Jeffrey W. Boich

The applicant filed an application under section 120 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, raising concerns about the respondent children's aid society's termination of services and transfer of responsibility to another agency.

The matter was scheduled for a hearing, but the parties reached a settlement agreement prior to the hearing date.

The Child and Family Services Review Board closed the file as settled in accordance with the terms of the agreement.

The applicant mother filed an application with the Child and Family Services Review Board (CFSRB) complaining about the services provided by the respondent children's aid society.

The respondent submitted that the complaints were already the subject of ongoing child protection proceedings before the Superior Court of Justice.

The CFSRB found that the applicant's complaints, which included allegations of conspiracy and fraud, were not separate and different from the substantive issues before the court.

Consequently, the CFSRB concluded it lacked jurisdiction to review the application and dismissed it.

In a child protection trial under the CYFSA, the court found the child in need of protection based on risk of physical harm, risk of emotional harm, and the mother’s unavailability at the time of apprehension.

The court accepted evidence of serious, longstanding, and largely untreated mental health concerns affecting the mother’s ability to regulate conduct, cooperate with professionals, and make child-focused decisions, and also found unresolved risk arising from an adult child residing in the home.

Although the mother demonstrated strengths in housing, instrumental care, and positive access, the court held that neither return nor supervision was sufficient to protect the child because the requisite cooperation, insight, and reliability were absent.

A six-month interim society care order was made, with specified minimum unsupervised access for both parents.

The applicant filed a complaint under section 120 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act regarding services received from the respondent children's aid society.

The respondent argued the Board lacked jurisdiction because the issues raised were the subject of ongoing custody and access proceedings in family court.

The Board found that all of the applicant's concerns, including allegations regarding the children's father and the applicant's mental health, were issues that had been or were currently before the court.

Accordingly, the Board dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction under section 120(8) of the Act.

The Children's Aid Society appealed a motion judge's order that required it to supervise a mother's access to her child.

The motion judge had granted custody of the child to the paternal grandparents under section 102 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that once a section 102 custody order is made, the Society is no longer a party to the proceedings.

Under section 34(2) of the Children's Law Reform Act, a court cannot order the Society to supervise access unless it consents, which it did not in this case.

The order was varied to provide for supervised access through a local access centre.

The Children's Aid Society and the father brought summary judgment motions seeking a custody order placing the child with the father.

The mother conceded custody but sought specified access, which the father opposed, preferring access to be at his discretion.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the child's continued need for protection and placement with the father.

The court granted the custody order and, finding that the father had not encouraged the child's relationship with the maternal family, ordered specified progressive access for the mother and maternal grandmother, including reintegration counselling.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a final order to place the child in the care of the maternal grandmother for six months subject to supervision.

The mother had suffered a medical incident, struggled with substance abuse, and had not been in contact with the Society or her counsel for several months.

The father was noted in default.

Applying the test for summary judgment in child protection proceedings, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, determined the child remained in need of protection, and concluded that the requested supervision order was the least intrusive option in the child's best interests.

The children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order for extended society care with no access for a two-year-old child.

The parents, who both have developmental delays, opposed the motion and sought the return of the child with a supervision order.

The court found there was no genuine issue requiring a trial, as the parents lacked the capacity to parent independently and did not have adequate 24/7 supports in place.

The court granted summary judgment placing the child in extended society care, but ordered that the parents have access at the discretion of the society, finding that access was positive and in the child's best interests.

The mother (M.W.) appealed a summary judgment decision that placed her child (M.N.D.) in the custody of the father (M.S.) with discretionary access for the mother.

The appeal court admitted fresh evidence regarding the mother's ongoing non-cooperation with the Children's Aid Society (CAS) and her failure to comply with court orders concerning her other children.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the motions judge's factual findings or application of law regarding summary judgment and status review applications.

The fresh evidence further confirmed the appropriateness of the original decision, emphasizing the child's best interests and the need for permanence.

The children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to find two children in need of protection and to place them with their respective fathers.

The mother, who suffers from severe and chronic mental health issues, did not respond to the motion.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, and ordered the children placed with their fathers.

The court declined the society's request to delegate access discretion to the fathers, holding that a court cannot delegate its statutory duty to determine access based on the best interests of the children, and instead ordered supervised access with specific parameters.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment to place three children with their father under a six-month supervision order, with the mother's access to be supervised at the Society's discretion.

The father consented, and the mother did not actively oppose the motion.

The court applied the test for summary judgment in child protection proceedings, screened the evidence for admissibility (including business records and children's hearsay statements), and found no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court concluded that the children continued to be in need of protection and that the proposed order was in their best interests.

A child protection motion for summary judgment brought by the Children's Aid Society seeking an order for extended society care without access to either parent.

The child was placed in care due to the mother's inability to manage the child's behaviour.

The father had no contact with the child for seven years prior to the Society's involvement.

On the motion, the parties consented to an order placing the child in extended society care with access to the mother.

The only outstanding issue was whether access to the father should be ordered.

The court dismissed the motion with respect to paternal access, finding no genuine issue requiring trial and that such access would not be in the child's best interests.

This is a second appeal in a child protection matter involving a 10-year-old child made a Crown ward with no access for adoption purposes.

The biological parents appealed the no access order.

The first appeal judge, while finding no error with the trial judge's determination, nonetheless ordered access followed by an openness hearing, made findings of ineffective assistance of counsel against trial counsel, and ordered personal costs against her.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Society's appeal, restored the trial judge's no access order, dismissed the parents' cross-appeal seeking declarations of Charter violations and miscarriage of justice, and allowed trial counsel's cross-appeal on the ineffective assistance findings and costs order.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court decision dismissing an appeal from an Ontario Court of Justice order making a Crown wardship order with no access by either parent.

The child was apprehended at eight weeks old along with three older siblings due to expressed fears of violence by the appellant's then partner.

The child had been in the custody of prospective adoptive parents for approximately four years at the time of appeal.

The appellants sought to challenge the Crown wardship order and the no-access provision.

The appellants effectively abandoned the Crown wardship challenge and focused on the access issue.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence including a CAS worker's affidavit and video recordings of access visits, but also admitted an affidavit from Dr. Kathy Keefe regarding open adoption, though with reservations about its foundation and timing.

The Court upheld the no-access order, finding that the appellants failed to meet the statutory test requiring that the relationship be meaningful and beneficial to the child and that access would not impair future adoption opportunities.

Appellants J.V. and M.V., maternal grandparents of a child apprehended at birth, appealed from a Superior Court decision dismissing their appeal of a trial judgment declaring the child a Crown ward without access.

The child had been in continuous foster care since ten months of age with prospective adoptive parents.

The appellants sought to have the child placed in their care, but the trial judge found their plan was not in the child's best interests due to concerns including the biological mother's permanent disability (Alcohol Related Neurodevelopmental Disorder), unresolved conflict between the biological mother and the appellants, and the lack of permanence in their proposed arrangement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Crown wardship order, finding the trial judge's decision was soundly based on evidence and that the child's need for permanence and stability outweighed the appellants' desire to parent.

A mother appealed a Crown wardship order made without access to her child.

She moved for interim access pending the hearing of her appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The child had been apprehended at eight weeks of age and remained in foster care for approximately three and a half years.

The trial judge found the child was in need of protection due to the mother's mental health issues, lack of insight into the child's needs, and exposure of the child to domestic conflict.

The Superior Court appeal judge dismissed the mother's appeal and found that continued access was neither meaningful nor beneficial to the child and impaired the child's adoption prospects.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for interim access, finding no substantial ground of appeal and determining that access was not in the child's best interests pending the appeal.

This appeal addressed systemic failures in the child welfare system, including trial counsel incompetence, judicial bias, and inordinate procedural delay, which led to a child remaining in legal limbo for over four years.

The court found the parents' trial counsel incompetent and the trial process unfair.

While the Crown wardship order was not challenged on appeal, the court overturned the "no access" order, replacing it with a contact order for the parents and the child.

It also established a "Pathway Plan" for an Openness Order Hearing, acknowledging a legislative conflict between a child's right to contact with parents and the requirement that such contact not impair adoption opportunities.

The appellant, K.F., appealed a Crown wardship order concerning her child, Z.A.F. The appeal raised issues of systemic delay in child welfare proceedings, alleged misfeasance by the Children's Aid Society, the standard of appellate review, the weight given to expert evidence (Dr. Amin's parenting capacity assessment), and access to the Crown ward.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error by the trial judge.

It emphasized that criminal law delay principles do not apply to child welfare cases and that continued access by the parent would impair the child's future opportunities for adoption.

This appeal concerned a child protection application where the trial judge granted Crown Wardship of child A.V. to the Children's Aid Society without access.

The biological mother and maternal grandparents appealed, raising constitutional questions under section 15 of the Charter and seeking a new trial or placement of the child with the maternal grandparents.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings of fact or correctness in law, and no violation of constitutional rights, upholding the Crown Wardship based on the child's best interests.

The appellants appealed a Crown wardship order without access regarding their two children.

They argued the trial judge erred by failing to identify the mother as Indian or native, failing to apply Gladue principles, drawing negative inferences from the mother's flat affect, and failing to consider the children's best interests regarding access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the children did not meet the statutory definition of Indian or native person under the Child and Family Services Act, and that an access order was statutorily precluded because it would impair adoption prospects.

The Court also strongly condemned the systemic delays in the child protection proceedings.