Sarah Mae Robinson Clarke

This case concerns a temporary care and custody motion for an Indigenous child, L.L.C., who had been residing with a maternal aunt under a Customary Care Agreement (CCA).

Following the CCA's termination, the child was placed with the father.

Kina Gbezhgomi Child and Family Services initiated a protection application seeking a protection finding and a supervision order with the father.

The court determined that the federal An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families (Federal Act) applies and has paramountcy over provincial legislation (CYFSA), altering the method of analysis for Indigenous children's placements.

Applying the Federal Act's national standards, the court found it was in the child's best interests to be placed with the father, without the need for society supervision, as there were no protection concerns.

The court also ordered continued contact with the maternal aunt and suggested the matter be transitioned to a Children's Law Reform Act application.

A motion to remove counsel for a foster parent in a child protection application.

The respondent child and family services agency sought to disqualify the applicant's lawyer, who had previously represented the agency in related proceedings involving the same child.

The court applied the test from MacDonald Estate v. Martin to determine whether a conflict of interest existed.

The court found that the lawyer had access to confidential information as counsel of record for the agency in prior proceedings, including the Customary Care Agreement and the termination of the Crown Wardship Order.

The court held that the public, represented by the reasonably informed person, would not be satisfied that no misuse of confidential information would occur.

The lawyer was removed from the record.

The applicants brought a non-party production motion in a multi-party Children’s Law Reform Act application concerning the future care of three Indigenous children.

The motion sought records from Probation and Parole Services, the Ontario Provincial Police, and Payukotayno-James and Hudson’s Bay Family Services regarding the respondent parents and the children's older siblings.

The court granted the production order, finding the records relevant to determining the children's best interests and understanding the family's history, including constitutional questions related to Indigenous inherent rights.

The court balanced privacy interests against the need for full disclosure, noting the parents' non-engagement and the existing sealing order.

R.A.R., the father of A.J.H-R., brought a motion in the Superior Court seeking to set aside an adoption order and extend the time to appeal a Crown Wardship order, which was granted without access in 2011.

This action was prompted by the Motherisk Commission's finding that hair follicle tests significantly influenced the original wardship decision.

The current motion was for directions on the proper procedural route, venue, and statutory pathway, with R.A.R. relying on sections 7 and 24 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court adjourned the procedural motion to allow the newly retained counsel for the adoptive parents to take instructions and to encourage the parties to explore alternative dispute resolution, such as mediation, given the complex issues involved.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society brought a temporary care and custody motion in a child protection proceeding involving twin five-year-old girls.

The Society alleged the children were at risk of physical and emotional harm in their mother's care due to inappropriate physical discipline, exposure to parental conflict, school attendance issues, and allegations of sexual abuse against the father.

The mother opposed the motion and sought to maintain custody with minimal or no conditions.

The court found credible and trustworthy evidence of risk of harm and determined that the children could not be adequately protected by an interim supervision order given the mother's lack of cooperation with the Society and her pattern of refusing services.

The court granted the Society's motion, placing the children in the temporary care and custody of their father, subject to the Society's supervision and various terms and conditions, including supervised access for the mother.

This is a costs decision arising from two motions in a child protection application.

The Jewish Family and Child Service of Greater Toronto sought orders preventing children from attending court and receiving a psychological report.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer opposed both motions.

The court granted the agency's motions.

In the costs decision, the court addressed claims by the mother and the agency.

The mother's costs claims were dismissed.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer was ordered to pay costs to the agency in the amount of $3,850 due to their failure to meet agreed-upon filing deadlines, which caused additional work for the agency.

This motion arose from a child protection proceeding concerning two children, H. (15) and C. (12).

The children and their father sought a stay of two orders made by a lower court judge: one prohibiting the children from attending the protection hearing, and another restricting their access to a prepared report.

The moving parties argued that the refusal to accept late materials from the Children's Lawyer violated procedural fairness and that the children had a presumptive right to participate.

The court applied the R.J.R.-MacDonald test for a stay, considering it through the prism of the children's best interests.

It found no irreparable harm in denying the stays and that the balance of convenience favored dismissal, citing overwhelming evidence of emotional harm to the children from involvement in the high-conflict litigation.

The motion to stay the orders was dismissed.

The applicant child protection agency brought two motions in a protection proceeding involving two children (ages 15 and 12) arising from parental conflict following the death of a sibling and the parents' separation.

The first motion sought an order preventing the children from attending court proceedings.

The second motion sought to prevent the children from receiving a clinical assessment report prepared by a family therapist.

The court granted both motions, finding that attendance at court and access to the report would cause emotional harm to the vulnerable children who were already deeply immersed in the parental conflict and litigation.

This is a ruling on whether the definitions of "Indian" and "Native" person in the Child and Family Services Act violate equality rights under section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant society sought summary judgment in a child protection application, requesting that the child be found not to be an Indian or Native person under the Act.

The child's mother is Indigenous and the maternal grandmother is a registered member of the Qalipu Mi'kmak First Nations Band.

However, the child does not have Indian status under the Indian Act because the mother has not applied for membership in the Band.

The court found that the statutory definitions create a distinction based on an analogous ground and perpetuate disadvantage to Indigenous children who do not fall within the narrow definitions, thereby violating section 15(1) of the Charter.

The court granted the child an individual remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter, ordering that the child be treated as if he were an Indian, Native person or Native child for all purposes of the protection application and any related proceedings.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside an ex parte Mareva injunction restraining them from dealing with their assets in connection with allegations of fraud and unjust enrichment.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant fraudulently induced the transfer of $750,000 USD to a numbered company controlled by his common-law partner and that the funds were used for personal expenses and property renovations.

The court found a strong prima facie case of fraud against the individual defendant and unjust enrichment against the other defendant, and held there was a real risk of asset dissipation.

The court rejected arguments that the plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure on the ex parte motion and declined to require the plaintiff to post security for its undertaking in damages.

The Mareva injunction was continued and the defendants’ motions were dismissed.

Following a summary judgment motion in a franchise dispute, the court addressed costs after the moving party was largely unsuccessful except for striking a jury notice.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the motion had little chance of success, while the defendant argued costs should be reserved or limited because the motion was reasonably brought.

The court held that although the motion was not unreasonable, the unsuccessful party should ordinarily pay the successful party’s costs of the motion.

Applying the Rules of Civil Procedure and considering duplication of effort and partial success on the jury issue, the court fixed partial indemnity costs at $50,000 inclusive of disbursements and tax.

The defendant franchisor brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing the franchisees’ action on the basis of a mutual release signed following the failure of the franchised restaurant, and alternatively sought partial summary judgment dismissing a statutory rescission claim under the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000.

The plaintiffs argued the release was unenforceable due to unconscionability and statutory invalidity, and that disclosure deficiencies entitled them to rescind within the two‑year period applicable where no compliant disclosure document is provided.

The court held that genuine issues requiring a trial existed regarding the enforceability of the mutual release, including potential unconscionability, lack of legal advice, and imbalance of bargaining power.

The court also found that determining whether the disclosure requirements were satisfied under the statute required a full evidentiary record and could not be resolved on summary judgment.

However, the court struck the plaintiffs’ jury notice based on the contractual waiver and the equitable nature of certain relief sought.

Following competing summary judgment motions in a civil commercial dispute, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The plaintiff’s summary judgment motion had previously been dismissed, while the defendant’s cross‑motion was found premature and allowed to be brought again after discoveries.

The plaintiff argued that the defendant should not receive costs because it withdrew one cross‑motion and the remaining motion was premature.

The court found that misleading and contradictory evidence advanced by the plaintiff undermined the litigation process and forced the defendant to bring the cross‑motions.

Considering the factors in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded the defendant substantial indemnity costs.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim as statute-barred under both the former and current Limitations Act regimes.

The moving party argued that, even accepting the plaintiff’s evidence at its highest, the limitation period had expired.

The court acknowledged that the limitation argument had merit but found that credibility issues and the incomplete evidentiary record made summary determination inappropriate.

The court held that a full trial and discoveries were necessary for the trier of fact to properly assess the evidence and refine the issues.

The motion was adjourned sine die with leave to renew the limitation argument on notice.