Catherine Bellinger

This case involves two Status Review Applications brought by the Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto concerning four children.

The Society sought extended society care for all children, while the father sought a twelve-month supervision order for all children to be placed with him.

The mother agreed to extended society care for the children.

The court assessed the children's best interests, considering their special needs, the parents' ability to provide consistent care, and the father's history of non-compliance and undermining placements.

The court found the father unreliable and secretive.

Ultimately, the court ordered extended society care for all four children, with specific access provisions where the children are the access holders, and the parents are the recipients, subject to the children's views and the society's discretion.

The appellant, G.C., appealed a lower court's dismissal of his appeal from a summary judgment motion that found his children in need of protection due to a risk of sexual harm by him under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the summary judgment procedure was suitable given the significant consequences and the appellant's inability to cross-examine affiants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the motion judge and appeal judge correctly applied the summary judgment test in child protection cases, including the principles from Kawartha-Haliburton, and properly weighed the evidence.

The applicant father sought joint custody, limited access, a cap on s. 7 expenses, no spousal support, and minimal equalization.

The respondent mother sought sole custody, access with all children, no cap on s. 7 expenses, spousal support, and higher equalization.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer supported the mother's position on custody and access for all children.

The court granted the mother sole custody, ordered the father to have parenting time with all four children, dismissed the father's request for a cap on s. 7 expenses, ordered the father to pay spousal support of $450 per month, and an equalization payment of $7,265.

The court found the father's parenting style inflexible and his SSAG calculation manipulated.

The appellant mother, A.T., brought a motion to extend the time for filing an appeal against protection orders issued by the trial judge concerning her two children, A.T-W. and N.T. The trial judge had found the children in need of protection due to the mother's unfounded allegations of sexual abuse, mental health issues, and breaches of a supervision order, placing them with their respective fathers.

The motion judge applied the four-factor test for extending time for appeal: reasonable explanation for delay, prejudice to the respondent, merits of the appeal, and the justice of the case, with the children's best interests being paramount.

While the mother provided a reasonable explanation for the delay as a self-represented litigant dealing with a two-part judgment, the court found the appeal lacked merit and that allowing it would cause prejudice to the respondents and be contrary to the children's best interests by prolonging litigation.

The motion to extend time was dismissed.

This appeal addressed systemic failures in the child welfare system, including trial counsel incompetence, judicial bias, and inordinate procedural delay, which led to a child remaining in legal limbo for over four years.

The court found the parents' trial counsel incompetent and the trial process unfair.

While the Crown wardship order was not challenged on appeal, the court overturned the "no access" order, replacing it with a contact order for the parents and the child.

It also established a "Pathway Plan" for an Openness Order Hearing, acknowledging a legislative conflict between a child's right to contact with parents and the requirement that such contact not impair adoption opportunities.

The parents appealed a motion judge's order dismissing their appeal of a Crown wardship decision for delay.

The parents argued the motion judge failed to consider the merits of their appeal and breached their right to a fair hearing by denying an adjournment.

The Court of Appeal found that while the motion judge should have explicitly addressed the merits, a review of the record showed the parents' appeal raised only factual disputes with no palpable and overriding error.

Given the lack of merit and the child's need for stability, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants challenged an Ontario Court of Justice decision dismissing a status review application following a Crown wardship order with no access and the child’s placement for adoption.

A putative father argued the order was a nullity due to lack of notice and sought DNA testing and participation in the proceedings, while also raising constitutional challenges to provisions of the Child and Family Services Act defining “parent” and restricting appeals and status reviews after adoption placement.

The court held the putative father lacked standing to bring a status review under the statute and that the application was barred because the child had already been placed for adoption and the statutory waiting period had not elapsed.

The court further held there was no denial of procedural fairness and rejected Charter challenges under ss. 7 and 15.

The appeals and related constitutional applications were dismissed as improper collateral attacks on prior orders.

The appellant mother appealed a Superior Court decision that upheld an Ontario Court of Justice order denying her access to her children and maintaining their placement with their father under the supervision of the Children's Aid Society.

The mother had not seen her children since 2007 due to unaddressed mental health issues and had failed to comply with previous court orders requiring her to seek psychiatric assessment and treatment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the lower courts' decisions or in the refusal to grant an adjournment, and upheld the costs award against the mother.

The appellant parent appealed an order dismissing his appeal to the Superior Court from a decision granting the Children's Aid Society permanent wardship of his two children.

The Superior Court had dismissed the appeal for delay because the appellant failed to perfect the appeal by obtaining transcripts.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, noting the paramount concern for the children's need for stability and permanency.

The Court also found the appeal had virtually no prospect of success, as the trial judge's findings of inadequate parenting skills were fatal and there was no evidence of bias or inadequate assistance of counsel.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision making the children Crown wards without access, arguing she was denied procedural fairness at the status review hearing.

The children had previously been placed in her custody but were apprehended after a police incident involving alleged crack cocaine trafficking at her home.

At the time of the status review hearing, the appellant had relapsed into drug use and was in default of court orders.

The Court of Appeal found no procedural unfairness, noting the appellant and her lawyer participated in the hearing and no adjournment was requested.

The appeal was dismissed as the disposition was clearly in the best interests of the children.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment in a matrimonial dispute, arguing that the trial judge's conduct exhibited a reasonable apprehension of bias and compromised trial fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility findings were supported by the evidence and his comments fell far short of meeting the test for reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court also upheld the custody and access order, noting it was grounded in the specific needs and best interests of the children and consistent with the position of the Children's Lawyer.

The appellant father sought to suspend a final adoption order for his biological child by challenging the underlying Crown wardship order.

The child was apprehended at birth and made a Crown ward before the father's paternity was known.

After paternity was established, the Children's Aid Society gave the father time to present a parenting plan but ultimately proceeded with adoption when he failed to act promptly.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under s. 157(1) of the Child and Family Services Act, the final adoption order precluded any motion to set aside the Crown wardship order, and the father was precluded from bringing a status review application after the child was placed for adoption.

The Children's Aid Society appealed a trial judge's order granting a mother and aunt access to two children who had been made Crown wards.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by ignoring the statutory presumption against access to Crown wards and improperly placing the burden of proof on the Society.

The court also found the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the beneficial nature of the access and its impact on the children's future opportunities for a permanent and stable adoptive placement.

The appeal was allowed, the access order for the mother and aunt was terminated, and the order was left silent on sibling access to allow the Society to facilitate it.

The applicants, foster parents of a child since birth, sought judicial review of a Director's decision confirming the Halton Children's Aid Society's decision to place the child for adoption with another family.

The applicants argued the process was procedurally unfair due to excessive delay and the admission of late expert evidence, and that the removal of the child violated their section 7 Charter rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the delay was necessary to determine the child's best interests, the applicants had no section 7 rights as foster parents, and the Director's decision was reasonable based on the evidence of the child's attachment to the adoptive family.

The applicants, former foster parents, brought a motion to admit several affidavits on their judicial review application.

The respondents filed responding and reply affidavits.

The Divisional Court noted that the indiscriminate filing of affidavits likely offended the rule in Keeprite, but concluded it was not feasible to parse the inextricably woven evidence paragraph by paragraph.

The court admitted all affidavits, except for a portion of one affidavit that the applicants agreed to strike, noting it would separate the wheat from the chaff during the hearing.

The appellant mother appealed the dismissal of her appeal from a summary judgment granting Crown wardship of her three children to the Society without access.

On appeal, the mother sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding a proposed plan of care.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the lower courts' decisions but noted concerns regarding the children's current status and the deteriorating prospects for adoption.

The Court dismissed the appeal but granted the mother leave to commence a fresh status review application forthwith to assess whether re-establishing contact or placement with the mother is in the children's best interests.

The appellant appealed a judgment of Justice Rogin dated October 31, 2002.

The Court of Appeal ordered the appeal adjourned sine die pending a reference to be made in relation to the matter.

The applicant children's aid society appealed a decision that set aside a trial judge's order in a child protection matter.

The appeal judge had found palpable and overriding error based on the trial judge's comments regarding an expert witness's demeanour.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appeal judge failed to read the trial judge's reasons as a whole.

The trial judge had placed her concerns about the expert's demeanour in context and provided positive reasons for relying on his evidence, which was supported by other accepted witnesses.

The trial judge's orders were restored.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judgment awarding custody of her two daughters to their aunt.

The mother, who represented herself, argued that it was in the children's best interests to be in her care and raised concerns about their well-being with the aunt.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had carefully weighed the evidence and correctly applied the best interests of the child test.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court noting the children were in a stable, loving environment with their aunt.

The appellant mother appealed an order making her child a Crown ward without access for the purposes of adoption.

The child had been in the care of the respondent society for several years and had bonded with her foster family.

The Supreme Court of Canada admitted fresh evidence regarding the child's current situation and wishes.

The Court held that on a status review hearing under the Child and Family Services Act, the court must consider both whether the child continues to be in need of protection and the best interests of the child.

Finding that the child's psychological bonding with the foster family and her need for continuity of care outweighed the mother's interests, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Crown wardship order without access.