to a lesser role.

The respondents argued the claim was barred by the six-month limitation in s. 7 of the Public Authorities Protection Act.

The majority held that the limitation does not protect all acts of a public authority as a matter of status and applies only where the plaintiff's claim correlates to a public duty or power of a public character.

Although the board's overall reorganization was a public initiative, the implementation affecting the appellant was characterized as an internal labour relations matter with a predominantly private aspect.

The appeal was allowed and the action was permitted to proceed against the board.