Erik Savas

The applicant neighbours sought declarations, injunctions, and damages to prevent the respondents from using an eight-foot right of way across the applicants' property for motor vehicle access.

The applicants alleged the right of way was intended only for pedestrian use and that the respondents' vehicles repeatedly trespassed and caused damage.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the original 1905 grant and 1973 modification did not restrict the easement to pedestrian use, and that motor vehicle access was within the reasonable contemplation of the parties.

The court further held that the right of way was safe for vehicular use and that any minor incursions were de minimis, resulting in no compensable damages.

The applicant, a condominium owner, brought an application against a neighbouring unit owner, alleging that second-hand smoke was migrating into his unit and causing a nuisance.

The respondent was a legacy smoker exempted from the condominium's general smoking prohibition, subject to not causing a nuisance.

Relying on an odour migration assessment and security logs, the Tribunal found that the respondent's unit was the probable source of the smoke odours and that the migration constituted an unreasonable nuisance.

The Tribunal ordered the respondent to seal the cracks around her door and furnace at her own expense to abate the nuisance, and to reimburse the applicant's Tribunal filing fees.

The applicant condominium corporation sought an order requiring the respondent unit owner and his tenants to comply with noise and nuisance rules.

The corporation alleged the tenants created unreasonable noise in their unit and engaged in disruptive conduct on the common elements.

The Tribunal found that the tenants' noise in the unit constituted a nuisance contrary to section 117(2) of the Condominium Act, but their conduct on the common elements did not.

The Tribunal further held that the unit owner failed to take reasonable steps to ensure his tenants' compliance under section 119(2) of the Act.

The owner was ordered to take specific enforcement steps and pay $4,700 in costs.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed a decision by Tarion Warranty Corporation denying its claim for major structural defect (MSD) warranty coverage for its underground parking garage.

The builder argued the claim was barred by previous settlement agreements.

The Tribunal found the previous agreements only applied to first and second-year warranty claims and did not release future MSD claims.

On the merits, the Tribunal preferred the evidence of the appellant's structural engineers and found that the builder's failure to install continuous expansion joints throughout the structure and the use of defective concrete resulting in delamination constituted a major structural defect under the function test.

The Tribunal ordered Tarion to pay the appellant $1,565,313.43 for the cost of repairs to the garage.

The applicant condominium corporation brought a motion to remove the agent representing the respondent owner and the intervenor tenants, arguing the agent did not qualify for the 'friend' exemption under the Tribunal's Rules of Practice and Law Society By-law 4.

The Tribunal found that the agent qualified as a friend to the intervenors and could continue to represent them.

However, the Tribunal found no evidence of a relationship between the agent and the respondent owner beyond this case, and disqualified the agent from representing the respondent.

This appeal concerned the interpretation and breach of a "Buyback Provision" (BBP) in an agreement for the transfer of property.

The appellant, Mr. Quinn, argued that the BBP was an option requiring strict compliance, which the respondents, Ms. Jones and Mr. Jones, failed to meet.

The Court of Appeal characterized the BBP as an option but found that Mr. Quinn's agent acted in bad faith by obstructing the respondents' attempts to exercise the option.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the lower court's order for specific performance of the buyback, with a minor clarification regarding the return of items.

Tarion Warranty Corporation brought a motion to adjourn a scheduled 10-day hearing regarding a major structural defect warranty claim and to instead hold a one-day motion to dismiss the appeal based on a prior settlement agreement.

The appellant opposed the motion.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal dismissed the motion, finding that an adjournment would prejudice the appellant and that Tarion had failed to raise the settlement issue in a timely manner.

The Tribunal ordered that the settlement issue be determined as a preliminary matter at the commencement of the scheduled hearing.

The applicant, a condominium unit owner, requested copies of the condominium corporation's legal invoices from 2017 to 2022.

The respondent corporation denied the request, citing solicitor-client privilege and statutory exemptions under the Condominium Act.

The Condominium Authority Tribunal found that the applicant was entitled to redacted copies of the invoices that show only the total amounts billed and paid, protecting privileged information while serving the open book principle.

The tribunal also determined the reasonable fees the respondent could charge for redacting and photocopying the records, and ordered the respondent to reimburse the applicant's tribunal filing fee.

The applicant filed an application with the Condominium Authority Tribunal which proceeded to Stage 2 mediation.

The applicant was given permission to move the matter to Stage 3 but failed to pay the required fee within the prescribed 15-day period, despite a reminder from Tribunal staff.

Consequently, the Tribunal ordered the case closed and dismissed under Rule 34.3 of the CAT's Rules of Practice.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a forum selection clause in a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA).

The appellants, Savanta Inc. and GEI Consultants, Inc., sought to stay portions of an action and counterclaim, arguing that the clause conferred exclusive jurisdiction on Massachusetts courts.

The clause stated disputes "must be brought in any state or federal court... in Massachusetts, and each Party irrevocably submits and agrees to attorn to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of such court." The motion judge found the clause ambiguous and thus non-exclusive, allowing Ontario to retain jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in her interpretation that the term "non-exclusive" applied to the jurisdiction generally, not merely between state and federal courts within Massachusetts.

The respondents in a Condominium Authority Tribunal (CAT) application brought a motion to stay or adjourn the CAT proceeding pending the resolution of a related application they filed with the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO).

The underlying dispute involved the condominium corporation's enforcement of breed and weight restrictions against a resident's service dog.

The Tribunal applied the factors for staying multiple proceedings and found that the CAT application was ready to proceed, the HRTO application had not yet been served, and the CAT had jurisdiction to resolve the human rights issues.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

These consolidated applications concerned a 100-acre farm property transferred under a distressed sale arrangement containing a rental agreement and an eight-year buyback provision.

The court found that the responding party, acting through his attorney/mandatary, obstructed and frustrated the moving party’s repeated efforts to exercise the contractual buyback right, and thereby breached the agreement.

The court held that the breach supported both contractual enforcement and a constructive trust, and granted a mandatory injunction requiring the transfer to proceed on terms equivalent to those due on May 31, 2021.

Although the court accepted that the occupancy arrangement was commercial in nature and that some lease breaches had been shown, it refused termination and related relief under the Commercial Tenancies Act as inequitable in the circumstances.

The applicant, a condominium unit owner, sought an exemption from a newly enacted 'no dog rule' for a dog she had placed a deposit on prior to the rule's effective date.

The condominium corporation denied the exemption because the dog was not kept in the building before the deadline.

The Condominium Authority Tribunal found that the board's interpretation and application of the rule was reasonable and made in good faith, applying the business judgment rule.

The application was dismissed without costs.

This motion concerned a dispute over a property where the applicant, the owner, sought an order for the respondent, a commercial tenant who also resided there, to vacate the premises and leave to commence a new application for damages.

The applicant argued the respondent was a trespasser due to a terminated lease and property damage.

The respondent argued the applicant's actions caused the damage and that the proper procedure for eviction under the Commercial Tenancies Act was not followed.

The court applied the three-part test for an injunction from RJR-MacDonald Inc., finding a serious issue but no irreparable harm if the respondent was not removed.

The court denied the request for the respondent to vacate and the leave to commence a new application, noting that the issues were already covered in existing consolidated applications.

However, the court ordered a plan for the applicant to access the property for necessary repairs, with the respondent and her son absent during work hours.

Costs were not awarded due to mixed success and poor party conduct.

The applicant condominium corporation applied to the Condominium Authority Tribunal for an order requiring the respondent owner to remove her dog from the condominium.

The respondent allowed her dog to urinate and defecate on her balcony, causing waste to fall onto the patio below.

The respondent did not participate in the hearing.

The Tribunal found that the board reasonably deemed the dog a nuisance under the declaration and ordered the respondent to clean her balcony and comply with any subsequent board order to remove the dog.

The Tribunal also awarded the applicant its filing fees and partial costs for pre-litigation legal letters, but denied legal costs for the application.

The applicants, who operated a cannabis retail store in their condominium units, sought to stay a final consent order requiring them to permanently cease their cannabis business.

The applicants argued that a recent condominium owners' meeting, which rejected their request to repeal the condominium's rule prohibiting cannabis sales, was procedurally flawed.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicants failed to meet the stringent Carlisle test for staying a final order, as the condominium corporation's conduct was not oppressive or an abuse of process.

The court also found that the applicants failed to meet the RJR-MacDonald test for a stay.

The moving parties' motion for reconsideration was previously dismissed.

The Court of Appeal ordered the moving parties to pay the responding party's costs of the motion fixed at $1,500 inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

The Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The respondents in the appeal were ordered to pay costs to the appellant in the amount of $5,919.14 for the appeal.

Additionally, the costs order from the application below was set aside, and the respondents were ordered to pay the appellant $6,669.02 for the costs of the application below.

The unit owners purchased an adjoining condominium unit and obtained board approval to create an opening in the demising wall between the units.

A new board later sought to revoke the approval, restrict the owners' use of common elements, and impose an onerous, retroactive section 98 agreement unlike those given to other owners.

The application judge found the Condominium's conduct oppressive under section 135 of the Condominium Act, 1998, ordered the execution of a standard section 98 agreement, and awarded damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Condominium's appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that the Condominium acted oppressively and that the original board approval was valid as the alteration was not material to the Condominium.

This decision concerns a motion for reconsideration brought by Niagara North Condominium Corporation No. 6 and Simpson Wigle Law LLP, seeking to overturn a previous Court of Appeal decision (2019 ONCA 762) that allowed Jean Temedio to conduct an out-of-time assessment of legal accounts.

The moving parties argued the panel relied on a special circumstance (findings by Taylor J. regarding the reasonableness of legal costs and the corporation's conduct) that was not properly before the court.

The Court of Appeal denied the motion for reconsideration, finding that the reasonableness of accounts was squarely before the court, Taylor J.'s decision was referenced by both parties, and it was not decisive to the original appeal's outcome.

The court also noted that challenges to Taylor J.'s decision constituted an improper collateral attack.