Jeffrey W. Boich

The mother (M.W.) appealed a summary judgment decision that placed her child (M.N.D.) in the custody of the father (M.S.) with discretionary access for the mother.

The appeal court admitted fresh evidence regarding the mother's ongoing non-cooperation with the Children's Aid Society (CAS) and her failure to comply with court orders concerning her other children.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the motions judge's factual findings or application of law regarding summary judgment and status review applications.

The fresh evidence further confirmed the appropriateness of the original decision, emphasizing the child's best interests and the need for permanence.

The children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to find two children in need of protection and to place them with their respective fathers.

The mother, who suffers from severe and chronic mental health issues, did not respond to the motion.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, and ordered the children placed with their fathers.

The court declined the society's request to delegate access discretion to the fathers, holding that a court cannot delegate its statutory duty to determine access based on the best interests of the children, and instead ordered supervised access with specific parameters.

A child protection motion for summary judgment brought by the Children's Aid Society seeking an order for extended society care without access to either parent.

The child was placed in care due to the mother's inability to manage the child's behaviour.

The father had no contact with the child for seven years prior to the Society's involvement.

On the motion, the parties consented to an order placing the child in extended society care with access to the mother.

The only outstanding issue was whether access to the father should be ordered.

The court dismissed the motion with respect to paternal access, finding no genuine issue requiring trial and that such access would not be in the child's best interests.

This is a second appeal in a child protection matter involving a 10-year-old child made a Crown ward with no access for adoption purposes.

The biological parents appealed the no access order.

The first appeal judge, while finding no error with the trial judge's determination, nonetheless ordered access followed by an openness hearing, made findings of ineffective assistance of counsel against trial counsel, and ordered personal costs against her.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Society's appeal, restored the trial judge's no access order, dismissed the parents' cross-appeal seeking declarations of Charter violations and miscarriage of justice, and allowed trial counsel's cross-appeal on the ineffective assistance findings and costs order.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing an appeal from an Ontario Court of Justice order making a Crown wardship order with no access by either parent.

The child was apprehended at eight weeks old along with three older siblings due to expressed fears of violence by the appellant's then partner.

The child had been in the custody of prospective adoptive parents for approximately four years at the time of appeal.

The appellants sought to challenge the Crown wardship order and the no-access provision.

The appellants effectively abandoned the Crown wardship challenge and focused on the access issue.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence including a CAS worker's affidavit and video recordings of access visits, but also admitted an affidavit from Dr. Kathy Keefe regarding open adoption, though with reservations about its foundation and timing.

The Court upheld the no-access order, finding that the appellants failed to meet the statutory test requiring that the relationship be meaningful and beneficial to the child and that access would not impair future adoption opportunities.

Appellants J.V. and M.V., maternal grandparents of a child apprehended at birth, appealed from a Superior Court decision dismissing their appeal of a trial judgment declaring the child a Crown ward without access.

The child had been in continuous foster care since ten months of age with prospective adoptive parents.

The appellants sought to have the child placed in their care, but the trial judge found their plan was not in the child's best interests due to concerns including the biological mother's permanent disability (Alcohol Related Neurodevelopmental Disorder), unresolved conflict between the biological mother and the appellants, and the lack of permanence in their proposed arrangement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Crown wardship order, finding the trial judge's decision was soundly based on evidence and that the child's need for permanence and stability outweighed the appellants' desire to parent.

A mother appealed a Crown wardship order made without access to her child.

She moved for interim access pending the hearing of her appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The child had been apprehended at eight weeks of age and remained in foster care for approximately three and a half years.

The trial judge found the child was in need of protection due to the mother's mental health issues, lack of insight into the child's needs, and exposure of the child to domestic conflict.

The Superior Court appeal judge dismissed the mother's appeal and found that continued access was neither meaningful nor beneficial to the child and impaired the child's adoption prospects.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for interim access, finding no substantial ground of appeal and determining that access was not in the child's best interests pending the appeal.

This appeal addressed systemic failures in the child welfare system, including trial counsel incompetence, judicial bias, and inordinate procedural delay, which led to a child remaining in legal limbo for over four years.

The court found the parents' trial counsel incompetent and the trial process unfair.

While the Crown wardship order was not challenged on appeal, the court overturned the "no access" order, replacing it with a contact order for the parents and the child.

It also established a "Pathway Plan" for an Openness Order Hearing, acknowledging a legislative conflict between a child's right to contact with parents and the requirement that such contact not impair adoption opportunities.

This appeal concerned a child protection application where the trial judge granted Crown Wardship of child A.V. to the Children's Aid Society without access.

The biological mother and maternal grandparents appealed, raising constitutional questions under section 15 of the Charter and seeking a new trial or placement of the child with the maternal grandparents.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings of fact or correctness in law, and no violation of constitutional rights, upholding the Crown Wardship based on the child's best interests.

The appellants appealed a trial decision making their two children Crown wards without access.

The appellants argued the trial judge failed to properly consider the mother's Aboriginal heritage, misinterpreted her 'flat affect', ignored positive evidence, and failed to consider less intrusive alternatives.

The appeal court dismissed all grounds, finding the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors and properly prioritized the children's best interests, noting the parents' chronic inability to safely parent and the severe failure to thrive of one child.

The court also strongly criticized the systemic delays in the child protection proceedings, noting the children had been in foster care for over four years.

A mother sought leave to bring a status review application regarding three children who had been made Crown wards without access.

The children had been in the same foster placements for over six years and were thriving.

The court applied the five-part test for leave to bring a status review application and found that the mother failed to satisfy all five criteria.

The court found that the mother had not demonstrated bona fides, had not established an unusual circumstance, and had not proven a prima facie case.

The mother had not addressed the underlying protection concerns identified at trial, particularly her personality disorder and impulsive decision-making.

The court dismissed the motion for leave, emphasizing the importance of permanency and stability for children in care.

A child protection trial concerning three children where the Children's Aid Society sought protection orders.

The central issue was determining who had "charge" of the two younger children immediately before intervention.

The mother had legal custody but the father had provided full-time care for approximately 66.6% of the ten months preceding the apprehension.

The court found the father had charge of the younger children and made custody orders accordingly, placing the eldest child with the mother and the two younger children with the father, with reasonable access provisions for both parents.