Maia Stevenson

The appellants brought an application seeking public funding for Jewish day schools in Ontario, arguing that the failure to provide such funding violates their Charter rights.

Ontario successfully moved to strike the application on the basis that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Adler v. Ontario definitively resolved the issue.

On appeal, the appellants argued there was a reasonable prospect of revisiting Adler under the Bedford/Carter test due to new evidence of antisemitism and developments in international and constitutional law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the proposed new evidence did not fundamentally shift the parameters of the debate in Adler, and that s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 remains a comprehensive code for denominational school rights.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal from the denial of certification of a class action alleging systemic negligence in the use of seclusion and restraint at a forensic psychiatric hospital.

The court found that the motion judge did not err in concluding that the claims lacked commonality, as the alleged wrongdoing could only be determined on an individual basis.

The court also upheld the dismissal of claims against individual hospital administrators and affirmed the costs award, finding no reversible error in the motion judge’s analysis.

The Empowerment Council sought leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal from the refusal to certify a proposed class action concerning psychiatric inpatients at Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed intervener’s submissions were largely duplicative of the appellants’ and would not usefully contribute to the resolution of the appeal without prejudicing the parties.

The applicants, tow truck drivers with decades of experience, sought judicial review of O. Reg. 167/23 under the Towing and Storage Safety and Enforcement Act, 2021.

The regulation disqualified them from obtaining a tow certificate due to mandatory lifetime weapons prohibitions stemming from 20-year-old criminal convictions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the regulation was not ultra vires as it reasonably aligned with the Act's purpose of combating crime in the towing industry.

The Court also dismissed the Charter challenges, holding that the evidentiary record did not establish criminal history as an analogous ground under s. 15, and that the regulatory disqualification constituted neither 'treatment' nor 'punishment' under s. 12.

Ontario sought judicial review of an interim decision by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario finding that changes to the Ontario Autism Program (OAP) discriminated against a child with autism on the basis of disability.

The Divisional Court allowed the application and quashed the Tribunal's decision, finding it unreasonable.

The Court held that the Tribunal failed to provide a rational chain of analysis to support its conclusion that the child experienced adverse treatment based on her disability, as the OAP's funding caps were designed to address inequities and ensure all eligible children received some beneficial services.

The Court declined to remit the issue of disability discrimination back to the Tribunal, concluding that no rational analysis could lead to a finding of discrimination on these facts.

The applicant, a child with Autism Spectrum Disorder, sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing their claim that changes to the Ontario Autism Program discriminated on the basis of age and disability.

The tribunal had declined to decide whether the definition of 'age' in section 10 of the Human Rights Code, which limits age discrimination claims to persons 18 or older, violated section 15 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court held that the tribunal was required to decide the Charter issue as it was properly pleaded and necessary to resolve the applicant's claim.

The tribunal's decision was quashed and the matter remitted for resolution of the constitutional question.

The respondents sought public funding for Jewish day schools in Ontario, arguing that the failure to fund them breached their Charter rights under ss. 2(a) and 15(1).

Ontario brought a motion to strike the application on the basis that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Adler definitively decided the issues.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding a reasonable prospect of meeting the Bedford/Carter test for revisiting binding precedent.

On appeal, the Divisional Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the application, holding that the motion judge erred in relying on facts and circumstances that were not new and in questioning the force of the majority analysis in Adler.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' motion for certification in a systemic negligence class action against a psychiatric hospital and the Province of Ontario, the successful defendants sought costs.

Waypoint claimed approximately $1.3 million and Ontario claimed approximately $815,000.

The court found the claimed amounts to be fair and reasonable given the complexity of the case and the resources expended by the plaintiffs.

Applying section 31 of the Class Proceedings Act, the court applied an approximate 10% discount due to the public interest nature of the litigation, awarding Waypoint $1,170,000 and Ontario $735,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against Ontario, Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care, and individual hospital administrators, alleging systemic negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and Charter violations related to the use of seclusion and restraints at a maximum-security psychiatric hospital.

The court dismissed the certification motion, finding that while some patients may have individual claims for culpable seclusion, there was no basis in fact for systemic wrongdoing.

The court concluded that the claims lacked commonality, as the use of restraints required highly individualized clinical assessments, and that a joinder action, rather than a class proceeding, was the preferable procedure.

The applicant, a tow truck driver subject to a mandatory lifetime weapons prohibition, was denied a tow certificate and a tow driver certificate under the Towing and Storage Safety and Enforcement Act, 2021.

He brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the enforcement of the certificate requirements against him pending his application for judicial review and a Charter challenge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried and the applicant would suffer irreparable harm, the balance of convenience favoured the respondent due to the strong public interest in enforcing legislation designed to protect public safety in the towing industry.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal.

Pursuant to an agreement between the parties, no costs were ordered.

The appellants (Crown) appealed a Divisional Court order that declared the Math Proficiency Test (MPT) unconstitutional for infringing s. 15(1) of the Charter due to disproportionate adverse impact on racialized teacher candidates, and found it not justified under s. 1.

The Court of Appeal found that the Divisional Court erred by relying on incomplete and preliminary data (July 2021 Data) to conclude a disproportionate adverse impact.

The Court of Appeal, reviewing more complete data (December 2021 Data), determined that the MPT did not have a disproportionate adverse impact on racialized candidates' entry to the teaching profession, nor did it reinforce existing disadvantages.

The appeal was allowed, and the Divisional Court's order, including the declaration that s. 18(1)(c) of the OCTA was unconstitutional, was set aside.

The applicants, families of adults with severe autism, sought judicial review of the Ministry's decision to discontinue special, non-statutory funding for Applied Behavioural Analysis (ABA) therapy and transition them to mainstream adult developmental services.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the allocation of public funds is a political decision not subject to judicial review absent bad faith.

The court also dismissed the applicants' Charter claims, reaffirming that section 7 does not impose a positive obligation on the state to fund specific health or social services, and finding no breach of sections 7, 9, or 12 regarding one applicant's involuntary hospitalization under the Mental Health Act.

On a motion to strike a constitutional application challenging Ontario's funding of Roman Catholic and public schools to the exclusion of Jewish day schools and other independent faith-based schools, the court held it was not plain and obvious that the applicants could not satisfy the Bedford and Carter threshold for revisiting binding precedent.

The court found a reasonable prospect that changes in constitutional interpretation, state neutrality, international law, minority-rights jurisprudence, and the amendment adding s. 93A could fundamentally shift the parameters of the debate as against Ontario.

The claim against Canada was struck because education funding is a provincial matter, Canada had taken no impugned legislative action, and unincorporated treaty obligations were not directly enforceable against it in this proceeding.

The motion therefore succeeded only in part.

The appellants, two churches and their members, challenged the constitutionality of Ontario's COVID-19 regulations that imposed capacity restrictions on indoor and outdoor religious gatherings.

The motion judge found that the regulations infringed the appellants' freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter but were justified under s. 1.

On appeal, the appellants argued the motion judge erred in her treatment of expert evidence, her refusal to use hindsight evidence, her decision not to conduct separate analyses for other s. 2 Charter rights, and her s. 1 justification analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's deferential approach to the government's response to an unprecedented public health emergency, her application of the precautionary principle, or her conclusion that the measures were minimally impairing and proportionate.

The appellants sought to appeal the dismissal of their application challenging outdoor gathering restrictions imposed as public health measures during the COVID-19 pandemic, which was initially dismissed for lack of public interest standing.

The Court of Appeal determined that the underlying application was moot because the challenged regulations were no longer in force.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the appeal regarding Mr. Baber's private interest standing, finding that this issue was also moot and that a decision would not resolve any live controversy or bind future hypothetical challenges.

The moving parties, consisting of two churches and their members, brought motions to set aside judicial orders directing compliance with COVID-19 religious gathering limits.

They argued the capacity restrictions infringed their freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter.

The court found that the numerical and percentage capacity limits did infringe s. 2(a) by interfering with the claimants' ability to engage in religious activity as a collective in-person congregation.

However, applying the Oakes test, the court concluded that the restrictions were demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit in a free and democratic society to protect public health during the pandemic.

The motions were dismissed.

The Applicants sought judicial review of Ontario's Mathematics Proficiency Test (MPT), a standardized test required for teacher certification.

They argued the MPT violated s. 15 of the Charter by having a disproportionate adverse impact on racialized teacher candidates.

The Divisional Court found that the MPT infringed s. 15, as statistical evidence showed significant disparities in success rates for Black and Indigenous candidates.

The Court further held that the infringement could not be justified under s. 1, as the Respondent failed to show the MPT minimally impaired the rights of racialized candidates, given the availability of less impairing alternatives like requiring math courses in Bachelor of Education programs.

The legislative provisions creating the MPT were declared unconstitutional and of no force and effect.