Mira R. Pilch

In a child protection status review involving two children in society care, the court found the children remained in need of protection because of the mother's unresolved mental health concerns, ongoing conflictual behaviour, and lack of insight into the impact of that behaviour on the children.

Although the society and the mother sought a supervision order returning the children to the mother in another province, the court held that plan did not adequately protect the children's emotional wellbeing.

The court gave significant weight to the children's consistent wishes not to return, while grounding the analysis in the lived basis for those wishes rather than treating preference as determinative.

Extended care was ordered, with limited supervised virtual access preserved to maintain cultural, linguistic, and familial connection without undermining the children's stability and future permanency options.

In a child protection proceeding, the applicant society moved for summary judgment on the protection finding and separately sought to strike the mother’s answer and plan of care.

The court permitted the summary judgment motion to proceed despite its lateness because the matter had been delayed repeatedly and the child’s best interests required movement toward finality.

On the admitted record, the court held that the combination of eviction, police involvement, and the mother’s involuntary hospitalization established a risk of physical harm under s. 74(2)(b)(i) of the CYFSA, but declined to find that no parent was available to make adequate care arrangements under s. 74(2)(k) because the record did not show sufficient effort to obtain the mother’s input.

The motion to strike pleadings was dismissed because striking is a last-resort remedy and the mother’s recent non-attendance did not justify it in the context of her broader participation and self-represented status.

This decision addresses a motion under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 concerning the temporary care and custody of a child, M.S., following apprehension by the Children’s Aid Society of Oxford County.

The court applied the statutory test under section 94 of the Act, focusing on whether there were reasonable grounds to believe the child was at risk of harm and whether supervision orders could adequately protect the child.

The evidence demonstrated the mother’s long-standing alcohol abuse, verbal abuse, and uncooperative behavior, which placed the child at risk.

The court ordered the child remain in the father’s temporary care with supervised access to the mother, emphasizing the least disruptive placement consistent with the child’s safety and well-being.

The applicant, a homestay caregiver, filed an application alleging that the respondent children's aid society failed to provide reasons for its decision to verify allegations of inadequate supervision and neglect regarding students in her care.

The respondent had made multiple unsuccessful attempts to contact the applicant during the investigation.

After the investigation concluded, the respondent explained the process, findings, and reasons for the verification decision to the applicant through multiple phone calls with an interpreter.

The tribunal found that the respondent provided meaningful reasons for its decision and dismissed the application.

The Applicant father filed a complaint against the Children's Aid Society of Toronto, alleging that workers acted improperly by supporting his 16-year-old daughter's decision to leave home and reside with her boyfriend's family.

The Applicant claimed he was denied the opportunity to be heard and was not provided reasons for the workers' decisions.

The Child and Family Services Review Board dismissed the complaint, finding that the 16-year-old daughter had voluntarily withdrawn from parental control and was receiving services separate and distinct from any services provided to the Applicant.

Consequently, the Applicant was not a service recipient with respect to the daughter's interactions with the workers and had no right to be heard or receive information about those services without the daughter's consent.

The child protection agency brought a motion within a status review proceeding to change the temporary placement of an Indigenous child from the father's care to the mother's care pending trial.

The mother supported the motion, citing her progress in substance abuse recovery, while the father opposed it, arguing the child had stability in his care and the mother's progress needed to be tested at trial.

The court applied a flexible approach to varying a supervision order and determined that the father had provided stability for over two years.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the evidence regarding the mother's recovery and the child's best interests required a full trial.

The Children's Aid Society (CAS) brought a motion to temporarily place a child (X) with the father's girlfriend (V.P.), or alternatively, arrange graduated access.

The mother opposed this, seeking temporary placement with the maternal grandmother or graduated access.

The court dismissed both motions for temporary placement, finding neither party met the onus under subsection 113(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, to demonstrate that X's best interests *required* a change in temporary placement given the imminent trial and need for stability.

However, the court ordered increased access for X to both V.P. and the maternal grandmother, with the CAS exercising discretion, to facilitate deeper relationships and gather evidence for trial.

The court clarified that X would be the access holder and V.P. and the maternal grandmother would be access recipients, without granting them party status, to avoid derailing the upcoming trial.

The applicant father and respondent mother disputed which parent should have decision-making responsibility regarding their 11-year-old child's routine and COVID-19 vaccinations.

The mother opposed vaccination based on personal and family medical history, while the father supported it.

After hearing expert evidence from both sides, the court qualified the father's expert in infectious diseases but rejected the mother's expert's qualifications regarding the COVID-19 vaccine's safety and efficacy.

The court took judicial notice of the safety and efficacy of routine childhood immunizations but declined to do so for the COVID-19 vaccine, instead relying on the father's expert evidence.

Finding the mother's opposition to be irrational and not evidence-based, the court granted the father sole decision-making authority over all vaccinations for the child.

The applicant father brought a motion to vary an interim parenting order to increase his parenting time to a 2/2/3 schedule, along with requests for summer access, possession of the child's documents, and the use of OurFamilyWizard.

The court found no material change in circumstances to justify varying the regular interim parenting schedule, noting the child's upcoming transition to kindergarten and slight aging were insufficient.

The court granted a gradual increase in summer parenting time, ordered the mother to hold the child's official documents while providing notarized copies to the father, and declined to order the use of OurFamilyWizard due to cost concerns.

In a child protection trial, the applicant society sought to qualify a psychologist as an expert in assessing the risk of harm to children if access by their father was supervised by their paternal grandfather.

Following a voir dire, the court refused to qualify the witness as an expert in this area, finding that assessing access supervisors is not a recognized psychological specialty, lacks an established protocol, and the witness's report raised concerns regarding impartiality.

However, the court noted the assessment report remained admissible as evidence under section 98(12) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The appellant father (B.K.) appealed a final order from the Ontario Court of Justice that placed his children in the care and custody of the respondent mother (D.A.) subject to the Society's supervision.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's findings regarding who had pre-intervention charge of the children and the children's true wishes, and alleged misconduct by the Society and the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL).

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings of fact and mixed fact and law, emphasizing the high degree of deference owed to trial judges in child protection proceedings.

The court also dismissed the appellant's motion to admit fresh evidence, finding it did not meet the required standard of being highly relevant and decisive to the children's best interests.

The Children's Aid Society of Brant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a protection finding and an order for extended care for the child.

The parents opposed, arguing the Society's evidence was deficient.

The court found the Society's affidavits largely inadmissible hearsay and not specifically prepared for a summary judgment motion, failing to meet the evidentiary standard for disposition.

However, the court did make a protection finding under section 74(2)(b)(i) of the Child and Family Services Act, based on the mother's admitted illegal drug use, which was undisputed.

The motion for summary judgment regarding disposition (placement and access) was dismissed, and the matter was adjourned for a trial management conference.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's order transferring primary care of the parties' two children to the respondent father, which included an initial period of no contact for the mother and a staged increase in parenting time.

The trial judge's decision, made after a 39-day trial, found the mother had intentionally undermined parenting schedules and made false allegations of sexual abuse to terminate the children's relationship with the father.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's exercise of discretion and factual findings, emphasizing the deference owed to trial judges in parenting orders, especially when the decision has already been implemented.

The court found no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or her consideration of the Divorce Act regarding family violence, as the mother's allegations were not established.

This case involves two Status Review Applications brought by the Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto concerning four children.

The Society sought extended society care for all children, while the father sought a twelve-month supervision order for all children to be placed with him.

The mother agreed to extended society care for the children.

The court assessed the children's best interests, considering their special needs, the parents' ability to provide consistent care, and the father's history of non-compliance and undermining placements.

The court found the father unreliable and secretive.

Ultimately, the court ordered extended society care for all four children, with specific access provisions where the children are the access holders, and the parents are the recipients, subject to the children's views and the society's discretion.

The applicants sought a review of the respondent society's decision to remove a youth with special needs from their foster home.

Prior to the hearing on the merits, the respondent brought a motion to move the youth from her temporary hotel placement to a group home, arguing the Board lacked jurisdiction over interim placements.

The Board found it had jurisdiction to make interim placement orders based on the child's best interests.

Applying the best interests test, the Board dismissed the motion, finding insufficient evidence to justify disrupting the youth's continuity of care before the final hearing.

The appellant (P.I.A.) sought a stay of a trial judge's order transferring primary care and decision-making responsibility of two children to the respondent (W.S.), pending appeal.

The motion judge applied the three-part test for a stay (serious question, irreparable harm, balance of convenience), with the overriding consideration being the children's best interests.

While a low threshold for serious question was met on one ground (admissibility of expert evidence), the court found no evidence of irreparable harm to the children and determined the balance of convenience favored maintaining the trial judge's order to restore the parenting relationship with the respondent.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The respondent father applied for a mistrial in a child protection proceeding, alleging numerous procedural irregularities and disclosure failures by the applicant agency.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer joined the application, while other parties opposed it.

The court reviewed the established test for mistrial, emphasizing it as a measure of last resort for fatally wounded trial processes.

While acknowledging the applicant's chaotic and haphazard disclosure practices and inefficient trial management, the court found that the cumulative effect of the issues did not fatally compromise trial fairness.

The court ordered certain evidence struck and mandated further disclosure from the applicant, but ultimately dismissed the mistrial application, prioritizing the child's best interests and avoiding further delay.

The society brought a status review application seeking an order for extended society care of a toddler who had been in care since shortly after birth.

The mother, who has cognitive limitations and a transient lifestyle, sought an adjournment on the eve of trial to assess a newly proposed kinship plan by the maternal grandmother.

The court dismissed the adjournment request, finding that further delay was contrary to the child's best interests.

After a full trial, the court found the child remained in need of protection, rejected the grandmother's plan due to a lack of commitment, and ordered extended society care.

The court granted the mother specified indirect access (letters and photos) but denied in-person access, finding no meaningful relationship existed to preserve.

The applicant child protection agency sought to qualify an expert in child maltreatment.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the expert's opinion evidence.

The court found that "child maltreatment" as a general field of scientific inquiry lacked threshold reliability as a novel science, as there was no evidence of tested theories/techniques, peer review of the general discipline, or established standards for information quality.

Furthermore, the court determined that the expert was engaged for litigation purposes, not as a "participation expert" and thus failed to comply with Rule 20.2(2) of the Family Law Rules.

Consequently, the expert was not qualified, and his report was not admitted, as the risks of admitting unreliable evidence outweighed any benefit.

This is a costs decision arising from a motion heard on August 28, 2020, in which the father sought decision-making authority over vaccination of the parties' child, cessation of day care attendance, a change from private to public school, and a modified parenting schedule.

The parties settled the school issue and certain other matters.

The father succeeded on the vaccination issue but failed on the day care issue.

The court found divided but unequal victory, with the father achieving greater success on the more complex and time-consuming vaccine issue.

The court awarded costs to the father in the reduced amount of $3,000.00 inclusive of HST and disbursements, taking into account the divided victory and applying principles of reasonableness and proportionality.