Sarah E. Pepall

On an estate appeal, the appellants challenged findings that upheld a later will, dismissed their application, and refused costs relief.

The court found legal and palpable-and-overriding errors in the trial-level analysis of suspicious circumstances, knowledge and approval, conflict concerns surrounding the drafting solicitor, and undue influence evidence.

The court held the impugned will invalid, granted related relief dismissing the connected Small Claims Court action, and set aside the costs order.

Applying modern estate-costs principles, the court ordered a blended costs result, including substantial indemnity costs personally against the respondent for part of first-instance costs, with the remaining amounts payable from the estate.

Following a successful appeal from a Superior Court judgment, the Court of Appeal determined costs for the proceedings below.

After reviewing both parties' submissions, the court awarded costs of $25,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements, to the appellant, payable forthwith.

The appellant purchased furniture, fixtures, and equipment, including a large racking system, from insolvent tenants under a court-approved Liquidation Process Order in bankruptcy proceedings.

The appellant failed to remove the racking from the landlord's distribution centre/warehouse before the lease disclaimer date and multiple deadlines.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's conversion claim, finding that the racking was deemed abandoned pursuant to the Sale Guidelines incorporated in the Liquidation Process Order, which provided that any fixtures or personal property left in a store after the sale termination date and lease disclaimer would be deemed abandoned.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's interpretation, holding that the deemed abandonment provision was irrebuttable when read in the context and purpose of the insolvency proceedings, and that the appellant could have sought a variation of the order through the come-back provision but failed to do so.

The appeal and the respondents' cross-appeal on damages were both dismissed.

Costs endorsement following the appeal reasons reported at 2025 ONCA 861.

The respondents on appeal were the more successful parties, having succeeded entirely on one issue and partially on the second, where the court substituted a temporary stay for the motion judge's dismissal.

The court discounted both the motion judge's costs award and the agreed appeal costs by 25% to reflect the divided success, resulting in costs of $18,750 for both the motion and the appeal, inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellants, a postal workers' union and its representatives, sought a declaration that federal back-to-work legislation ending rotating strikes in 2018 unjustifiably limited their members' freedom of association under s. 2(d) and freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The application judge dismissed the application as moot because the legislation was spent and declined to exercise discretion to decide on the merits under the Borowski criteria.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed the application was moot and deferred to the discretionary decision not to hear it on the merits.

In the alternative, the court found the legislation limited s. 2(d) rights but was justified under s. 1, and that neither the Prime Minister's public statement nor the Act limited s. 2(b) rights.

Appeal dismissed.

The appellants, a public sector union and its officers, challenged the constitutionality of back-to-work legislation (Bill 178) that ended a five-week faculty strike at Ontario's 24 colleges of applied arts and technology in 2017.

The Court of Appeal found that the legislation limited the appellants' s. 2(d) Charter right to freedom of association by ending a lawful strike, departing from the application judge's finding of no substantial interference.

However, the court held that the limitation was justified under s. 1 of the Charter, finding that Ontario had a pressing and substantial objective of resuming classroom instruction to protect students' academic year, that the means were rationally connected and minimally impairing, and that the substitution of neutral interest arbitration for strike activity rendered the effects proportionate.

The appellants brought an application seeking public funding for Jewish day schools in Ontario, arguing that the failure to provide such funding violates their Charter rights.

Ontario successfully moved to strike the application on the basis that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Adler v. Ontario definitively resolved the issue.

On appeal, the appellants argued there was a reasonable prospect of revisiting Adler under the Bedford/Carter test due to new evidence of antisemitism and developments in international and constitutional law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the proposed new evidence did not fundamentally shift the parameters of the debate in Adler, and that s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 remains a comprehensive code for denominational school rights.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her anti-SLAPP motion regarding a $2.5 million defamation counterclaim brought by her former employer.

The motion judge had found the counterclaim had the hallmarks of a SLAPP and there was no evidence of a causal link between the appellant's expression and the respondents' alleged harm, but allowed the counterclaim to proceed because dismissing it would not meaningfully reduce the scope of the factual inquiry at trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under the Supreme Court's decision in Hansman, the weighing exercise must be tethered to the statutory text, which requires evidence of likely harm and causation.

The overlap between the claim and counterclaim was an impermissible consideration.

The counterclaim was dismissed, and the appellant was awarded $5,000 in statutory damages and costs.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal allowed.

The appeal challenged Ontario recognition and enforcement of a German default judgment, relying principally on an arbitration-clause public-policy defence.

The court held public policy did not bar recognition where appellants failed to raise the arbitration point in the German proceeding and dismissed the appeal.

The appeal concerned whether claims arising from strike picketing by a unionized employer and related non-unionized corporate affiliates belonged in labour arbitration or in the Superior Court.

Applying Weber, the court held that the unionized employer’s claims arose from the collective agreement and were within the labour arbitrator’s exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction.

Applying Bisaillon, the court held that the arbitrator lacked personal jurisdiction over the non-party corporate affiliates, so their claims could not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

However, to prevent parallel litigation from undermining arbitration, the court ordered a temporary stay of the non-party claims pending completion of the labour arbitration and any related judicial review period.

This commercial lease appeal addressed validity of default and termination notices, the resulting lease termination findings, and related costs rulings.

The court upheld the application judge’s determinations and dismissed both the main appeal and the costs appeal after granting leave on costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay damages for sexually assaulting the respondent after administering the drug temazepam without her knowledge.

The appellant argued the trial judge ignored relevant evidence, provided insufficient reasons, and erred in applying the rule in Browne v. Dunne.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge conducted a thorough credibility assessment, provided extensive reasons capable of appellate review, and properly applied the rule in Browne v. Dunne because the appellant failed to put his version of events to the respondent during cross-examination.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay $520,096.35 under a mortgage loan.

He argued the mortgages were forged, the respondent failed to provide required statements, and the respondent lost the right to sue for the debt by selling the properties after commencing the action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and noting the appellant failed to provide trial transcripts.

The Court also clarified that exercising a power of sale, unlike foreclosure, does not preclude a mortgagee from suing for the debt.

The appellant, who had a long history of family law litigation and outstanding costs and child support arrears, appealed an SCJ order that quashed his previous appeals as an abuse of process.

He also brought motions to adduce fresh evidence and to review a single judge's decision dismissing his motion to amend his notice of appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence motion as irrelevant and the review motion as meritless.

The Court exercised its discretion to refuse to entertain the appeal due to the appellant's continuing disobedience of court orders regarding financial obligations, and noted there was no basis for appellate intervention in any event.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its motion to add respondents as defendants to a lawyer's negligence and breach of fiduciary duty action, arguing the motion judge erred in determining the limitations issue on a motion to amend.

The Court of Appeal found no error, holding the appellant failed to adduce evidence to rebut the statutory presumption of discoverability under s. 5(2) of the Limitations Act, 2002, and the claims were statute barred as the motion was brought more than two years after discovery according to the unrebutted presumption.

The appellant City of Hamilton appealed a trial judgment finding it and ArcelorMittal Dofasco Inc. (AMD) jointly and severally liable for damages arising from periodic flooding of the respondent National Steel Car Limited's industrial property caused by wastewater discharge into a clogged drainage channel.

The trial judge awarded compensatory damages of approximately $5.3 million (apportioned equally between the defendants), punitive damages of $400,000 against the City and $500,000 against AMD, and granted a mandatory injunction requiring remediation and maintenance of the channel.

The City appealed on four grounds: (1) the equal apportionment of liability; (2) failure to find mitigation by National; (3) the punitive damages award; and (4) the terms of the injunction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal except for a clarification to the injunction language.

The appellants, David Hui and Musab Saboon, appealed their convictions for kidnapping and first-degree murder of Lee Chiodo, as well as Hui's sentence for kidnapping.

Both were convicted after a trial by judge alone and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's credibility and reliability analysis of Marshall Hardy-Fox, a Vetrovec witness whose evidence was key to the convictions.

The appellants also argued the trial judge failed to apply the proper legal test for assessing credibility and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of Hardy-Fox's evidence, proper application of the credibility test, and adequate reasons.

The court also dismissed Hui's sentence appeal based on the parity principle.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a Belleville police officer charged with assault causing bodily harm arising from an arrest.

The officer and a co-accused were charged following an incident at a fast-food restaurant where they arrested a man for alleged theft of an energy drink.

The trial judge found the co-accused guilty of common assault but acquitted the respondent officer.

The Crown argued the acquittal was incongruous and that the officer should have been found guilty because he shared the co-accused's erroneous belief about reasonable grounds for arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly applied the law and made factual findings that supported the acquittal, particularly that the respondent did not know what was happening inside the restaurant until he saw the struggle through the window.

The appellant appealed a costs award of $300,000 made by the trial judge following a motor vehicle accident case.

The respondent was struck by a vehicle driven by the appellant while crossing a pedestrian crossing.

After a three-week jury trial, the jury awarded the respondent $24,166 in general damages and $26,000 in special damages for past income loss, with a net recovery of $16,160.50 after accounting for contributory negligence and statutory deductibles.

The trial judge awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, finding the respondent was more successful at trial.

The appellant argued the costs award was wholly disproportionate to the modest recovery and that the trial judge erred in finding the respondent was more successful.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the costs award.