Vanessa Kaljaste

In a child protection summary judgment motion arising from severe unexplained injuries and the death of one infant sibling while in parental care, the court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

Applying the cautious child-protection summary judgment approach under Rule 16 and the Hryniak framework, the court found the medical evidence overwhelming, the alternative explanations speculative, and the risk to the surviving children incapable of mitigation.

The court concluded one child continued to be in need of protection on status review and the other was in need of protection on the protection application.

Final orders placed one child in kin custody, the other in extended society care with an adoption plan, and provided supervised parental and sibling access.

This case concerns a temporary care hearing for a 13-month-old child, G.R., whose parents are J.R. (mother) and S.J. (father).

The Children's Aid Society intervened due to the mother's continued relationship with an individual facing sexual assault charges, her lack of insight into the associated risks, and her inability to meet the child's basic needs, including medical care and safe sleeping arrangements.

The court found the child to be at high risk if returned to the mother's care and determined that a supervision order would be insufficient to mitigate this risk due to the mother's unreliability and repeated breaches of the safety plan.

The court also addressed the interpretation of "charge" under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, concluding that both parents shared charge.

The child remained placed with the father, and the mother's access was ordered to be supervised, removing the Society's discretion for unsupervised access, as the court found unsupervised access incongruent with the child's best interests given the mother's credibility issues and non-compliance.

The Children's Aid Society of Brant brought a status review application.

Within this, the respondent mother, A.C., brought a motion to relocate with the child, J.C-T., from Brantford to Petawawa.

The respondent father, J.T., opposed this move and brought a cross-motion seeking to prohibit the relocation or, alternatively, for primary care of the child.

The court applied the mobility provisions of the Children’s Law Reform Act (CLRA) to the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYSFA) proceeding, finding that the proposed move constituted a relocation.

The court determined that both parties bore the burden of proof on this interim motion.

The mother failed to demonstrate that the relocation was in the child's best interests, considering factors such as impact on father's access, lack of confirmed supports in the new location, and the mother's ongoing mental health concerns.

The father successfully demonstrated that it was in the child's best interests to remain in Brantford.

The mother's motion to relocate was dismissed, and she was prohibited from moving the child's primary residence.

The applicant alleged that the respondent children's aid society failed to comply with three terms of a settlement agreement reached at a pre-hearing.

The Child and Family Services Review Board determined the matter in writing after the applicant failed to attend a scheduled teleconference.

The Board found that the respondent had complied with the terms regarding the service plan and communication model, but had failed to provide a clear written outline of the reasons why it viewed there to be ongoing parental conflict.

The Board ordered the respondent to provide the required written outline within 14 days.

This is a temporary care hearing under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act concerning three children.

The central issue determined by the court is who had charge of the children immediately prior to the Society's intervention.

The court found that the two older children were in the charge of their father, M.S., and the youngest child was in the charge of his father, S.D., immediately prior to intervention.

The mother, A.J., had abandoned the children in August 2015 to pursue substance abuse and was subsequently incarcerated intermittently.

The court applied the legal test for temporary care orders, focusing on the nature of the active caring relationship rather than legal custody.

A child protection trial determining whether three children were in need of protection under the Child and Family Services Act.

The Children's Aid Society sought a finding that the children had suffered physical harm inflicted by their parents through excessive corporal punishment, including beatings with belts, use of ginger root inserted anally as punishment, forced confinement to a garage, and threats.

The parents denied the allegations, claiming the children were influenced by the oldest child to fabricate abuse claims.

The court found the children credible and reliable, and determined that the parents had subjected the children to inappropriate and excessive physical discipline causing physical harm, warranting a protection finding.

A motion was brought to determine whether transcripts of children's evidence from a preliminary hearing in criminal proceedings were admissible in a child protection trial without making the children available for cross-examination.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer opposed cross-examination, arguing it would cause trauma to the children and that the transcripts should be admitted as hearsay under the principled exception or under section 50 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The court held that the requirement of necessity had not been met, as there was insufficient evidence of psychological trauma beyond mere nervousness.

The court ruled that the children must be made available for cross-examination, subject to protective safeguards including closed-circuit television, a support person, and cross-examination only by the mother's counsel.

The appellant parent appealed an order dismissing his appeal to the Superior Court from a decision granting the Children's Aid Society permanent wardship of his two children.

The Superior Court had dismissed the appeal for delay because the appellant failed to perfect the appeal by obtaining transcripts.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, noting the paramount concern for the children's need for stability and permanency.

The Court also found the appeal had virtually no prospect of success, as the trial judge's findings of inadequate parenting skills were fatal and there was no evidence of bias or inadequate assistance of counsel.

The appeal was dismissed.