Yashoda Ranganathan

This endorsement addresses seven motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of provisions of the Security from Trespass and Protecting Food Safety Act, 2020, and its Regulation 701/20, which were found to violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to intervene to Animal Alliance, Centre for Free Expression (CFE), Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA), and Labour Issues Coordinating Committee (LICC), finding they offered useful and distinct perspectives without unduly expanding the appeal's scope.

Motions by Justicia for Migrant Workers (J4MW), Canadian Journalists for Free Expression (CJFE), and Animal Environmental Legal Advocacy (AEL Advocacy) were dismissed, primarily due to concerns about expanding the issues or duplication of arguments.

The applicants, animal rights activists, challenged the constitutionality of the Security from Trespass and Protecting Food Safety Act and its Regulation.

They argued that provisions voiding consent to enter agricultural premises if obtained under false pretences, and provisions prohibiting interaction with farm animals, violated their Charter rights to freedom of expression and assembly.

The court found that the Act's prohibition on interacting with animals did not violate the Charter, as there is no constitutional right to physically interact with another's private property.

However, the court held that Section 9 of the Regulation, which penalized any false statement made to gain access to agricultural premises, unjustifiably infringed freedom of expression.

The court struck down Section 9 and certain limitations within the whistleblower and journalist exemptions, while upholding the rest of the Act.

The appellants (Crown) appealed a Divisional Court order that declared the Math Proficiency Test (MPT) unconstitutional for infringing s. 15(1) of the Charter due to disproportionate adverse impact on racialized teacher candidates, and found it not justified under s. 1.

The Court of Appeal found that the Divisional Court erred by relying on incomplete and preliminary data (July 2021 Data) to conclude a disproportionate adverse impact.

The Court of Appeal, reviewing more complete data (December 2021 Data), determined that the MPT did not have a disproportionate adverse impact on racialized candidates' entry to the teaching profession, nor did it reinforce existing disadvantages.

The appeal was allowed, and the Divisional Court's order, including the declaration that s. 18(1)(c) of the OCTA was unconstitutional, was set aside.

This endorsement addresses four motions for leave to intervene as friends of the court in a constitutional challenge brought by Animal Justice et al. against the Security from Trespass and Protecting Food Safety Act, 2020.

The applicants in the main case allege violations of Charter rights, including freedom of expression, freedom of the press, peaceful assembly, liberty, security of the person, arbitrary detention, and reverse onus.

The court applied the test for intervention, considering the nature of the case, the issues, and the likelihood of a useful contribution without causing injustice or expanding the record.

The motion by Justice for Migrant Workers was dismissed for lack of a substantial interest and for attempting to expand the issues.

The motion by Centre for Free Expression was allowed in part, limited to the existing issues and excluding a proposed s. 2(a) Charter argument due to lack of a developed record and expertise.

The motions by Animal Alliance of Canada and Regan Russell Foundation were fully allowed, as they met the criteria and did not seek to expand the issues.

All successful interventions were granted subject to specific conditions on written and oral submissions.

The appellant municipality challenged provincial legislation that reduced Toronto City Council's ward structure from 47 to 25 wards mid-election campaign, arguing it violated the Charter's freedom of expression guarantee and the unwritten constitutional principle of democracy.

The majority held that the appellant's claim was a positive rights claim governed by the Baier framework, requiring demonstration of radical frustration of expression effectively precluding meaningful expression, a threshold not met where candidates had 69 days to re-orient their campaigns under the new structure.

The majority further held that unwritten constitutional principles cannot serve as independent bases for invalidating legislation, and that the democratic principle cannot be used to narrow provincial authority over municipalities under s. 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The dissent would have allowed the appeal, finding the timing of the legislation violated s. 2(b) and that Ontario offered no pressing and substantial justification for making the changes during an ongoing election.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of amendments to the Election Finances Act that extended the pre-election restricted spending period for third-party political advertising from six to twelve months.

The court found that the 12-month restriction infringed freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Oakes test, the court held that while the objective of fostering fair elections was pressing and substantial, the 12-month period failed the minimal impairment test because the government's own experts indicated a six-month period was effective.

The impugned provisions were declared of no force or effect.

The applicants in a constitutional application requested leave to file factums exceeding the 30-page limit prescribed by the Practice Direction.

The Attorney General opposed the request.

The court denied the request, emphasizing that the 30-page limit is a serious policy intended to focus counsel on the issues, and that leave is exceptional and granted sparingly.

The court noted that since there was still a week before the factums were due, counsel had sufficient time to produce shorter, more focused versions.

The Ontario legislature enacted the Better Local Government Act, 2018, which reduced Toronto City Council from 47 to 25 councillors and changed ward boundaries in the middle of a municipal election campaign.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of the Act, arguing it violated section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (freedom of expression) and unwritten constitutional principles.

The application judge found the Act violated section 2(b) and allowed the application.

On appeal, the majority (D.M. Miller J.A., with Tulloch and Harvison Young JJ.A. concurring) allowed the appeal and upheld the Act as constitutional.

The majority held that section 2(b) does not guarantee effective expression, does not require government to maintain platforms for expression, and does not incorporate the right to vote from section 3 of the Charter.

The majority also rejected arguments based on unwritten constitutional principles and jurisdictional limits in section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

MacPherson J.A. (with Nordheimer J.A. concurring) dissented, finding the Act infringed section 2(b) by interfering with freedom of expression during an active election and that the infringement could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter.

R.A.R., the father of A.J.H-R., brought a motion in the Superior Court seeking to set aside an adoption order and extend the time to appeal a Crown Wardship order, which was granted without access in 2011.

This action was prompted by the Motherisk Commission's finding that hair follicle tests significantly influenced the original wardship decision.

The current motion was for directions on the proper procedural route, venue, and statutory pathway, with R.A.R. relying on sections 7 and 24 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court adjourned the procedural motion to allow the newly retained counsel for the adoptive parents to take instructions and to encourage the parties to explore alternative dispute resolution, such as mediation, given the complex issues involved.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed a Superior Court decision that declared provisions of Bill 5 (Better Local Government Act, 2018) unconstitutional for violating freedom of expression rights under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Bill 5 reduced Toronto's municipal wards from 47 to 25 mid-election.

The application judge found that the mid-campaign change substantially interfered with candidates' ability to communicate their political messages and violated voters' right to effective representation.

The Court of Appeal granted a stay of the lower court's order pending appeal, finding a strong likelihood that the application judge erred in law and that the appeal would succeed.

The court held that Bill 5 does not limit or restrict candidates' messages and that the right to effective representation falls under s. 3 (democratic rights), not s. 2(b) (freedom of expression), and s. 3 does not apply to municipal elections.

The province enacted Bill 5, reducing Toronto wards from 47 to 25, mid-municipal election.

Applicants challenged its constitutionality.

The court found Bill 5 violated candidates' and voters' freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, as it substantially interfered with campaign communication and denied effective representation due to increased ward sizes.

The violation was not justified under s. 1, as the legislative objectives (better decision-making, voter parity) were not pressing and substantial enough to warrant mid-election implementation, nor was minimal impairment demonstrated.

The impugned provisions were declared unconstitutional and set aside, requiring the election to proceed with 47 wards.

The applicant moved to strike portions of an affidavit filed by the respondent Attorney General.

The underlying application involves a Charter challenge to the application of FIPPA to certain quasi-judicial tribunals.

The parties had previously agreed to limit the scope of the application to 16 specific tribunals.

The impugned affidavit evidence detailed the procedures of the Social Benefits Tribunal, which was not one of the 16 listed tribunals.

The court granted the motion, finding that the evidence improperly expanded the scope of the application contrary to a prior case management endorsement.

Various public interest groups brought motions for leave to intervene as friends of the court in a Charter challenge regarding the application of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act to administrative tribunals.

The court granted leave to intervene on consent to several groups.

For the contested proposed intervenors, the court granted leave to the Ontario Judicial Council and Justice for Children and Youth, finding they would bring unique perspectives and expertise.

The court denied leave to the Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario and the Workers' Health and Safety Legal Clinic, finding their proposed contributions would be largely repetitive of positions already represented by other parties and intervenors.

An appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing an appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming the appellant's involuntary status under the Mental Health Act.

The appellant, a dangerous offender with a lengthy history of violent and sexual crimes, challenged his detention as an involuntary psychiatric patient, arguing that the Mental Health Act was being used to extend his prison sentence indefinitely (psychiatric gating) and that his Charter rights were violated.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding that the appellant suffers from mental disorders (paraphilia, antisocial personality disorder with psychopathy) that pose a serious risk to others, that the initial Form 1 was properly completed, and that the appellant's Charter claims under sections 7, 9, 11(h), and 12 all failed.

The applicants challenged s. 65(5.7) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA), which excludes all records relating to abortion services, arguing it violated their s. 2(b) Charter right to freedom of expression by impeding meaningful public discussion.

The court found that the provision substantially impeded meaningful debate on a matter of public interest, establishing a prima facie breach of s. 2(b).

While the objective of protecting privacy and safety was pressing, the absolute exclusion of all records, including non-identifying statistical information, was not rationally connected, minimally impairing, or proportional to the objective.

The court declared s. 65(5.7) of FIPPA to be of no force or effect, suspending the declaration for 12 months to allow the legislature to enact remedial legislation.

Following a complex family law trial involving challenges to a marriage contract, equalization, support arrears, and related financial claims, the successful party sought substantial costs.

The court considered Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and found that the unsuccessful party acted in bad faith, including failing to provide disclosure, refusing reasonable settlement offers, and engaging in conduct that prolonged the litigation.

The court held that such conduct justified full recovery costs.

After deducting certain conference-related and administrative charges, the court awarded substantial costs and prejudgment interest to the successful party and costs to added respondents from the date of their settlement offer.

In an appeal from Ontario, the appellants sought a stay of a defamation action on the basis of lack of jurisdiction and forum non conveniens.

The Court held that Ontario had a real and substantial connection because the alleged tort was published in Ontario and the plaintiff pleaded publication and reputational harm in that forum.

The Court also held that the appellants failed to show Quebec was clearly more appropriate, giving deference to the motion judge’s discretionary forum analysis.

The Court discussed concerns about forum shopping and noted, without deciding, that choice-of-law rules in multijurisdictional defamation may warrant future refinement.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The parties separated after a 16-year marriage.

During a brief reconciliation attempt, they negotiated a marriage contract.

The wife intended to give the husband one-half the value of the matrimonial home, but a drafting error in the contract gave him the full value.

The husband and his lawyer noticed the error but failed to seek clarification.

At the time, the wife was suffering from undiagnosed bipolar disorder and hypomania, causing her to act recklessly.

The court found the contract void ab initio due to a lack of consensus ad idem on a fundamental term.

Alternatively, the court set aside the contract under the Family Law Act due to the wife's lack of capacity and unconscionability.

The court ordered an equalization payment, retroactive spousal support, and retroactive and ongoing child support.