Patrick Brohman

A children's aid society brought a child protection application under the CYFSA.

During argument on a temporary care and custody motion, a dispute arose about whether the child should be found to be a First Nations child under Ontario Regulation 155/18.

Although the child did not self-identify and neither parent identified the child as Indigenous, the child's half-sibling and that sibling's biological father self-identified as First Nations.

The court adopted a broad, purposive interpretation of the regulation and found that section 1(c)(i) applied, holding that the self-identification of a half-sibling was sufficient to establish the child as a First Nations child for the purposes of the CYFSA, engaging the Federal Act's placement priority provisions.

The temporary care and custody hearing was adjourned for further argument.

This decision concerns a motion to change the placement of a child, A., from her paternal grandmother’s care to her mother’s care under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The court reviews the admissibility of hearsay evidence, the reliability of statements made by the child, and the comparative risks and benefits of each placement.

The court applies the augmented best interests test for Indigenous children, considering the hierarchy of placements under the federal legislation.

The court concludes that placement with the mother is required to promote A.’s best interests and issues a temporary order accordingly.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion seeking to continue the placement of a child, N., with the Father, with Mother's parenting time at the Society's discretion.

Mother sought an equally shared parenting arrangement.

The court determined that Father was the primary caregiver before the Society's intervention, and as there were no protection concerns with Father, N. must remain in his care according to the mandatory placement hierarchy under section 94(2) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The court found Mother's mental health and past impulsive behaviours, including incidents witnessed by the child, posed risks, and her proposed shared care plan lacked sufficient detail and safety measures.

The Society was granted discretion over Mother's access, with parameters for future review based on Mother's progress.

The applicant maternal grandmother sought an order under s. 81(4) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA) to have her granddaughter brought before the court for child protection, alleging the child was not adequately protected in her father's care.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds to believe the child was in need of protection due to a pattern of neglect by the father and that court intervention under the CYFSA was necessary, as protection could not be adequately achieved through existing Children's Law Reform Act (CLRA) proceedings.

The court ordered that the threshold tests for a protection application were met, an Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) order be made, and the CLRA proceedings be stayed.

The Children's Aid Society and the father brought summary judgment motions seeking a custody order placing the child with the father.

The mother conceded custody but sought specified access, which the father opposed, preferring access to be at his discretion.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the child's continued need for protection and placement with the father.

The court granted the custody order and, finding that the father had not encouraged the child's relationship with the maternal family, ordered specified progressive access for the mother and maternal grandmother, including reintegration counselling.

The children's aid society brought a motion to change the placement of a 10-year-old child from the father's care to the mother's primary care.

The father brought a cross-motion seeking leave to move the child's primary residence to another region.

The child had been residing with the father and step-grandfather, but the step-grandfather was moving away and the father's housing and sobriety were unstable without him.

The mother had successfully completed programming and provided a stable home.

The court applied section 113(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, finding that the presumption in favour of the existing placement favoured the mother, as she was the only caregiver whose situation remained intact.

Alternatively, the court found it was in the child's best interests to be placed in the mother's primary care.

The society's motion was granted and the father's motion was dismissed.

The Children's Aid Society brought a child protection application regarding a 7-year-old child.

The court found the mother lacked credibility regarding her severe substance abuse issues, domestic violence instigation, and failure to comply with court orders, including driving while prohibited.

The court found the child to be in need of protection due to the risk of physical and emotional harm from the mother.

The child was ordered to remain in the care of the father for six months under CAS supervision, with the mother granted specified supervised access.

The Children's Aid Society sought a finding that the child was in need of protection due to the mother's volatile behaviour, severe mood swings, and history of making false allegations of physical abuse against the father's partner.

The mother had also breached publication bans by posting videos and writing a book identifying the child.

The court found the child in need of protection under the CYFSA due to the risk of physical and emotional harm in the mother's care.

The child was placed with the father for six months under Society supervision.

The court declined to order access at the Society's discretion, finding it lacked jurisdiction to delegate such discretion, and instead ordered specific supervised access for the mother.

Following a summary judgment motion in a child protection proceeding where the children were placed in the mother's custody, the mother sought costs of $4,000 from the father.

The mother argued the father was extremely unreasonable in proposing the children live with his sister.

The court reviewed the jurisprudence on costs in child protection matters, noting that costs between parents are only awarded in rare and exceptional circumstances involving bad faith or extreme unreasonableness.

The court found that while the father's position was unreasonable, it did not reach the threshold required to order costs in a child protection proceeding, and dismissed the mother's request.

The mother in a child protection proceeding brought a motion to disqualify the father's counsel, alleging a conflict of interest based on his prior interactions with the maternal grandfather and the mother.

The court found no disqualifying conflict of interest, as the mother was never a client and the grandfather's prior consultation did not yield relevant confidential information.

Furthermore, the court held that even if a conflict existed, disqualification was unwarranted due to the delay in bringing the motion and the significant prejudice to the father in retaining new counsel on the eve of trial.

The motion was dismissed.

The children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection and an order placing them in the custody of their mother.

The father, who was facing criminal charges related to his older daughter and had bail conditions preventing contact with the children, opposed the motion.

The court applied the test for summary judgment in child protection cases and found no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court found the children in need of protection due to the father's unavailability and the risk of emotional harm.

The children were placed in the custody of the mother, with access to the father and their half-sister to be at the children's wishes and the mother's discretion.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion to change the placement of a 21-month-old Métis child from foster care to a kin-in-care placement with the father of the child's older half-siblings.

The mother opposed the motion, seeking to have the child placed in her care under supervision.

The court applied an augmented best interests test, incorporating factors from both the CYFSA and federal Bill C-92.

The court found that placement with the kin caregiver was the least intrusive option, offering stability, a strong sibling bond, and protection from the risks associated with the mother's precarious housing and history of severe domestic violence.

The Society's motion was granted.

The Children's Aid Society sought a temporary order placing newborn twins in its care, while the respondent mother sought their return on terms of supervision.

The mother, an Indigenous woman, had a history of trauma and was on a methadone program, but had made significant strides in her mental health.

The Society apprehended the medically fragile twins shortly after birth and placed them in an Indigenous foster home located hours away, relying on the placement hierarchy in federal legislation (Bill C-92).

The court found that the Society's concerns could be managed through a supervision order and that returning the children to the mother's care was the least intrusive option in their best interests.

The court also held that the augmented best interests test for Indigenous children overrides the Bill C-92 placement hierarchy, meaning the Society cannot prioritize a distant culturally-matched foster home over a local placement if it impairs the parent-child bond and substantive equality.

The Children's Aid Society sought a temporary order to keep a prematurely born child in its care.

The child was apprehended shortly after birth due to the father's history of sexual offences against children and current serious criminal charges, as well as the mother's lack of insight into the risk posed by the father.

Although a transition plan to return the child to the mother was initiated, it was halted when the mother refused to cooperate with Society workers and denied them full access to her home.

The court found a real possibility of harm if the child was returned to the mother and ordered the child to remain in the temporary care of the Society.

In a child protection proceeding, the maternal great-aunt brought a motion to be added as a party to seek access to the child.

The child's mother was deceased, and the child had been placed with the paternal grandmother since birth.

The Society sought a final order granting sole custody to the paternal grandmother.

The court applied the five-part test for adding a party and found that adding the great-aunt solely to pursue an access claim would unduly delay the proceeding and was not in the child's best interests, as the child required permanency.

The motion was dismissed, without prejudice to the great-aunt bringing a subsequent access claim under the Children's Law Reform Act.

In a child protection status review application, the Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking custody of a child who had suffered serious unexplained injuries at two months of age.

The child had been in foster care and subsequently in the care of paternal grandparents under a supervision order.

The biological mother opposed the motion, arguing that counselling she had undertaken created a genuine issue for trial regarding her ability to care for the child.

The court found that the unexplained injuries, combined with the mother's lack of insight, ongoing lack of cooperation with the Society, and the conclusions of a parenting capacity assessment, established an ongoing need for protection.

The court granted summary judgment, placing the child in the custody of the paternal grandparents with supervised access for the mother.