8 total
Mother's appeal of extended society care order dismissed; access varied on consent to weekly visits.
The mother appealed a final order placing her 12-year-old child in the extended care of the children's aid society with access at the society's discretion.
The mother argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, provided insufficient reasons, misapplied the law, and erred in relying on a parenting capacity assessment.
The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's assessment of the mother's mental health and behaviour, which posed a risk to the child.
On consent, the access order was varied to provide the mother with supervised access at least once a week in accordance with the child's wishes.
Extended society care ordered with discretionary access due to the mother's unaddressed mental health issues.
This is a status review application in a child protection matter involving an 11-year-old child who had been in the care of the Children's Aid Society for 33 months.
The court determined that the child was in need of protection and that intervention through a court order was necessary.
The applicant sought extended society care with access at the agency's discretion.
The respondent mother sought placement of the child in her care subject to a supervision order.
The court found that the mother's mental health issues, lack of insight, combative behaviour, and failure to address protection concerns made her unsuitable to care for the child.
The court ordered extended society care with access to the mother at the agency's discretion.
The mother's motion to extend the time to appeal child protection orders was dismissed for lacking merit.
The appellant mother, A.T., brought a motion to extend the time for filing an appeal against protection orders issued by the trial judge concerning her two children, A.T-W. and N.T. The trial judge had found the children in need of protection due to the mother's unfounded allegations of sexual abuse, mental health issues, and breaches of a supervision order, placing them with their respective fathers.
The motion judge applied the four-factor test for extending time for appeal: reasonable explanation for delay, prejudice to the respondent, merits of the appeal, and the justice of the case, with the children's best interests being paramount.
While the mother provided a reasonable explanation for the delay as a self-represented litigant dealing with a two-part judgment, the court found the appeal lacked merit and that allowing it would cause prejudice to the respondents and be contrary to the children's best interests by prolonging litigation.
The motion to extend time was dismissed.
Leave of the court is required to withdraw a voluntary status review application under the Child and Family Services Act.
Foster parents who brought a status review application seeking to terminate Crown wardship of four children and obtain custody or supervision orders subsequently filed a notice of withdrawal.
The court determined that leave of the court is required to withdraw a status review application, even when the application was brought voluntarily rather than mandatorily.
The court held that once a status review application is commenced, the court has a duty to proceed because of the paramount purpose of the Child and Family Services Act to promote the best interests, protection and well-being of children.
Leave to terminate was granted on the facts.
Appeal from Crown wardship without access dismissed as mother's plan of care put children at risk.
The appellant mother appealed a Superior Court decision that upheld a trial judge's order making her two children Crown wards without access.
The children had been in care since 2010.
The trial judge found the children would be at risk if returned to the mother due to her mental health, inability to care for them, and a toxic relationship.
The Court of Appeal found no error in principle by the Superior Court judge and upheld the decision, noting the statutory timelines had passed and the children must be placed for adoption.
The court ordered Crown wardship without access due to the mother's unmitigated personality disorder and parenting deficits.
The Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto sought Crown wardship for adoption of two children (ages 7 and 5) who had been in continuous care since June 2010.
The mother sought return of the children under a supervision order, while the father sought a supervision order with the children in his care.
The court found the children to be in need of protection based on the mother's mental health issues, inability to maintain a safe home, self-centered parenting, poor emotional regulation, and history of domestic violence exposure.
The mother's plan was rejected due to her lack of insight into her personality disorder, her toxic relationship with the society, and her inability to consistently prioritize the children's needs.
The father's plan was abandoned when his family withdrew their support.
The court ordered both children to be made Crown wards for the purpose of adoption, with no access granted to the mother.
A Child and Family Services Review Board decision is admissible in a child protection trial under the public document and principled hearsay exceptions.
This is an evidentiary ruling in a child protection trial concerning the admissibility of a Child and Family Services Review Board decision.
The applicant society sought to exclude a Board decision that upheld the mother's complaints regarding the society's failure to comply with statutory obligations.
The court ruled that the Board's decision was admissible both as a public document and under the principled exception to the hearsay rule based on necessity and reliability.
The decision addresses the relevance of the Board's findings to the court's consideration of whether the society provided appropriate services and gave the parent a reasonable opportunity to parent.
Appeal of child protection finding dismissed; finding supported by the record.
The appellant father appealed a finding that his child was in need of protection.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the finding was supported by the record and not tainted by materials solely admissible at the disposition stage.
The Court clarified that the judge hearing the disposition stage would not be bound by certain statements in the lower court's reasons concerning the necessity for court intervention.
