Erik Savas

This appeal concerned the interpretation and breach of a "Buyback Provision" (BBP) in an agreement for the transfer of property.

The appellant, Mr. Quinn, argued that the BBP was an option requiring strict compliance, which the respondents, Ms. Jones and Mr. Jones, failed to meet.

The Court of Appeal characterized the BBP as an option but found that Mr. Quinn's agent acted in bad faith by obstructing the respondents' attempts to exercise the option.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the lower court's order for specific performance of the buyback, with a minor clarification regarding the return of items.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a forum selection clause in a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA).

The appellants, Savanta Inc. and GEI Consultants, Inc., sought to stay portions of an action and counterclaim, arguing that the clause conferred exclusive jurisdiction on Massachusetts courts.

The clause stated disputes "must be brought in any state or federal court... in Massachusetts, and each Party irrevocably submits and agrees to attorn to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of such court." The motion judge found the clause ambiguous and thus non-exclusive, allowing Ontario to retain jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in her interpretation that the term "non-exclusive" applied to the jurisdiction generally, not merely between state and federal courts within Massachusetts.

This motion concerned a dispute over a property where the applicant, the owner, sought an order for the respondent, a commercial tenant who also resided there, to vacate the premises and leave to commence a new application for damages.

The applicant argued the respondent was a trespasser due to a terminated lease and property damage.

The respondent argued the applicant's actions caused the damage and that the proper procedure for eviction under the Commercial Tenancies Act was not followed.

The court applied the three-part test for an injunction from RJR-MacDonald Inc., finding a serious issue but no irreparable harm if the respondent was not removed.

The court denied the request for the respondent to vacate and the leave to commence a new application, noting that the issues were already covered in existing consolidated applications.

However, the court ordered a plan for the applicant to access the property for necessary repairs, with the respondent and her son absent during work hours.

Costs were not awarded due to mixed success and poor party conduct.

The applicants, who operated a cannabis retail store in their condominium units, sought to stay a final consent order requiring them to permanently cease their cannabis business.

The applicants argued that a recent condominium owners' meeting, which rejected their request to repeal the condominium's rule prohibiting cannabis sales, was procedurally flawed.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicants failed to meet the stringent Carlisle test for staying a final order, as the condominium corporation's conduct was not oppressive or an abuse of process.

The court also found that the applicants failed to meet the RJR-MacDonald test for a stay.

This decision concerns a motion for reconsideration brought by Niagara North Condominium Corporation No. 6 and Simpson Wigle Law LLP, seeking to overturn a previous Court of Appeal decision (2019 ONCA 762) that allowed Jean Temedio to conduct an out-of-time assessment of legal accounts.

The moving parties argued the panel relied on a special circumstance (findings by Taylor J. regarding the reasonableness of legal costs and the corporation's conduct) that was not properly before the court.

The Court of Appeal denied the motion for reconsideration, finding that the reasonableness of accounts was squarely before the court, Taylor J.'s decision was referenced by both parties, and it was not decisive to the original appeal's outcome.

The court also noted that challenges to Taylor J.'s decision constituted an improper collateral attack.

A condominium corporation sought to recover its actual legal costs from a unit owner for pre-litigation correspondence, a compliance proceeding, and appeal-related proceedings.

The unit owner applied for assessment of the legal bills.

The application judge referred only the appeal bills for assessment, finding insufficient special circumstances for the pre-litigation and compliance proceeding bills.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a third party liable to pay legal bills should receive more favourable consideration than the client who received and paid the account.

The court found special circumstances existed due to the corporation's unsuccessful pursuit of an extreme eviction remedy that was criticized by the trial judge, and the significant disparity between the $52,000 in legal fees and the $2,500 costs award.

All bills were referred for assessment.

The applicants, Michael and Victoria Noguera, sought an oppression remedy under s. 135 of the Condominium Act, 1998, against Muskoka Condominium Corporation No. 22, alleging oppressive and unfairly prejudicial conduct.

This arose from a dispute over the Board's approval of structural changes to their units, the requirement for a s. 98 agreement, and restrictions on their use of common elements.

The Condominium brought a cross-application to re-examine the approval process.

The court found the Board's initial approval of the structural changes to be valid, rejecting claims of conflict of interest or lack of quorum.

It determined that the Condominium's subsequent actions, including demanding an overly broad s. 98 agreement and restricting common element use, were oppressive and unfair.

The court ordered the parties to enter into a modified s. 98 agreement, permitted the applicants to use the lakeside path, and awarded them $10,000 in general damages.

The Condominium's cross-application was dismissed.

The moving parties sought an interlocutory injunction preventing the responding parties from excluding them from jointly operating several addiction-treatment medical clinics and pharmacies following a breakdown in their business relationship.

The applicants also sought directions regarding patient communications, access to clinics, and division of software and other assets.

Applying the test for interlocutory injunctions from R.J.R.-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), the court held that the applicants failed to demonstrate irreparable harm if access to the clinics was denied.

The court found that the applicants had already established alternative clinic locations and were intending to compete with the respondents.

Instead of granting the injunction, the court ordered a structured disengagement process, including patient choice protections and limited directions regarding software and patient database access.

Following the dismissal of a defendant’s motion seeking an interim stay of an action and a stay of a production order pending a summary judgment motion, the successful plaintiff sought costs payable immediately and on a substantial indemnity basis.

The defendant argued the issue of costs should be reserved to the judge hearing the summary judgment motion, or alternatively fixed on a partial indemnity basis.

The court reaffirmed that the successful party on a motion generally has a reasonable expectation of costs and that substantial indemnity costs are reserved for exceptional circumstances involving egregious or unreasonable conduct.

Finding no such conduct and rejecting the request to defer the issue, the court ordered costs on a partial indemnity basis.

Costs were fixed at $10,000 inclusive of disbursements and tax, payable within 30 days.

The moving party corporation sought to set aside a default judgment in an action alleging breach of contract relating to approximately $800,000 advanced for construction of jail cells.

The corporation had initially chosen not to defend the action but later sought to file a defence and counterclaim asserting equitable set-off and alleging breach of contract and breach of trust by the plaintiff.

Applying the principles from Nobosoft Corp. v. No Borders Inc., the court considered the surrounding factual matrix, including the reasons for the delay, the absence of prejudice, and whether there was an arguable defence.

Although the proposed defence appeared weak and lacked specificity, the court held that an arguable defence existed and that the delay was not inordinate.

The default judgment was set aside on terms, including security for costs of $20,000 and payment of the plaintiff’s motion costs.