Peter J. Pliszka

The moving parties, comprising various social media companies including Meta, Snap, and TikTok entities, brought motions for leave to appeal the substantive and costs orders of Leiper J. The Divisional Court granted the motions for leave to appeal without costs and directed the parties to provide an agreed schedule for the exchange of appeal materials.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered appeals and cross-appeals from a certification decision in a proposed class action regarding alleged defects in BMW vehicles equipped with N20 engines.

The court found that the certification judge erred in certifying causes of action for negligent design/manufacturing resulting in repair costs and in defining the class to include persons who incurred such costs.

The court held that neither of the proposed representative plaintiffs had a valid cause of action and set aside the certification order.

The plaintiff, Toronto District School Board, brought an action in negligence and public nuisance against several major social media corporations, alleging that their products were intentionally designed to be addictive to children and caused widespread mental health and behavioral issues among students.

The Board claimed it suffered direct economic damages in responding to these student harms, including increased costs for mental health services, security, and staff training.

The defendant corporations brought a motion to strike the statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the claims had no reasonable prospect of success.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion, allowing the Board's novel claims in negligence and public nuisance to proceed.

The appellants, pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors of opioid products, challenged the constitutional validity of s. 11 of British Columbia's Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, which authorizes British Columbia to act as representative plaintiff in a class action on behalf of all federal, provincial, and territorial governments in Canada unless they opt out.

The majority held that s. 11 is intra vires, characterizing its pith and substance as a procedural mechanism under s. 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (Administration of Justice in the Province) that facilitates intergovernmental cooperation without creating or altering substantive rights.

The majority further found that s. 11 maintains a meaningful connection to British Columbia and respects the legislative sovereignty of other governments.

Côté J. dissented, finding that the pith and substance of s. 11 engages and derogates from property and civil rights of extra-provincial governments under s. 92(13), that no meaningful connection exists, and that ss. 11(1)(b) and (2) should be severed as ultra vires.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered an appeal and cross-appeal, along with motions to quash.

The parties agreed that the appeal and cross-appeal were sufficiently interrelated to be heard together to avoid duplication and ensure consistency.

Consequently, the court, on consent, dismissed both motions to quash without costs, ordering the consolidated appeal and cross-appeal to proceed.

The appellants sought to certify a class proceeding against pharmaceutical companies for negligently manufacturing valsartan, alleging contamination with NDMA and NDEA, which are potential carcinogens.

The claim was for damages related to an increased risk of cancer, costs of medical services and monitoring, refunds for drugs, and psychological damages.

The motion judge dismissed the certification, finding no viable cause of action based on concrete injury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that claims for genotoxic injury (molecular changes without perceptible effect), psychological harm (not meeting the 'serious and prolonged' or 'ordinary fortitude' thresholds), and pure economic loss (as the product was discarded and not imminently dangerous) were not compensable in tort.

The court also upheld the dismissal of claims for battery, consumer protection breaches, Competition Act breaches, and unjust enrichment, concluding that the pleadings did not disclose viable causes of action or meet commonality criteria for certification.

This appeal concerned a motion judge's order regarding a class action.

The core issues were whether a discontinued cause of action and defendants could be added to an existing class action (the Martin action) and whether that action would then be governed by the old Class Proceedings Act, 1992, or the amended Act.

The motion judge had ordered the "recast" Martin action to proceed under the amended Act and denied leave to add a party (MicroPort Orthopedics Inc.) based on limitations.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in ordering the Martin action to be governed by the amended Act, as Section 39 of the amended Act clearly dictates that actions commenced before October 1, 2020, remain under the old Act.

The court also found an error in dismissing the motion to add MicroPort Orthopedics Inc. based on the Limitations Act, stating that limitation periods are typically individual issues in class actions.

The appeal and cross-appeal were allowed in part, clarifying that the Martin action continues under the old Act, and a re-filed Rowland action (including MicroPort Orthopedics Inc.) would proceed under the amended Act.

The plaintiff brought a proposed class action against numerous pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors regarding the marketing and sale of opioids in Canada.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action, and one defendant, Pro Doc Limitée, moved to dismiss the action against it for lack of jurisdiction.

The court granted Pro Doc's jurisdiction motion, finding no real and substantial connection to Ontario.

The court struck the claims against the distributor defendants without leave to amend, finding no viable cause of action.

The court found that while there were viable causes of action against the manufacturer defendants for breach of the Competition Act, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, and failure to warn, the plaintiff's pleading was defective.

The court struck the claims against the manufacturer defendants with leave to amend to join representative plaintiffs for each defendant group and to comply with the rules of pleading.

This is a motion to discontinue a proposed class action concerning automobile airbags that had been recalled.

The action, which had not been certified, sought compensation for pure economic loss.

Due to developments in case law, particularly the Supreme Court of Canada's clarification on pure economic loss for defective products, the litigation risk increased, and the prospects for certification and substantial economic recovery diminished.

Class Counsel sought leave to discontinue the action with prejudice and without costs.

The court granted the motion, finding that the action was commenced for a proper purpose, the test for discontinuance was satisfied, and putative class members were not prejudiced, as limitation periods remained suspended.

This is a class action certification motion concerning allegedly defective N20 engines in BMW vehicles.

The plaintiffs sought to certify a class of owners/lessees of BMW vehicles with these engines, alleging design and/or manufacturing defects causing sudden loss of power.

The court analyzed the five certification criteria under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

While a cause of action in negligence was found, it was significantly narrowed to exclude claims for pure economic loss, limiting recovery to repair costs for actual damage or to avert imminent damage.

The proposed class definition was also narrowed to include only those who incurred such repair expenses by the judgment date.

One of the two proposed representative plaintiffs was deemed unsuitable as she had no recoverable loss.

The motion for certification was granted, but with substantial limitations on the scope of the class and the recoverable damages, and with only one representative plaintiff.

The plaintiff, Dr. Darryl Gebien, sought court approval for a Third-Party Funding Agreement with Omni Bridgeway Ltd. for a proposed class action against numerous pharmaceutical companies regarding the opioid crisis.

Several defendants objected to specific provisions of the agreement, including those related to amendments, assignments, attornment, costs enforcement, termination procedures, accrued costs, and confidentiality.

The court found that while the agreement generally met the requirements for approval, several of the defendants' objections, particularly concerning comprehensive attornment by Omni Bridgeway Ltd. and the broad confidentiality provisions, were "genuinely meaningful" and required resolution.

The motion for approval was adjourned to allow the parties to address these issues, with the court emphasizing that it is not its role to draft the agreement.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated November 16, 2022.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the respondents to pay the moving party agreed costs of $5,000.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Morgan J. dated December 21, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the respondents in the amount of $7,500.

This endorsement addresses the quantum of costs following the Plaintiffs' successful certification motion in a class action.

The court, while acknowledging the Plaintiffs' entitlement to costs on a partial indemnity scale, disallowed a claim for nearly $20,000 in docketed time spent on preparing the costs submissions themselves, deeming it novel and not to be encouraged.

The court rejected the Defendants' argument that the Plaintiffs' fees were too high, noting that both sides invested similar hours and the difference in dollar amounts reflected firm structure rather than overwork.

The Plaintiffs were awarded all-inclusive costs of $496,000.

The plaintiffs sought certification of a national class action against the defendants regarding alleged defects and failures to warn associated with Allergan breast implants, specifically concerning risks of BIA-ALCL, premature rupture, and ASIA/BII.

The court found that the plaintiffs met all the criteria under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, including demonstrating a plausible methodology for their claims through expert evidence, despite significant scientific debate.

The action was certified against all defendants, expanding a previous partial certification order.

The plaintiff in a certified class action brought a refusals motion seeking to compel answers to questions refused during cross-examinations on the defendants' affidavits of documents.

The court dismissed the motion in its entirety, finding that the questions regarding the scope of documentary production, missing documents, and search terms were premature and irrelevant because the parties had not yet settled a discovery plan.

The court held that the scope of documentary discovery must be determined on the pending discovery plan motion before the adequacy of the affidavits of documents could be assessed.

In a certified class action regarding allegedly defective MINI Cooper vehicles, the defendants brought a motion seeking a declaration that the German defendant, BMW-AG, could produce documents using a 'layered approach' to comply with European and German privacy laws (GDPR).

This approach involved initially redacting all personal data.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing that Ontario's Rules of Civil Procedure required unredacted production.

The court held that the relevance scrutiny inherent in the Rules of Civil Procedure satisfies the 'Legitimate Interests Exception' under the foreign privacy laws.

The court ordered BMW-AG to produce documents in accordance with a modified Rule 30.03, allowing redactions only for privileged information and personal data that is not relevant to any issue in the action.

The defendants Mercedes-Benz and Mitsubishi brought a motion to dismiss the proposed class action for delay pursuant to s. 29.1 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The plaintiffs argued that the court had discretion not to dismiss the action and that all defendants must join the motion.

The court held that s. 29.1 is mandatory and does not require all defendants to join.

The action was dismissed against the moving defendants, but the court exercised its jurisdiction under s. 12 to order that the dismissal be set aside if the plaintiffs file a complete certification motion record within thirty days.

The plaintiffs sought to certify a class action against the defendant pharmaceutical companies for manufacturing and distributing valsartan contaminated with NDMA and NDEA, which are probable human carcinogens.

The plaintiffs claimed damages for psychological harm and pure economic losses (medical bills, medical monitoring, refunds, and wasted pills) arising from the increased risk of being diagnosed with cancer, but explicitly did not claim damages for actually developing cancer.

The court dismissed the certification motion, finding that the law does not recognize a cause of action for the mere creation of risk or for pure economic loss from shoddy but not imminently dangerous goods, and therefore the claims failed to satisfy the cause of action, common issues, and preferable procedure criteria.