Sarah Jamshidimoghadam

The appellants, operators of a long-term care home, appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their defamation action under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (anti-SLAPP motion).

The respondent had posted approximately 100 tweets over three years on anonymous accounts alleging elder abuse and serious wrongdoing at the facility.

The motion judge found the tweets related to a matter of public interest and dismissed the action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge made reviewable errors in her section 137.1(4) analysis by failing to properly assess whether the defamation claim had merit and whether the appellants had suffered harm, and by assuming the respondent's expression had value without conducting the necessary preliminary analysis.

The appellant, Grandfield Homes (Kenton) Ltd., appealed a lower court decision that denied its request for a trial on damages beyond forfeited deposits in a failed residential real estate transaction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the claim for additional damages was not sufficiently pleaded in the notice of application or supporting evidence.

The court emphasized that relief sought must be precisely stated in pleadings and that counsel's confirmation during cross-examination that additional damages were not sought in the application was binding.

The court also agreed that ordering a separate trial on damages would result in an unnecessary bifurcation and multiplicity of proceedings, causing potential prejudice to the respondent.

The applicant sought a declaration of entitlement to a deposit paid by the respondent under a contract to purchase a new build home, and a direction for a trial on further damages.

The respondent refused to close, alleging misrepresentations regarding square footage and finish quality.

The court found no valid misrepresentations, enforcing the entire agreement clause against the respondent despite claims of limited English and alleged verbal assurances.

The court declared the applicant entitled to retain the $502,500 deposit, finding a 15% deposit not unconscionable.

However, the court dismissed the applicant's request for a trial on further damages, noting it was not sought in the initial application and would lead to inefficient bifurcation of proceedings.

The plaintiffs sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendants from enforcing two vendor take-back mortgages on a commercial property and the plaintiffs' residential property.

The plaintiffs alleged they were induced to purchase the property based on inaccurate sales figures and that the transaction was fraudulent.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish irreparable harm that could not be quantified monetarily and that the balance of convenience favoured the defendants.

The decision reinforced the principle that mortgagees should be allowed to enforce contractual rights unless fraud related to the mortgage itself is proven, and noted the plaintiffs' apparent inability to honour their undertaking as to damages.

The appellant law firm appealed the dismissal of its application seeking to set a market rate for lease renewal and compensation for renovations, and also sought leave to appeal a costs order from a prior cross-motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that the respondent landlord did not breach its duty to act in good faith during lease negotiations, that the expert evidence was properly considered, and that compensation for renovations was not warranted.

The court also refused leave to appeal the costs order from the cross-motion, finding no strong grounds to interfere with the motion judge's discretion.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of agreements governing the distribution of settlement funds and the reimbursement of litigation costs following the settlement of two professional negligence actions against KPMG.

The appellants, Benzer Ltd. and Rajneesh Mathur, argued that the application judge erred in denying their reimbursement for costs under an Assignment Agreement, contending that the phrase "if any" regarding legal costs awarded should not apply when no costs were awarded.

They also argued that security for costs funds should be included in "net amounts recovered" for calculating their 15% compensation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's interpretation that the "if any" clause was valid and that security for costs were litigation expenses, not "net amounts recovered."

The applicant sought an order directing the release of funds held in trust following the settlement of two professional negligence actions against KPMG.

The parties disputed the interpretation of an Assignment Agreement and a Mutual Release regarding the distribution of the settlement funds and the return of monies paid into court as security for costs.

The court applied principles of contractual interpretation, finding that the Release did not bar the application, the respondent was not entitled to reimbursement of litigation expenses in the absence of a costs award, and the security for costs funds were not 'net amounts recovered' from the litigation.

The court ordered the funds distributed according to its interpretation of the agreements, apportioning the remaining settlement funds equally between the two actions.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim for lack of jurisdiction.

The parties were co-workers and unionized teachers subject to a collective agreement.

The plaintiff had sued the defendant for defamation, intentional interference with economic relations, and intentional infliction of mental distress arising from workplace harassment complaints.

The court applied the exclusive jurisdiction model from Weber, finding that the essential character of the dispute was workplace-related and arose from the interpretation, application, administration, or violation of the collective agreement.

The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction, as the dispute must be resolved through the grievance arbitration process.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.