6 total
Ontario jurisdiction over a child born abroad was affirmed due to the mother's attornment.
The appellant mother challenged the Ontario Superior Court's jurisdiction over her youngest child, who was born in the U.S. and had never been to Canada, in the context of temporary parenting orders.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding of jurisdiction, holding that the Superior Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under the Divorce Act because the father was ordinarily resident in Ontario.
Furthermore, the mother had attorned to the court's jurisdiction by actively participating in the merits of the underlying motions without formally challenging jurisdiction.
The appeal was dismissed, with no order as to costs due to the mother's reliance on public assistance.
Court orders mother to travel to Ottawa for summer in-person visits and section 30 assessment.
The parties returned to court to address temporary parenting arrangements and the appointment of a section 30 assessor.
The father and paternal grandparents sought expanded, in-person parenting time during the summer, while the mother opposed in-person visits and requested that the assessment be conducted entirely virtually.
The court found that virtual visits had been positive and ordered the mother to travel to Ottawa with the children for the summer to facilitate graduated in-person visits.
The court also appointed the father's proposed assessor, requiring in-person observation visits due to the complex family dynamics and allegations of domestic violence.
Divisional Court lacks jurisdiction over appeals of final Divorce Act orders; appeal transferred.
The appellant mother appealed a motion judge's final order asserting jurisdiction over the parties' fourth child under the Divorce Act.
The Divisional Court raised the issue of its own jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
The court concluded that because the order appealed from was made under the federal Divorce Act, rather than an Ontario statute, the appeal route lies to the Court of Appeal under section 6(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, not the Divisional Court.
Applying the Dunnington test, the court declined to dismiss the appeal and instead transferred it to the Court of Appeal.
Motion granted to appoint the Children's Lawyer for children in proceeding challenging adoption due to Motherisk flaws.
The biological mother brought a motion to appoint the Office of the Children's Lawyer to represent her two biological children in her underlying application to set aside an adoption order.
The underlying application was based on the reliance on flawed Motherisk drug testing reports in the original Crown wardship proceedings.
The Children's Aid Society and the adoptive parents opposed the motion as premature.
The court granted the motion, finding that the children's rights to participate and be heard were paramount, and appointed the Children's Lawyer pursuant to section 89(3.1) of the Courts of Justice Act.
The court adjourned a procedural motion to set aside an adoption following flawed Motherisk testing.
R.A.R., the father of A.J.H-R., brought a motion in the Superior Court seeking to set aside an adoption order and extend the time to appeal a Crown Wardship order, which was granted without access in 2011.
This action was prompted by the Motherisk Commission's finding that hair follicle tests significantly influenced the original wardship decision.
The current motion was for directions on the proper procedural route, venue, and statutory pathway, with R.A.R. relying on sections 7 and 24 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
The court adjourned the procedural motion to allow the newly retained counsel for the adoptive parents to take instructions and to encourage the parties to explore alternative dispute resolution, such as mediation, given the complex issues involved.
The court ordered the immediate return of a child to her mother, rejecting the grandmother's reliance on inadmissible hearsay to justify breaching a final consent custody order.
The respondent mother brought a motion seeking leave to bring a contempt motion on an urgent basis, a finding that the applicant grandmother was in contempt of a consent final order dated May 30, 2018, and an order directing police to locate and apprehend the child and deliver her to the mother.
The grandmother had refused to return the child at the end of a scheduled weekend access period on September 2, 2018, contrary to the final order which granted sole custody to the mother with specified access to the grandmother.
The court granted the mother's motion, ordering the grandmother to forthwith return the child to the mother's care and no later than 5:00 p.m. that day, with a police enforcement clause.
The contempt motion was adjourned.