Emily Mariah Carroll

This case addresses the decision-making regime and parenting schedule for a child born in March 2022.

The applicant mother sought sole decision-making and a gradual increase in the respondent father's parenting time.

The respondent father sought joint decision-making and a more expanded parenting schedule.

The court found the mother's testimony lacked credibility and noted her history of limiting the father's access and disrespect for court processes.

Conversely, the father was found credible and supportive of co-parenting.

The court, prioritizing the child's best interests and the principle of maximizing time with both parents, ordered joint decision-making and adopted the father's proposed parenting schedule, dismissing the mother's request for a gradual increase.

The Children's Aid Society of Brant brought a status review application.

Within this, the respondent mother, A.C., brought a motion to relocate with the child, J.C-T., from Brantford to Petawawa.

The respondent father, J.T., opposed this move and brought a cross-motion seeking to prohibit the relocation or, alternatively, for primary care of the child.

The court applied the mobility provisions of the Children’s Law Reform Act (CLRA) to the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYSFA) proceeding, finding that the proposed move constituted a relocation.

The court determined that both parties bore the burden of proof on this interim motion.

The mother failed to demonstrate that the relocation was in the child's best interests, considering factors such as impact on father's access, lack of confirmed supports in the new location, and the mother's ongoing mental health concerns.

The father successfully demonstrated that it was in the child's best interests to remain in Brantford.

The mother's motion to relocate was dismissed, and she was prohibited from moving the child's primary residence.

In a child protection status review, the biological father (E.J.) brought a motion for summary judgment seeking primary care and custody of two children, S.J.M. and L.J. The Children's Aid Society and Six Nations Child and Family Services supported the father's request, while the biological mother (S.M.) opposed it, seeking the children's return to her care.

The court granted the father's motion for custody, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding placement, as the mother had not demonstrated sufficient insight or responsibility for past protection concerns.

However, the court determined that the issue of the mother's access with the children presented a genuine issue for trial and ordered it to be set for a trial management conference.

The appellant sought to appeal a lower court order that found material changes in circumstances, reduced support arrears, and terminated spousal and child support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's decision regarding material change, imputation of income, termination of support, or costs.

The court emphasized the deference owed to family support decisions.

The court determined costs following a trial in a mobility case.

The respondent, Jennifer Davis, was the successful party and sought partial indemnity costs.

The applicant, Darcy Bourke, argued for no costs or minimal costs due to good faith litigation and significant future travel expenses for access.

The court affirmed the presumption that the successful party is entitled to costs, finding no general principle against awarding costs in mobility cases.

While acknowledging the applicant's travel costs, the court fixed costs at $22,760 for the respondent, representing a deduction of one year's child support from the claimed amount.

The Applicant Mother sought to continue a temporary order for primary care of Baby L. and a restraining order.

The Respondent Father sought equally shared parenting and production of child protection records.

The court, operating under COVID-19 protocols, considered the best interests of the child under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The court maintained Baby L.'s primary placement with the Mother but granted the Father significant unsupervised parenting time three nights per week at the paternal grandparents' home.

The existing restraining order was rescinded, and the Father's records motion was adjourned.

The applicant mother brought an emergency motion to suspend the respondent father's in-person access to two of their children due to concerns about COVID-19 exposure, citing one child's respiratory issues and the father's blended family living arrangements.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the child's health issues were mild and well-controlled, and the father's household, including his partner's children and their biological father's household, meticulously adhered to COVID-19 safety protocols.

The court reiterated the principle that existing parenting arrangements should generally continue during the pandemic unless there is compelling evidence of a reckless exposure risk.

The mother was ordered to pay costs to the father.

The applicant father sought an urgent order for access to his two minor children amidst the COVID-19 court suspension.

The respondent mother opposed, citing the father's lack of prior parenting time since separation, alleged abuse, and the children's fear.

The court, acting as Triage Judge, determined the matter was not urgent, noting the father's delay in bringing the motion, the absence of immediate safety or well-being concerns, the children's ages, and the involvement of Family and Children’s Services recommending supervised access.

The motion was adjourned to a case conference after regular court operations resume.

The respondent sought to amend his pleadings to advance claims for joint custody, child support, and access to the subject child, and to re-open a partially heard motion for summary judgment.

The court found that while the respondent had a right to amend pleadings under the Family Law Rules, many of the proposed claims lacked legal or evidential merit, including joint custody, section 7 extraordinary expenses for transportation, and a restraining order.

The court permitted amendment only for access-related claims, adjusted temporary child support based on the respondent's disclosed income, and scheduled the motion for summary judgment to continue.

The court emphasized that the respondent's primary deficiency was not deficient pleadings but rather the lack of a practical and workable access plan.

The applicant sought permission to issue an application requesting a Child Advocacy and Assessment Program (CAAP) assessment for the subject child, along with ancillary orders for Christmas parenting time, a prohibition against the respondent attending at the child's schools, and production of the child's personal documentation.

The respondent opposed the motion on the basis that section 138 of the Court of Justice Act prohibits duplicity of proceedings while an appeal of the prior final order was outstanding.

The court found it had no jurisdiction to grant the relief sought because there were no ongoing proceedings regarding custody or access to the child, as an appeal was pending.

The court held that assessments under section 30 of the Children's Law Reform Act or section 105 of the Courts of Justice Act cannot be ordered as standalone matters but only in the context of active custody or access proceedings.