Yashoda Ranganathan

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed a Superior Court decision striking down provisions of the Security from Trespass and Protecting Food Safety Act, 2020 and its Regulation.

The application judge had found that provisions invalidating consent to enter a farm obtained under false pretences violated the freedom of expression of animal rights activists seeking to conduct undercover exposés.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the activists' claim was a positive rights claim seeking access to private property on their own terms.

The Court found that the legislation did not substantially interfere with freedom of expression and that any limits were justified under section 1 of the Charter.

The appellant sought to uphold a provincial spending limit restricting third party political advertising to $600,000 in the year before a fixed-date election, while political parties faced no limits in the first six months of that period.

The majority held that the spending limit infringes s. 3 of the Charter by creating an absolute disproportionality in the political discourse, allowing political parties to drown out third party voices during a critical democratic period.

The majority further held the limit could not be saved under s. 1 as it failed the minimal impairment stage.

Two sets of dissenting judges would have allowed the appeal, finding the limit did not infringe s. 3 of the Charter on the evidentiary record, with the dissenters disagreeing on whether an expressive component exists within s. 3.

This endorsement addresses seven motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of provisions of the Security from Trespass and Protecting Food Safety Act, 2020, and its Regulation 701/20, which were found to violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to intervene to Animal Alliance, Centre for Free Expression (CFE), Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA), and Labour Issues Coordinating Committee (LICC), finding they offered useful and distinct perspectives without unduly expanding the appeal's scope.

Motions by Justicia for Migrant Workers (J4MW), Canadian Journalists for Free Expression (CJFE), and Animal Environmental Legal Advocacy (AEL Advocacy) were dismissed, primarily due to concerns about expanding the issues or duplication of arguments.

The respondents sought public funding for Jewish day schools in Ontario, arguing that the failure to fund them breached their Charter rights under ss. 2(a) and 15(1).

Ontario brought a motion to strike the application on the basis that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Adler definitively decided the issues.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding a reasonable prospect of meeting the Bedford/Carter test for revisiting binding precedent.

On appeal, the Divisional Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the application, holding that the motion judge erred in relying on facts and circumstances that were not new and in questioning the force of the majority analysis in Adler.

The applicants, animal rights activists, challenged the constitutionality of the Security from Trespass and Protecting Food Safety Act and its Regulation.

They argued that provisions voiding consent to enter agricultural premises if obtained under false pretences, and provisions prohibiting interaction with farm animals, violated their Charter rights to freedom of expression and assembly.

The court found that the Act's prohibition on interacting with animals did not violate the Charter, as there is no constitutional right to physically interact with another's private property.

However, the court held that Section 9 of the Regulation, which penalized any false statement made to gain access to agricultural premises, unjustifiably infringed freedom of expression.

The court struck down Section 9 and certain limitations within the whistleblower and journalist exemptions, while upholding the rest of the Act.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal.

Pursuant to an agreement between the parties, no costs were ordered.

The appellants (Crown) appealed a Divisional Court order that declared the Math Proficiency Test (MPT) unconstitutional for infringing s. 15(1) of the Charter due to disproportionate adverse impact on racialized teacher candidates, and found it not justified under s. 1.

The Court of Appeal found that the Divisional Court erred by relying on incomplete and preliminary data (July 2021 Data) to conclude a disproportionate adverse impact.

The Court of Appeal, reviewing more complete data (December 2021 Data), determined that the MPT did not have a disproportionate adverse impact on racialized candidates' entry to the teaching profession, nor did it reinforce existing disadvantages.

The appeal was allowed, and the Divisional Court's order, including the declaration that s. 18(1)(c) of the OCTA was unconstitutional, was set aside.

On a motion to strike a constitutional application challenging Ontario's funding of Roman Catholic and public schools to the exclusion of Jewish day schools and other independent faith-based schools, the court held it was not plain and obvious that the applicants could not satisfy the Bedford and Carter threshold for revisiting binding precedent.

The court found a reasonable prospect that changes in constitutional interpretation, state neutrality, international law, minority-rights jurisprudence, and the amendment adding s. 93A could fundamentally shift the parameters of the debate as against Ontario.

The claim against Canada was struck because education funding is a provincial matter, Canada had taken no impugned legislative action, and unincorporated treaty obligations were not directly enforceable against it in this proceeding.

The motion therefore succeeded only in part.

This endorsement addresses four motions for leave to intervene as friends of the court in a constitutional challenge brought by Animal Justice et al. against the Security from Trespass and Protecting Food Safety Act, 2020.

The applicants in the main case allege violations of Charter rights, including freedom of expression, freedom of the press, peaceful assembly, liberty, security of the person, arbitrary detention, and reverse onus.

The court applied the test for intervention, considering the nature of the case, the issues, and the likelihood of a useful contribution without causing injustice or expanding the record.

The motion by Justice for Migrant Workers was dismissed for lack of a substantial interest and for attempting to expand the issues.

The motion by Centre for Free Expression was allowed in part, limited to the existing issues and excluding a proposed s. 2(a) Charter argument due to lack of a developed record and expertise.

The motions by Animal Alliance of Canada and Regan Russell Foundation were fully allowed, as they met the criteria and did not seek to expand the issues.

All successful interventions were granted subject to specific conditions on written and oral submissions.

The Ministry of Health appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing its application for judicial review of Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decisions.

The Tribunal had found that the Ministry engaged in systemic gender discrimination against Ontario midwives by abandoning equitable compensation principles established in 1993, leading to a significant compensation gap between midwives and community health clinic physicians.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that the standard of review for the Tribunal's decisions is reasonableness, even post-Vavilov.

The Court held that the Adjudicator's liability and remedy decisions were reasonable, as they revealed a rational chain of analysis supported by the evidence, and dismissed the appeal.

The Applicants sought judicial review of Ontario's Mathematics Proficiency Test (MPT), a standardized test required for teacher certification.

They argued the MPT violated s. 15 of the Charter by having a disproportionate adverse impact on racialized teacher candidates.

The Divisional Court found that the MPT infringed s. 15, as statistical evidence showed significant disparities in success rates for Black and Indigenous candidates.

The Court further held that the infringement could not be justified under s. 1, as the Respondent failed to show the MPT minimally impaired the rights of racialized candidates, given the availability of less impairing alternatives like requiring math courses in Bachelor of Education programs.

The legislative provisions creating the MPT were declared unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

The appellant municipality challenged provincial legislation that reduced Toronto City Council's ward structure from 47 to 25 wards mid-election campaign, arguing it violated the Charter's freedom of expression guarantee and the unwritten constitutional principle of democracy.

The majority held that the appellant's claim was a positive rights claim governed by the Baier framework, requiring demonstration of radical frustration of expression effectively precluding meaningful expression, a threshold not met where candidates had 69 days to re-orient their campaigns under the new structure.

The majority further held that unwritten constitutional principles cannot serve as independent bases for invalidating legislation, and that the democratic principle cannot be used to narrow provincial authority over municipalities under s. 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The dissent would have allowed the appeal, finding the timing of the legislation violated s. 2(b) and that Ontario offered no pressing and substantial justification for making the changes during an ongoing election.

This was a costs endorsement following a successful constitutional application challenging provisions of election finance legislation under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The court held that partial indemnity remained the appropriate scale because the respondent government's conduct was professional and did not justify substantial or full indemnity costs.

In fixing a fair overall award, the court emphasized that four applicant groups had advanced identical legal challenges in a consolidated proceeding, and that economies of scale had to be reflected in the result.

The court reduced the aggregate request from approximately $690,000 to $500,000 and apportioned that amount among the successful applicants.

No costs were awarded for or against the Chief Electoral Officer or the intervenor.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of amendments to the Election Finances Act that extended the pre-election restricted spending period for third-party political advertising from six to twelve months.

The court found that the 12-month restriction infringed freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Oakes test, the court held that while the objective of fostering fair elections was pressing and substantial, the 12-month period failed the minimal impairment test because the government's own experts indicated a six-month period was effective.

The impugned provisions were declared of no force or effect.

The applicants in a constitutional application requested leave to file factums exceeding the 30-page limit prescribed by the Practice Direction.

The Attorney General opposed the request.

The court denied the request, emphasizing that the 30-page limit is a serious policy intended to focus counsel on the issues, and that leave is exceptional and granted sparingly.

The court noted that since there was still a week before the factums were due, counsel had sufficient time to produce shorter, more focused versions.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Chief Electoral Officer to refer complaints to the Attorney General as apparent contraventions of the Elections Finances Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the decision did not affect the legal rights, interests, property, privileges, or liberty of any person.

Applying the Court of Appeal's reasoning in PC Ontario Fund, the court held the decision was not susceptible to judicial review and did not engage section 2(b) Charter rights.

The Ministry of Health applied for judicial review of decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario finding that the Ministry engaged in systemic gender discrimination in setting compensation for midwives.

The Tribunal found that the Ministry had abandoned historical compensation principles that aligned midwives with community health centre physicians, leading to an inequitable compensation gap.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Tribunal's findings of adverse treatment and the connection to sex were reasonable.

The Court also upheld the Tribunal's remedial orders, which included a 20% retroactive compensation increase and $7,500 per eligible midwife for injury to dignity.

The moving party sought a stay of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario remedial decision pending the outcome of its judicial review application.

The moving party argued that compliance with the remedial orders would divert critical resources away from the COVID-19 pandemic response.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the Divisional Court found that the moving party established a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm to the public interest, and that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The motion was granted, and the Tribunal's orders were stayed until 10 days following the release of the judicial review decision.

The Ontario legislature enacted the Better Local Government Act, 2018, which reduced Toronto City Council from 47 to 25 councillors and changed ward boundaries in the middle of a municipal election campaign.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of the Act, arguing it violated section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (freedom of expression) and unwritten constitutional principles.

The application judge found the Act violated section 2(b) and allowed the application.

On appeal, the majority (D.M. Miller J.A., with Tulloch and Harvison Young JJ.A. concurring) allowed the appeal and upheld the Act as constitutional.

The majority held that section 2(b) does not guarantee effective expression, does not require government to maintain platforms for expression, and does not incorporate the right to vote from section 3 of the Charter.

The majority also rejected arguments based on unwritten constitutional principles and jurisdictional limits in section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

MacPherson J.A. (with Nordheimer J.A. concurring) dissented, finding the Act infringed section 2(b) by interfering with freedom of expression during an active election and that the infringement could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter.

R.A.R., the father of A.J.H-R., brought a motion in the Superior Court seeking to set aside an adoption order and extend the time to appeal a Crown Wardship order, which was granted without access in 2011.

This action was prompted by the Motherisk Commission's finding that hair follicle tests significantly influenced the original wardship decision.

The current motion was for directions on the proper procedural route, venue, and statutory pathway, with R.A.R. relying on sections 7 and 24 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court adjourned the procedural motion to allow the newly retained counsel for the adoptive parents to take instructions and to encourage the parties to explore alternative dispute resolution, such as mediation, given the complex issues involved.