Eliza J. Montour

The respondent father brought a motion to change a 2016 final order concerning parenting time, decision-making, child support, and section 7 expenses for the parties' son.

The applicant mother opposed aspects of the father's claims and sought section 7 expenses for their older child.

The court found material changes in circumstances.

It granted the father sole decision-making authority and the proposed parenting time schedule for the son.

The court ordered the applicant to pay child support and arrears, and to contribute equally to the son's section 7 expenses and arrears.

The applicant's request for section 7 expenses for the older child was dismissed due to lack of pleading, prior dismissal, no material change, and insufficient evidence.

The respondent father applied for a mistrial in a child protection proceeding, alleging numerous procedural irregularities and disclosure failures by the applicant agency.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer joined the application, while other parties opposed it.

The court reviewed the established test for mistrial, emphasizing it as a measure of last resort for fatally wounded trial processes.

While acknowledging the applicant's chaotic and haphazard disclosure practices and inefficient trial management, the court found that the cumulative effect of the issues did not fatally compromise trial fairness.

The court ordered certain evidence struck and mandated further disclosure from the applicant, but ultimately dismissed the mistrial application, prioritizing the child's best interests and avoiding further delay.

This motion concerned interim child and spousal support, grossing-up of non-taxable income for a First Nations respondent, exclusive possession of the matrimonial home on a reserve, and other related financial and parenting issues.

The applicant sought grossed-up child support, spousal support, and continued primary residence of the child.

The respondent sought to defer the gross-up issue to trial and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The court ordered the respondent's income to be grossed-up for child support purposes on an interim basis, ordered child and spousal support payments and arrears, dismissed the respondent's claim for exclusive possession, and confirmed the child's primary residence with the applicant.

This trial decision addresses custody, access, and child support for the parties' 11-year-old child.

The Applicant sought sole custody, while the Respondent requested joint custody.

The court granted sole custody to the Applicant, noting a prior informal agreement and the Applicant's consistent primary caregiving.

The court ordered the Applicant to notify the Respondent of specialist appointments.

Access was ordered to be flexible with advance notice, considering the child's views.

For child support, the court imputed the Respondent's income for 2019 and 2020, finding certain business expenses unreasonable for support purposes and declining to impute income from a band.

Retroactive child support was ordered from July 2019.

The Respondent was ordered to contribute 60% to extraordinary expenses.

This is a temporary care hearing under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act concerning three children.

The Children's Aid Society sought placement determination among three competing family plans: the maternal grandmother, the mother, and the father.

The court determined that the maternal grandmother had acquired "charge" of the children through a series of voluntary relinquishments by the parents beginning in March 2015, and that this status was maintained through subsequent kinship and temporary care agreements.

The court found that a supervision order was sufficient to mitigate risk and placed the children with the maternal grandmother subject to supervision terms.

The court also directed the Society to update its Plan of Care to address services for the children and adjourned the matter to permit parties to negotiate terms of parental access.

This is a temporary care hearing under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act concerning three children.

The central issue determined by the court is who had charge of the children immediately prior to the Society's intervention.

The court found that the two older children were in the charge of their father, M.S., and the youngest child was in the charge of his father, S.D., immediately prior to intervention.

The mother, A.J., had abandoned the children in August 2015 to pursue substance abuse and was subsequently incarcerated intermittently.

The court applied the legal test for temporary care orders, focusing on the nature of the active caring relationship rather than legal custody.

The Mississaugas of the New Credit Band Council brought a motion for release of records held by Waterloo and Brant Family and Children Services relating to the current caregiver and potential alternative caregivers in a child protection proceeding.

The motion arose in the context of an upcoming trial involving competing plans for the child's placement.

The court established a two-stage test for disclosure of kin records, requiring the moving party to first demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that the records are likely relevant, followed by judicial review to weigh probative value against privacy interests and public policy considerations.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought a motion to clarify the court's previous decision regarding a child with leukemia whose parents sought to pursue traditional Haudenosaunee medicine alongside or instead of chemotherapy.

The court had previously found that the mother's constitutionally protected right under section 35 of the Constitution to pursue traditional medicine meant the child was not in need of protection.

The Attorney General, rather than appealing, engaged in dialogue with all parties, resulting in a joint submission.

The court clarified its decision by adding paragraphs confirming that while the aboriginal right to traditional medicine must be respected, the best interests of the child remain paramount, and that the family could pursue both traditional and Western medicine collaboratively.

An 11-year-old First Nations child from Six Nations of the Grand River was diagnosed with acute lymphoblastic leukemia with a 90-95% cure rate with chemotherapy.

The child's mother withdrew consent for chemotherapy to pursue traditional medicine consistent with their longhouse beliefs.

The hospital applied under section 40(4) of the Child and Family Services Act seeking a protection order.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the mother's decision to pursue traditional medicine constituted an exercise of an aboriginal right protected under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The court held that the child could not be found in need of protection when the substitute decision-maker exercised a constitutionally protected right.

A status review application under the Child and Family Services Act concerning four children in the care of the Children's Aid Society.

The court conducted a 14-day trial to determine whether the children should be returned to parental care under supervision or made Crown wards.

The Society sought Crown wardship for all four children, citing the parents' inability to adequately care for, supervise, and protect the children, particularly regarding control of problematic child behaviour.

The father sought return of the children under Society supervision.

The children's representatives sought various dispositions.

The court found that the children were in need of protection under section 37(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Act due to the parents' failure to adequately care for, supervise, and protect the children, creating a risk of physical harm.

The court ordered that all four children be made Crown wards of the Society.