Robert A. Centa

The plaintiff, Catalyst Capital Group Inc., brought an action against Brandon Moyse and West Face Capital Inc. for alleged misuse of confidential information regarding WIND Mobile Inc. and spoliation of documents.

Catalyst claimed Moyse, a former analyst, provided confidential information to West Face, which West Face then used to acquire an interest in WIND.

The court assessed the evidence, including witness credibility, and found no direct evidence of information transfer.

The court also examined the elements of breach of confidence and spoliation.

The action was dismissed in its entirety, with the defendants entitled to costs.

The applicant's motion for judicial review of a case management master's decision to recuse herself from construction lien proceedings was dismissed for prematurity.

The respondents sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing the applicant made reckless attacks on the integrity of a judicial officer.

The Divisional Court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, noting the bias issue was not determined on its merits.

The court ordered the applicant to pay $30,000 to the respondent 229 and $3,000 to the respondent St. Clare's.

The moving party sought an extension of time to bring a motion for leave to appeal two interlocutory orders: an order dismissing a request for forensic imaging of the responding parties' servers and devices, and an order dismissing a contempt motion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for an extension of time, finding that the moving party failed to adequately explain its lengthy delay in pursuing the correct appeal route.

Furthermore, the court concluded that the proposed appeals lacked merit, as the motions judge correctly applied the legal tests for forensic imaging and civil contempt, and there was no good reason to doubt the correctness of the orders.

The respondent brought a motion to strike the applicant's pleadings and a separate motion for contempt, both based on substantially similar allegations of breaching court orders.

The applicant brought a motion to stay the motion to strike pending the disposition of the contempt motion, arguing that responding to the motion to strike would effectively compel him to testify and violate his right against self-incrimination in the quasi-criminal contempt proceeding.

The court agreed, finding that the applicant's right to a fair trial on the contempt motion would be prejudiced if he were forced to respond to the civil motion to strike first.

The court ordered the motion to strike stayed pending the resolution of the contempt motion.

A class member challenged a court-approved Distribution Protocol in a class action settlement, alleging it contravened the Ontario Human Rights Code by requiring family members to pool their claims for minimum compensation, thereby discriminating on the basis of family and marital status.

The court held that the Human Rights Code does not apply to court orders or distribution schemes under the Class Proceedings Act.

Furthermore, even if the Code applied, the pooling requirement did not constitute discrimination, as it was a justified mechanism to encourage claims while preventing windfall overcompensation.

In a class action regarding price-fixing of DRAM devices, a settlement and distribution protocol were approved by the courts.

A class member subsequently alleged that the distribution protocol contravened the Ontario Human Rights Code by requiring family members residing in the same household to pool their claims, which allegedly discriminated based on family and marital status.

The court held a motion for directions to determine the issue.

The court ruled that the Human Rights Code does not apply to court orders, including a court-approved distribution protocol, as they are not 'services' under the Code.

Furthermore, even if the Code applied, the pooling requirement did not constitute prima facie discrimination, and any disadvantage was justified to prevent windfall compensation and encourage claims.

Following the dismissal of motions seeking an interlocutory voting injunction, an imaging order, and a contempt order, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The unsuccessful moving party argued that most costs should be deferred to trial because the evidence overlapped with issues to be litigated on the merits.

The court rejected this submission, applying the principle that a successful defendant resisting interlocutory injunctive relief is generally entitled to costs payable forthwith.

After considering factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the high stakes of the motions, the absence of legal complexity, and certain conduct contributing to the contempt motion, the court fixed reduced partial indemnity costs for each successful defendant.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Master's refusal to recuse herself from a construction lien reference due to alleged bias.

The Divisional Court considered whether the application was premature, as it challenged an interlocutory order before the underlying proceeding was completed.

Applying the factors from Air Canada v. Lorenz, the court weighed the potential hardship to the applicant against the adverse consequences of delay, waste, and fragmentation.

The court concluded that the adverse consequences of delay outweighed the possible hardship to the applicant, particularly given the statutory framework of the Construction Lien Act designed for speedy resolution.

The application was dismissed for prematurity.

The moving party sought three forms of relief in a commercial dispute involving alleged misuse of confidential information: an interlocutory injunction preventing a shareholder from voting its 35% interest in a telecommunications company, an order authorizing forensic imaging and review of the defendants’ corporate servers and devices, and a finding of contempt for alleged breach of a prior consent order.

The court held that the requested voting injunction could not be granted because the moving party failed to provide the mandatory undertaking as to damages under Rule 40.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or a favourable balance of convenience.

The requested imaging order was refused because there was no evidence that the responding party had failed to comply with its document production obligations or attempted to conceal or destroy electronic evidence.

The contempt motion also failed because the alleged acts—deleting personal browsing history and installing software capable of secure deletion—did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that relevant information had been intentionally destroyed in breach of the consent order.

Following the dismissal of Unimac's motion seeking the recusal of the Master on grounds of racial bias, the responding parties sought costs.

Unimac argued costs should be deferred to the Divisional Court pending judicial review.

The Master determined it was appropriate to fix costs immediately.

Finding that Unimac's motion was an abuse of process, involved scurrilous and unsubstantiated attacks on the integrity of the judicial officer, caused unnecessary delay, and that Unimac failed to accept a reasonable offer to settle, the Master awarded costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

Unimac was ordered to pay $52,810.37 to the Lead Respondents and $6,728.30 to St. Clare's.

The defendant MasterCard brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim in its entirety for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff, a footwear retailer, sued MasterCard and its payment processor after MasterCard imposed nearly $5 million in assessments following an alleged data breach.

The court dismissed the motion to strike the claims for intentional interference with contractual rights, unlawful interference with economic relations, negligence, unjust enrichment, conversion, and declaratory relief, finding they had a reasonable prospect of success.

The court struck the claims for conspiracy (with leave to amend) and breach of the duty of good faith (without leave).

This was a costs endorsement following a Rule 21 motion in which the defendants successfully struck three of four defamation allegations.

The plaintiff argued she had greater success overall or, alternatively, that there should be no costs or costs in the cause.

The court rejected those submissions, finding the defendants had achieved partial but meaningful success and that the reduced amount sought already reflected divided success and some duplication of effort by defence counsel.

Costs of the motion were fixed at $7,000 all-inclusive.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a claim arising from a land purchase agreement involving residential development lands in Oshawa.

The plaintiff alleged that the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and related Omnibus Agreement required a post-closing readjustment of the purchase price where the net developable area of the lands was later reduced.

The court held that the contracts did not provide for post-closing adjustments to the purchase price, and that the closing adjustments based on the consultant’s calculation of net developable area were final.

The plaintiff’s later attempt to rely on a recalculation based on modified development constraints was not conducted using the contractual definition of net developable area and was based on the purchaser’s subsequent development choices.

Interpreting the agreements to allow indefinite post-closing adjustments would create commercial uncertainty and absurdity.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the claim.

Following a successful family law motion granting injunctive relief to prevent dissipation of assets, the moving party sought costs on a full recovery basis.

The court considered Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and determined that the responding party had acted in bad faith by failing to provide proper financial disclosure, terminating support, and attempting to deal with jointly owned assets while international proceedings were ongoing.

Given the complexity of the litigation, the high financial stakes, and the conduct of the responding party, the court held that full indemnity costs were warranted.

The court ordered payment of substantial legal fees and disbursements to counsel for the moving party within 30 days.

The appellant, MasterCard, sought to stay an Ontario action brought by the respondent, Aldo, on the basis of a New York forum selection clause contained in agreements to which Aldo was not a party.

Aldo's claims arose from a cybercrime attack and subsequent data security assessments imposed by MasterCard and collected by Moneris.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision dismissing the stay, finding that Aldo's claims were direct tort claims rather than subrogated contractual claims.

The Court declined to apply the 'closely related' doctrine to bind Aldo to the forum selection clause, as it was not foreseeable that the clause would apply to its claims.

The appellants, two former doctoral students, appealed an order striking their 187-page Statement of Claim as an abuse of process without leave to amend.

They conceded the original claim was properly struck but argued they should have been granted leave to file a narrower amended claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's discretionary decision, as the proposed claims were an indirect attempt to appeal internal academic decisions that should be addressed through judicial review.

The appeal and leave to appeal costs were dismissed.

The self-represented appellants, former doctoral students, sought an extension of time to perfect their appeal from a motion judge's order striking their 187-page statement of claim against the university and its staff without leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal applied the four-factor test for extending time, focusing on the merits of the appeal.

While agreeing that most of the appellants' claims (including Charter, human rights, and intentional torts) were bound to fail, the Court found that claims for negligence and breach of contract regarding the university's handling of accommodation requests and tuition fees were not plainly and obviously doomed.

Concluding the appeal had sufficient merit, the Court granted a 30-day extension to perfect the appeal.

The plaintiff brought an urgent motion seeking injunctive relief and an Anton Piller order against former employees and a competing corporation.

Evidence indicated that one former employee downloaded thousands of confidential corporate files prior to leaving employment and that the defendants were using the information to compete for the plaintiff’s principal customer.

Applying the three‑part test for interlocutory injunctions under the Courts of Justice Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure as articulated in RJR‑MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), the court found a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm to the plaintiff’s business, and that the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff.

The court held that the defendants’ conduct arguably breached contractual confidentiality obligations, restrictive covenants, and duties of confidence.

Injunctive relief restraining the defendants’ conduct was granted.

This is a preliminary motion ruling on appeals of Compliance Audit Committee decisions to order compliance audits of election campaign finances.

The appellants sought to have the appeals conducted as hearings de novo, while the respondents and the Committee argued the appeals should be limited to a review of the record.

The court determined that absent a clear statutory mandate to the contrary, appeals must take the form of a review of the record rather than de novo hearings.

The court rejected arguments that deficiencies in the record, the Committee's failure to provide reasons, or the prematurity of the audit application warranted a de novo hearing format.

The applicant, a graduate student, sought judicial review of a university decision to dismiss him for plagiarism, alleging procedural unfairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application primarily due to an unexplained delay of over 21 months in commencing the application and a further 9 months in perfecting it.

The Court also found no merit to the applicant's allegations of procedural unfairness, noting that the disciplinary process was conducted without undue delay and the applicant was afforded appropriate procedural rights.