David John Maltby

The Children's Aid Society of Brant brought a status review application.

Within this, the respondent mother, A.C., brought a motion to relocate with the child, J.C-T., from Brantford to Petawawa.

The respondent father, J.T., opposed this move and brought a cross-motion seeking to prohibit the relocation or, alternatively, for primary care of the child.

The court applied the mobility provisions of the Children’s Law Reform Act (CLRA) to the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYSFA) proceeding, finding that the proposed move constituted a relocation.

The court determined that both parties bore the burden of proof on this interim motion.

The mother failed to demonstrate that the relocation was in the child's best interests, considering factors such as impact on father's access, lack of confirmed supports in the new location, and the mother's ongoing mental health concerns.

The father successfully demonstrated that it was in the child's best interests to remain in Brantford.

The mother's motion to relocate was dismissed, and she was prohibited from moving the child's primary residence.

The Children's Aid Society of Brant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a protection finding and an order for extended care for the child.

The parents opposed, arguing the Society's evidence was deficient.

The court found the Society's affidavits largely inadmissible hearsay and not specifically prepared for a summary judgment motion, failing to meet the evidentiary standard for disposition.

However, the court did make a protection finding under section 74(2)(b)(i) of the Child and Family Services Act, based on the mother's admitted illegal drug use, which was undisputed.

The motion for summary judgment regarding disposition (placement and access) was dismissed, and the matter was adjourned for a trial management conference.

The respondent father applied for a mistrial in a child protection proceeding, alleging numerous procedural irregularities and disclosure failures by the applicant agency.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer joined the application, while other parties opposed it.

The court reviewed the established test for mistrial, emphasizing it as a measure of last resort for fatally wounded trial processes.

While acknowledging the applicant's chaotic and haphazard disclosure practices and inefficient trial management, the court found that the cumulative effect of the issues did not fatally compromise trial fairness.

The court ordered certain evidence struck and mandated further disclosure from the applicant, but ultimately dismissed the mistrial application, prioritizing the child's best interests and avoiding further delay.

The applicant child protection agency sought to qualify an expert in child maltreatment.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the expert's opinion evidence.

The court found that "child maltreatment" as a general field of scientific inquiry lacked threshold reliability as a novel science, as there was no evidence of tested theories/techniques, peer review of the general discipline, or established standards for information quality.

Furthermore, the court determined that the expert was engaged for litigation purposes, not as a "participation expert" and thus failed to comply with Rule 20.2(2) of the Family Law Rules.

Consequently, the expert was not qualified, and his report was not admitted, as the risks of admitting unreliable evidence outweighed any benefit.

The Children's Aid Society of Brant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking continued protection findings for the child T.E.H., an order for deemed custody to the paternal aunt L.H., specific access orders for the mother and siblings, no access for the mother's partner, and discretionary access for the father.

The court found T.E.H. to be in continuing need of protection due to risk of emotional harm.

It granted deemed custody to the paternal aunt, L.H., prioritizing the child's best interests and Indigenous cultural identity.

The court made temporary access orders for the mother and siblings, but declined to make a "no access" order for the mother's partner or a discretionary access order for the father, emphasizing the court's obligation to impose specific terms and conditions for access.

The Children's Aid Society of Brant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking extended society care for two children, J.G.P.G. and J.B.G., following the termination of an interim care order.

The respondent mother, M.G., did not file responding materials, and the respondent father, F.B., though noted in default, was permitted to make submissions.

The court granted the Society's motion, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding the children's permanent placement, and ordered extended society care with specified access for both parents and the children's older sister, D.G.

A child protection agency brought an application seeking temporary care and custody of two children.

The respondent mother challenged the court's jurisdiction, arguing that the agency failed to comply with statutory timelines for bringing the matter before the court.

The central issue was whether a customary care agreement was validly executed and, if not, whether the agency's failure to commence proceedings within five days of removing the children from the mother's care resulted in a loss of jurisdiction.

The court found that the consent to the customary care agreement was invalid due to lack of voluntariness and absence of independent legal advice, and that the mother's subsequent revocation of consent was clear and unequivocal.

The court concluded that the agency's failure to bring the matter before the court within the statutory five-day period resulted in a loss of jurisdiction.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing a professional negligence action against accountants and a former employee on the basis that the claim was out of time.

The court applied the summary judgment framework and the discoverability provisions in ss. 4 and 5(1) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

In the context of an ongoing CRA reassessment and tax appeal, the court held the plaintiff reasonably relied on professional advice and could not reasonably have known he had a cause of action until at least December 2012.

The action, issued in September 2013, was therefore not statute-barred, and the motion was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following a trial where parties were unable to settle.

The respondent sought costs, arguing success on an access issue and the applicant's unreasonable conduct regarding disclosure of section 7 expenses.

The applicant claimed overall success and sought partial indemnity costs.

The court found the respondent was successful on one issue and the applicant acted unreasonably by failing to comply with a disclosure order, ignoring requests, and presenting disorganized material, which prevented a meaningful settlement offer and prolonged the trial.

Consequently, the respondent was awarded costs.

The parties, married in 2008 and separated in 2010, resolved custody, access, property equalization, and divorce through partial minutes of settlement.

The trial addressed outstanding issues of child support arrears, ongoing child support, contribution to section 7 extraordinary expenses, and the respondent's obligation to transport children to extracurricular activities during his Sunday access.

The court determined child support obligations based on the respondent's income, apportioned section 7 expenses, and granted the respondent discretion over Sunday activities during his access, emphasizing the importance of quality time with the children and paternal grandparents.

The Children's Aid Society of Haldimand and Norfolk brought a summary judgment motion seeking an order that three children be made wards of the Crown without access to their biological parents.

The respondent parents had a lengthy history with child protection services dating back to 2007, involving domestic violence, alcohol abuse, and failure to cooperate with service providers.

The children had been in and out of Society care multiple times.

The mother conceded that the children should be made Crown wards but sought ongoing access.

The father opposed Crown wardship but did not present a viable alternative plan.

The court granted summary judgment, finding that the children continued to be in need of protection and that Crown wardship without access was in their best interests, particularly given the need for permanency planning through adoption.

The respondent mother brought a motion to set aside a summary judgment decision rendered on September 29, 2014, in a child protection matter.

The mother sought to reopen the hearing based on newly received hair follicle drug test results from May 2014 and alleged factual errors in the judgment.

The court addressed the threshold jurisdictional issue of whether it was functus officio and determined it retained discretion to reconsider the judgment prior to the order being entered.

The court found that while the mother had not exercised due diligence in obtaining the test results, the evidence would not have changed the outcome given the totality of grave concerns including the mother's historical drug use, failure to cooperate with testing, violent conduct, poor judgment in child supervision, and refusal to accept responsibility for harm to the children.

The motion was dismissed.

In a child protection proceeding involving two children, the mother brought a motion seeking a parenting capacity assessment of the father who sought custody of one child.

The Society, the father, and counsel for the younger child opposed the request, arguing that sufficient evidence already existed and that the request amounted to a fishing expedition.

The court reviewed the legal framework under s. 54 of the Child and Family Services Act and Ontario Regulation 25/07, emphasizing that such assessments are discretionary and should only be ordered where reasonably necessary to assist the court.

The judge found that the evidentiary record already provided comprehensive information about the parents and the children, and that no unresolved clinical issues required expert evaluation.

The motion for a parenting capacity assessment was therefore dismissed.

A child protection application brought by the Children's Aid Society of Brant seeking protection findings and wardship for a child whose mother had a longstanding history of alcohol and drug abuse, mental health issues, and domestic conflict.

The Society sought a six-month kin placement order.

The mother opposed and sought return of the child to her care.

The court found protection findings under certain subsections but determined there was a genuine issue for trial regarding disposition.

Upon consideration of the mother's motion to vary the temporary order, the court found a material change in circumstances and determined the child could be adequately protected under a supervision order if returned to the mother's care, subject to strict conditions and a transition period.