Elizabeth McCarty

The court ruled that a child who is an access holder under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, is not limited to seeking an openness order only with persons explicitly named in an existing access order.

Instead, such a child may seek openness with any person with whom they have a beneficial and meaningful relationship, provided it is in the child's best interests.

This interpretation aligns with the plain language and purposeful approach of the CYFSA, as well as Canada's obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer's argument on jurisdiction for inter-sibling openness was affirmed.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision affirming a trial judge's order that denied him access to a child placed in extended society care.

The Court of Appeal considered whether the appellant had standing to appeal under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act and concluded that determining the appeal on the merits was in the child's best interests.

The Court admitted fresh evidence regarding the child's wishes to be adopted without ongoing access by the appellant.

Finding no error in the courts below and prioritizing the child's best interests, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a mid-trial consent order that would have automatically returned the child to the parents' care following a six-month interim care order.

The child, who had legal representation and party status under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, opposed the consent order.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The court held that the trial judge erred in law by making a final order based on consent when the child opposed it, thereby disregarding the child's statutory participatory rights.

The court further held that the trial judge's failure to provide reasons for the decision constituted an independent error of law.

Appeal from a Superior Court decision upholding a Crown wardship (extended care) order for four children.

The parents appealed, seeking return of the children to their care and challenging the access order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the adjournment request based on alleged inappropriate text messages from Society workers, finding that even if the workers were discredited, ample independent evidence supported the protection finding and extended care order.

The court upheld the appeal judge's decision, which maintained the extended care order while granting access to the parents, finding this arrangement best served the children's interests.

The applicant child, J.N.-L., brought an openness application seeking an order for continued contact with her four siblings, who were respondents along with the Children's Aid Society.

The primary issue addressed was the procedural requirement of notice to a biological parent (Ms. N.) who had not signed a consent to the openness order, particularly concerning a child in her primary care.

The court determined that while statutory notice provisions for openness applications do not explicitly extend to such parents, the court retains discretion under the Family Law Rules to add parties or require service.

Given Ms. N.'s engagement in the process and subsequent consent to one of the openness orders, the court found it unnecessary to add her as a party or serve her with the application.

The court granted two separate openness orders, one for J.N.-L. with three siblings and another for J.N.-L. with J.N., finding them to be in the best interests of the applicant.

The applicant child, J.N.-L., brought an openness application seeking an order for continued contact with her four siblings, who were respondents along with the Children's Aid Society.

The primary issue addressed was the procedural requirement of notice to a biological parent (Ms. N.) who had not signed a consent to the openness order, particularly concerning a child in her primary care.

The court determined that while statutory notice provisions for openness applications do not explicitly extend to such parents, the court retains discretion under the Family Law Rules to add parties or require service.

Given Ms. N.'s engagement in the process and subsequent consent to one of the openness orders, the court found it unnecessary to add her as a party or serve her with the application.

The court granted two separate openness orders, one for J.N.-L. with three siblings and another for J.N.-L. with J.N., finding them to be in the best interests of the applicant.

This is a costs decision arising from a summary judgment motion in a child protection proceeding.

The Children's Aid Society sought Crown wardship with no access for three children.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer opposed the motion, arguing there were triable issues regarding access.

The court granted the society's motion for Crown wardship without parental access but with sibling access.

Foster parents subsequently sought costs against the Office of the Children's Lawyer on a full recovery basis.

The court dismissed the costs request, finding that the Office of the Children's Lawyer properly represented their child client's views and preferences and that no exceptional circumstances warranted a costs award against a government agency in this child protection proceeding.

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order making her child a Crown ward without access.

The child had been in the care of the children's aid society for over four years and consistently expressed a strong desire not to have contact with the mother, following allegations of physical and sexual abuse.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no triable issue regarding access, as the mother could not establish that an ongoing relationship would be meaningful and beneficial to the child.

The court also found no error in the motion judge's reliance on hearsay evidence from the child's therapists and social workers, which is expressly permitted under the governing child protection legislation.

The appellant appealed an order of Crown wardship and, in the alternative, sought an order for access to the child.

At the hearing, the appellant abandoned the appeal against the Crown wardship order, limiting the appeal to the issue of access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from the Crown wardship order as abandoned so that the child could be immediately placed for adoption.

The Court reserved its decision on the issue of access.

The appellant mother appealed an order quashing her appeal from an openness order regarding her biological daughter, who had been in protection for six years and placed for adoption.

The appellant sought to challenge the adoption placement and have the child placed with extended family.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that placement cannot be determined at an openness hearing, the child consented to the adoption and the openness order, and the appellant was attempting to relitigate previously determined issues.

The appellants appealed a decision ordering Crown wardship with access to the maternal grandmother for two Aboriginal children.

The children had been apprehended and placed with a non-Aboriginal foster family for several years.

The appellants argued the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to the children's First Nations status.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while Aboriginal heritage is an important consideration under the Child and Family Services Act, it does not override the paramount consideration of the children's best interests.

The court upheld the finding that removing the children from their established foster family would be damaging, and that their cultural connection could be maintained through access visits.

The mother appealed a decision granting Crown wardship with no access for her two younger children.

The trial judge had differentiated the situation of the older children, who were given a chance to reintegrate with the mother, from the younger children, who were doing well in foster care and had no alternative placement if reintegration failed.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's individual assessment of the best interests of each child and upheld the disposition of Crown wardship with no access.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice in a family law matter involving the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

The Court of Appeal issued an order in terms of the consent filed by the parties.

No costs were awarded.

The appellant father appealed a finding that his child was in need of protection.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the finding was supported by the record and not tainted by materials solely admissible at the disposition stage.

The Court clarified that the judge hearing the disposition stage would not be bound by certain statements in the lower court's reasons concerning the necessity for court intervention.

The Children's Aid Society appealed a Superior Court decision that remitted the issue of a mother's access to her children, who were made Crown Wards, back to the trial court for a rehearing.

The trial judge had made a 'silent with respect to access' order to facilitate adoption.

The appeal judge found this order impermissible but ordered a rehearing due to the passage of time.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appeal judge erred in ordering a rehearing and should have ordered no access, as the mother failed to rebut the presumption against access under s. 59(2) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The Court emphasized the need to avoid delay in child protection proceedings.