Jeffrey W. Boich

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order making her child a Crown ward without access for the purposes of adoption.

The mother argued the motion judge erred by relying on a previous judgment regarding her older child as evidence of past parenting and by finding there was no genuine issue for trial.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge appropriately considered the past parenting evidence as a backdrop to measure change, correctly applied the summary judgment test, and properly determined that Crown wardship was in the child's best interests given the lack of cogent evidence demonstrating the mother's improved parenting capacity.

The appellants appealed a trial decision making their two children Crown wards without access.

The appellants argued the trial judge failed to properly consider the mother's Aboriginal heritage, misinterpreted her 'flat affect', ignored positive evidence, and failed to consider less intrusive alternatives.

The appeal court dismissed all grounds, finding the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors and properly prioritized the children's best interests, noting the parents' chronic inability to safely parent and the severe failure to thrive of one child.

The court also strongly criticized the systemic delays in the child protection proceedings, noting the children had been in foster care for over four years.

A mother sought leave to bring a status review application regarding three children who had been made Crown wards without access.

The children had been in the same foster placements for over six years and were thriving.

The court applied the five-part test for leave to bring a status review application and found that the mother failed to satisfy all five criteria.

The court found that the mother had not demonstrated bona fides, had not established an unusual circumstance, and had not proven a prima facie case.

The mother had not addressed the underlying protection concerns identified at trial, particularly her personality disorder and impulsive decision-making.

The court dismissed the motion for leave, emphasizing the importance of permanency and stability for children in care.

A child protection trial concerning three children where the Children's Aid Society sought protection orders.

The central issue was determining who had "charge" of the two younger children immediately before intervention.

The mother had legal custody but the father had provided full-time care for approximately 66.6% of the ten months preceding the apprehension.

The court found the father had charge of the younger children and made custody orders accordingly, placing the eldest child with the mother and the two younger children with the father, with reasonable access provisions for both parents.

The applicant Children's Aid Society appealed a trial judge's order granting access to three children who had been made Crown wards.

The Society argued the trial judge erred in finding that access would not impair the children's future opportunities for adoption and by creating an access structure that contravened the Child and Family Services Act.

The appeal court agreed, finding that the access order had deterred the only potential adoptive family, thereby impairing adoption opportunities.

The court also held that the trial judge exceeded her authority by creating a unique access reduction process that conflicted with the legislated scheme.

The appeal was granted and the access order was rescinded.

A mother appealed a summary judgment decision in child protection proceedings that found her child in need of protection and granted sole custody to the maternal grandparents.

The appellate court held that the motion judge relied heavily on inadmissible hearsay evidence, made unsupported credibility findings, and misapprehended key facts regarding the circumstances of the child's apprehension.

The court found the child had been voluntarily placed with grandparents prior to the Society’s involvement and was not in the mother’s care at the time of apprehension, undermining the protection finding.

The protection application was therefore ill-founded.

The order granting custody to the grandparents was set aside and the Society’s protection application dismissed.

The appellant mother appealed an order dismissing her appeal for delay.

Her original appeal was from a summary judgment finding her child in need of protection.

The mother failed to perfect her appeal within the 14-day period mandated by Rule 38(22), mistakenly believing she needed a transcript of submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle by the status hearing judge, as the paramount consideration was the best interests of the child and the need for expeditious resolution of placement and access issues.

The appellant appealed a decision placing her children under Crown wardship without access, arguing that the hearing judge intervened improperly by extensively questioning witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that in child protection proceedings, the paramount consideration is the best interests of the child.

The hearing judge was justified in seeking further information to clarify unusual testimony, and the questioning did not reach the level of showing a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant mother appealed the lower court decisions finding her children in need of protection and placing them under the supervision of the Children's Aid Society with the father.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the decisions below.

The Court noted that the protection and placement issues, as well as the mother's access, would be fully considered at an upcoming mandatory status review hearing.