Robert A. Centa

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario following an appeal that proceeded in writing.

The court awarded costs of $6,500, including disbursements and taxes, to the respondent, The University of Toronto.

The court noted that the appeal issues were not complex and largely replicated submissions made at first instance.

Following an order striking out the plaintiff's statement of claim, the successful defendant sought costs of $500.

The self-represented plaintiff opposed the costs request, citing an inability to pay and disagreeing with the underlying decision.

The court found the defendant's request for a token costs award of $500 to be very reasonable, noting that a lack of resources does not provide a license to bring unsuccessful proceedings without consequence.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay $500 in costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendant university brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff alleged wrongful expulsion, assault, and discrimination occurring in and around 2000.

The court dismissed the action, finding it was barred by the 15-year ultimate limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

Furthermore, the court noted it lacked jurisdiction over academic disputes and human rights claims, which must be directed to the university's internal processes and the Human Rights Tribunal, respectively.

The appellant sought to overturn the denial of an interlocutory injunction aimed at preventing the enforcement of a trespass notice issued by the respondent university.

The notice was impeding the appellant's studies and jeopardizing his student visa status, pending a Human Rights Tribunal proceeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the application judge's assessment of evidence or misapplication of the interlocutory injunction test.

The court upheld the finding that the balance of convenience favored the university, given the serious threats perceived and the inadequacy of the medical information provided by the appellant.

The plaintiffs moved to remove the defendant's designated representative for examination for discovery, Peter Hill, due to an irreconcilable conflict of interest.

Hill had a lucrative consulting contract with one of the incumbent telecommunications providers whose conduct was central to the action, and his contract required him to prefer his client's interests.

The court found that Hill's contractual obligations and his evasive testimony during discovery demonstrated a preference for the incumbent's interests over his duties as a witness, rendering him a demonstrably unsatisfactory representative.

The motion was granted, and Hill was ordered to be replaced by Kelly Gillis or another suitable witness.

The Ombudsman of Ontario appealed a Divisional Court decision that held neither the Election Compliance Audit Committee nor the Property Standards Committee of the City of Hamilton constituted "local boards" within the meaning of section 14.1 of the Ombudsman Act.

The Ombudsman sought to investigate whether these committees complied with the public meeting requirement under section 239 of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's decision, applying the ejusdem generis principle to conclude that the general language in the definition of "local board" does not extend to investigative/adjudicative bodies that do not carry on the day-to-day operations of the municipality.

Consequently, the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to investigate these committees' compliance with open meeting requirements.

This is a costs decision on appeal from a trial judgment dismissing the appellant's action.

The respondents were entirely successful on appeal and sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

West Face Capital Inc. sought $250,000 in costs while Brandon Moyse sought $149,905.18.

The appellant argued for reduced costs amounts.

The Court of Appeal awarded West Face $200,000 and Moyse $100,000, both inclusive of disbursements and HST, considering the respondents' complete success, the nature of the appeal involving a large record and detailed factual re-litigation, and costs thrown away due to an unnecessary adjournment.

Appeal from a trial judgment dismissing the appellant's action for misuse of confidential information and spoliation.

The appellant alleged that the respondent West Face Capital Inc. improperly obtained and used confidential information about the appellant's bid to acquire WIND Mobile Inc., allegedly obtained from a former employee who moved to West Face.

The trial judge dismissed all claims, finding that the appellant failed to prove that confidential information was provided to West Face or that any such information was used in West Face's successful competing bid.

The trial judge also found that the appellant's choice to terminate negotiations due to a break fee demand, rather than West Face's competing bid, caused the failure of the appellant's acquisition.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment and dismissed the appeal, as well as the application for leave to appeal the costs orders.

The moving parties, Antonio Ferrara (in trust) and Astoria Homes Inc., sought to strike a third-party claim brought by the Marcheses against Antonio Ferrara in his personal capacity.

The third-party claim was issued without consent or leave of the court, contrary to Rule 29.02.

The court found that while an irregularity occurred, leave would have been granted had it been sought, as no prejudice to the plaintiffs was demonstrated.

Furthermore, the irregularity was cured by the moving parties taking fresh steps in the litigation after becoming aware of the third-party claim.

The application to strike was dismissed.

The court issued a costs endorsement following the dismissal of the main action.

West Face Capital Inc. was awarded substantial indemnity costs of $1,239,965 due to the plaintiff's unfounded allegations of soliciting and misusing confidential information, which impugned West Face's integrity and honesty.

Brandon Moyse was awarded partial indemnity costs of $339,500.18, despite also facing integrity-damaging allegations, because he had destroyed evidence at the outset of the litigation, albeit without intent to destroy relevant evidence.

The court found the plaintiff's allegations against West Face and Moyse to be serious and unsubstantiated, justifying higher costs for West Face, while Moyse's conduct warranted a reduction to partial indemnity.

The plaintiff, Catalyst Capital Group Inc., brought an action against Brandon Moyse and West Face Capital Inc. for alleged misuse of confidential information regarding WIND Mobile Inc. and spoliation of documents.

Catalyst claimed Moyse, a former analyst, provided confidential information to West Face, which West Face then used to acquire an interest in WIND.

The court assessed the evidence, including witness credibility, and found no direct evidence of information transfer.

The court also examined the elements of breach of confidence and spoliation.

The action was dismissed in its entirety, with the defendants entitled to costs.

In a class action regarding price-fixing of DRAM devices, a settlement and distribution protocol were approved by the courts.

A class member subsequently alleged that the distribution protocol contravened the Ontario Human Rights Code by requiring family members residing in the same household to pool their claims, which allegedly discriminated based on family and marital status.

The court held a motion for directions to determine the issue.

The court ruled that the Human Rights Code does not apply to court orders, including a court-approved distribution protocol, as they are not 'services' under the Code.

Furthermore, even if the Code applied, the pooling requirement did not constitute prima facie discrimination, and any disadvantage was justified to prevent windfall compensation and encourage claims.

A class member challenged a court-approved Distribution Protocol in a class action settlement, alleging it contravened the Ontario Human Rights Code by requiring family members to pool their claims for minimum compensation, thereby discriminating on the basis of family and marital status.

The court held that the Human Rights Code does not apply to court orders or distribution schemes under the Class Proceedings Act.

Furthermore, even if the Code applied, the pooling requirement did not constitute discrimination, as it was a justified mechanism to encourage claims while preventing windfall overcompensation.

Following the dismissal of motions seeking an interlocutory voting injunction, an imaging order, and a contempt order, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The unsuccessful moving party argued that most costs should be deferred to trial because the evidence overlapped with issues to be litigated on the merits.

The court rejected this submission, applying the principle that a successful defendant resisting interlocutory injunctive relief is generally entitled to costs payable forthwith.

After considering factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the high stakes of the motions, the absence of legal complexity, and certain conduct contributing to the contempt motion, the court fixed reduced partial indemnity costs for each successful defendant.

The moving party sought three forms of relief in a commercial dispute involving alleged misuse of confidential information: an interlocutory injunction preventing a shareholder from voting its 35% interest in a telecommunications company, an order authorizing forensic imaging and review of the defendants’ corporate servers and devices, and a finding of contempt for alleged breach of a prior consent order.

The court held that the requested voting injunction could not be granted because the moving party failed to provide the mandatory undertaking as to damages under Rule 40.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or a favourable balance of convenience.

The requested imaging order was refused because there was no evidence that the responding party had failed to comply with its document production obligations or attempted to conceal or destroy electronic evidence.

The contempt motion also failed because the alleged acts—deleting personal browsing history and installing software capable of secure deletion—did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that relevant information had been intentionally destroyed in breach of the consent order.

The defendant MasterCard brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim in its entirety for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff, a footwear retailer, sued MasterCard and its payment processor after MasterCard imposed nearly $5 million in assessments following an alleged data breach.

The court dismissed the motion to strike the claims for intentional interference with contractual rights, unlawful interference with economic relations, negligence, unjust enrichment, conversion, and declaratory relief, finding they had a reasonable prospect of success.

The court struck the claims for conspiracy (with leave to amend) and breach of the duty of good faith (without leave).

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a claim arising from a land purchase agreement involving residential development lands in Oshawa.

The plaintiff alleged that the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and related Omnibus Agreement required a post-closing readjustment of the purchase price where the net developable area of the lands was later reduced.

The court held that the contracts did not provide for post-closing adjustments to the purchase price, and that the closing adjustments based on the consultant’s calculation of net developable area were final.

The plaintiff’s later attempt to rely on a recalculation based on modified development constraints was not conducted using the contractual definition of net developable area and was based on the purchaser’s subsequent development choices.

Interpreting the agreements to allow indefinite post-closing adjustments would create commercial uncertainty and absurdity.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the claim.

Following a successful family law motion granting injunctive relief to prevent dissipation of assets, the moving party sought costs on a full recovery basis.

The court considered Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and determined that the responding party had acted in bad faith by failing to provide proper financial disclosure, terminating support, and attempting to deal with jointly owned assets while international proceedings were ongoing.

Given the complexity of the litigation, the high financial stakes, and the conduct of the responding party, the court held that full indemnity costs were warranted.

The court ordered payment of substantial legal fees and disbursements to counsel for the moving party within 30 days.

The plaintiff brought an urgent motion seeking injunctive relief and an Anton Piller order against former employees and a competing corporation.

Evidence indicated that one former employee downloaded thousands of confidential corporate files prior to leaving employment and that the defendants were using the information to compete for the plaintiff’s principal customer.

Applying the three‑part test for interlocutory injunctions under the Courts of Justice Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure as articulated in RJR‑MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), the court found a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm to the plaintiff’s business, and that the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff.

The court held that the defendants’ conduct arguably breached contractual confidentiality obligations, restrictive covenants, and duties of confidence.

Injunctive relief restraining the defendants’ conduct was granted.

This is a preliminary motion ruling on appeals of Compliance Audit Committee decisions to order compliance audits of election campaign finances.

The appellants sought to have the appeals conducted as hearings de novo, while the respondents and the Committee argued the appeals should be limited to a review of the record.

The court determined that absent a clear statutory mandate to the contrary, appeals must take the form of a review of the record rather than de novo hearings.

The court rejected arguments that deficiencies in the record, the Committee's failure to provide reasons, or the prematurity of the audit application warranted a de novo hearing format.