COURT FILE NO.: FC-19-FO-98(1)
DATE: 2020/10/23
WARNING: This is a case under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 and subject to subsections 87(8) and 87(9) of this legislation. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Child, Youth and Services Act, 2017, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:
87(8) Prohibition re identifying child — No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.
(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged — The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.
142(3) Offences re publication — A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY OF THE REGION OF WATERLOO, Applicant (Moving Party)
AND:
E. B., Respondent Mother
AND:
S. L., Respondent Father
AND:
A.W., Respondent Father
BEFORE: Madam Justice J. Breithaupt Smith
COUNSEL: Ms. Aisha Ghafoor, Counsel for the Applicant Society Mr. Patrick Brohman, Counsel for the Respondent Mother Mr. Walter Wintar, Counsel for the Respondent Father, S. L. Mr. Michael J. Pass, Counsel for the Respondent Father, A. W.
HEARD: October 14, 2020
E N D O R S E M E N T -- COVID 19 PROTOCOL
[1] AS A RESULT OF COVID-19 the regular operations of the Superior Court of Justice are suspended at this time, as set out in the Notice to the Profession dated March 15, 2020 available at https://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/covid-19-suspension-fam/.
[2] In accordance with the consolidated Regional Notice to the Profession issued on June 26, 2020 effective July 6, 2020 and the Protocol for Central South dated April 7, 2020, electronic materials were filed by email to Kitchener.Superior.Court@ontario.ca:
a. The Applicant Children’s Aid Society of the Region of Waterloo (the “Society”) filed:
i. Status Review Application dated February 4, 2020;
ii. Notice of Motion originally returnable August 13, 2020;
iii. Affidavit of Colleen Graham dated February 3, 2020;
iv. Affidavit of Cornelia Purza dated May 5, 2020;
v. Affidavit of Cornelia Purza dated August 5, 2020;
vi. Reply Affidavit of Cornelia Purza dated September 29, 2020;
vii. Statement of Agreed Facts dated August 27, 2019;
viii. Factum dated October 9, 2020;
ix. Confirmation; and
x. Affidavits of Service.
b. The Respondent Mother (“Mother”) filed:
i. Her Answer/Plan of Care dated March 30, 2020; and
ii. Her Affidavit dated September 21, 2020;
iii. Affidavits of Service.
c. The Respondent Father, A.W. filed:
i. His Factum dated October 9, 2020;
ii. Affidavits of Service.
d. The Respondent Father, S. L. filed:
i. His Affidavit dated October 1, 2020;
ii. Affidavits of Service.
[3] I also have the benefit of the Reasons of Madam Justice Piccoli at the Place of Safety Hearing held on May 14, 2020, which Reasons are dated May 20, 2020.[^1]
[4] For the balance of these Reasons, I will refer to the child as “Baby C.” and to the parties as the “Society”; “Mother”; “Father” (being S.L., biological Father to Baby C. with whom we are concerned today); and “A.W.” (biological Father to Baby C’s two older siblings, who are the subject of this litigation but who are not the subject of today’s hearing).
[5] Two notes need to be made with respect to the documentation provided for today’s hearing.
[6] Firstly, Mr. Wintar for Father advises that his client’s Answer & Plan of Care (dated March 11, 2020 found at Vol. 3, Tab 5 of the physical Continuing Record), although not available electronically for today, supports placement of Baby C. with Mother and is consistent with the content of his Affidavit sworn October 1, 2020. Mr. Wintar therefore sees no issue in proceeding with today’s hearing in the absence of a copy of his client’s Answer & Plan of Care.
[7] Secondly, the Society has appended to its Factum a letter dated August 18, 2020 addressed to Mr. Brohman which encloses a copy of a “General Report” occurrence report by Waterloo Regional Police Service (“WRPS”) dated August 9, 2020 which describes an altercation involving Mother and at least two other women alleged to have taken place on that date. The Society filed Ms. Purza’s Affidavit dated September 29, 2020 and Mr. Brohman argues that it is improper to simply place a document before the Court as an attachment to a Factum when same ought to have been entered into evidence as an Exhibit to Ms. Purza’s Affidavit. Appreciating the Court’s ability to take into account evidence considered “credible and trustworthy” as codified in Section 94(10) of the CYFSA[^2], I am nonetheless concerned that, as former Senior Family Justice George Czutrin is fond of cautioning: “what we permit, we promote.” The Society has not served a Notice of Intent to File Business Records, which could have been done with the letter to Mr. Brohman of August 18, 2020. It is essential, particularly now as so many of our traditional approaches to the administration of justice are in flux, to maintain adherence to the rules of evidence. I therefore find that the WRPS General Report dated August 9, 2020 is inadmissible.
[8] Upon the resumption of court operations, the parties shall file their materials in the Continuing Record at the courthouse if they have not already done so.
Scope of Relief Sought and Parties’ Positions
[9] The Society’s Motion before the court seeks to change the placement of Baby C. from foster care to a kin-in-care placement with A.W. in the context of sections 90 through 94 of the CYFSA[^3]. The Society proposes that both parents have access in the Society’s discretion. Ms. Ghafoor underscores the Society’s ongoing obligation to assess the placement and confirmed that it “hasn’t closed its mind to the possibility of placement” with Mother, but that to place Baby C. with her now would be premature.
[10] A.W. supports the Society’s position and points out the strong bond developing between Baby C. and her two older sisters, both of whom have been in his care since February of 2019.
[11] Mother seeks to have Baby C. placed in her care under terms of supervision. Mr. Brohman argues that two main reasons gave rise to the removal of Baby C. from Mother’s care: (1) the violently toxic relationship with Father; and (2) poor decision-making in leaving Baby C. with an unsuitable caregiver. Regarding the violent relationship, he succinctly submits that Mother “didn’t get it, but now she does” and that the relationship is over permanently. Further, he submits that Mother would agree to a supervision term requiring that all alternate caregivers be approved in advance by the Society, thus alleviating the second concern.
[12] Father supports Mother’s position and confirms his agreement that his access continue to be at the discretion of the Society. Mr. Wintar submits that Father will abide by Mother’s wish to have no contact or, alternatively, to have contact only through counsel or Society staff.
[13] Although Mother identifies as Métis, the Métis Nation of Ontario does not appear to have been formally notified of these proceedings. However, Ms. Ghafoor confirms that the Society is working with the Métis Nation of Ontario to determine the availability of resources for this family.
Summary of Conclusions Reached
[14] I find that it is in Baby C.’s best interests to remain in the care of A.W. on a temporary basis. In doing so, I interpret the interplay between Bill C-92 and the CYFSA as establishing an augmented best interests test as the paramount consideration for Indigenous children.
[15] Unless otherwise indicated, the evidence upon which I rely in the balance of these Reasons is undisputed.
[16] Mother has six children in total. One of whom, K. B., who is almost six months of age, is in her care. The other five children are in the care of their respective Fathers, with the exception of Baby C. who is in the care of A. W., Father to her two sisters.
[17] Mother came to the Society’s attention in 2012 when pregnant with her first child. From 2012 to 2014, the protection concerns included: criminal charges; housing instability; and inappropriate caregivers. The Society was contacted in 2016 and 2018 but no real involvement was engaged until December 17, 2018 when serious family violence by Father against Mother was discovered.
[18] Father has five children in addition to Baby C. He does not have access with any of his children other than with Baby C., which visits are supervised and at the Society’s discretion. Father has been violent with multiple partners since 2009 and has been repeatedly charged with assault and breaching no-contact terms of release. Alcohol has consistently been a factor.
[19] Although Mother initially refused to discuss Father’s history of violence against his partners, she told the Society in December of 2018 that she would not allow him to have contact with three of her children who were in her care at that time, namely Baby C. and her two older sisters. Father, however, refused to agree to any such restriction. Upon learning of Father’s behaviour and his involvement with Baby C.’s sisters, their Father A.W. commenced family court litigation against Mother to seek custody. Presumably, that litigation is suspended while this proceeding unfolds.
[20] Despite Mother’s assurance to the Society, it became apparent on February 7, 2019 that she had permitted Father to reside in her home since Christmas of 2018. Father’s violence against Mother escalated until he hit her in the head by slamming a door and police were called. All three children were present at the time. Baby C. was five days old. Both Mother and Father lied repeatedly about the relationship; Father was overheard directing Mother in her dealings with the Society; and Father took the Society to task for bringing Baby C. and her two sisters to a place of safety. Baby C.’s two sisters were placed in A.W.’s care on that date, where they have remained since. Baby C. was taken to a foster home briefly, then returned to Mother’s care again on the Mother’s undertaking not to have any contact with Father in Baby C.’s presence, but by June of 2019 the Society’s intervention escalated further and Baby C. was brought into foster care where she remained until August of his year.
Analysis
[21] The analysis on a motion to change the placement of children in child protection proceedings asks two questions[^4]:
(1) Has the moving party demonstrated a material change in circumstances?
(2) If so, what placement is the least intrusive, presents the least risk to the children and is consistent with their best interests?
Question 1 – What is the Material Change in Circumstances?
[22] The material change in circumstances in this matter is the Society’s approval of A. W. as an appropriate kin-in-care placement for Baby C. This matter was not contested to by any of the Respondents.
Question 2 – What Placement is the Least Intrusive and Risky in the Children’s Best Interests?
[23] The court must choose the order that is the least disruptive placement consistent with adequate protection for the child. The degree of intrusiveness of the intervention should be proportional to the degree of risk to the child. In assessing the risk of harm, there must be a real possibility on the balance of probabilities that a child will suffer harm if returned to the parents and that the child cannot be protected adequately by terms and conditions imposed by the court.[^5] Working with the list of factors set out in the best interests considerations at Section 74(3) of the Act, Section 74(3)(l) speaks directly to the impact upon a child of his or her removal from the family unit. Section 74(3)(m) guides the court to consider the degree of risk of harm in determining whether a child is in need of protection. Thus, the factors set out at section 74(3) of the CYFSA provide a solid framework in answering the question of interim placement.
[24] As noted above, E. B. identifies herself and the children as Métis, and therefore additional considerations come into play. In CAS v. K. C. and Constance Lake First Nation, 2020 ONSC 5513, I reviewed the applicable text of An act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, R.S.C. 2019, c. 24 (“Bill C-92”), reproduced at Appendix “A” hereto, and held at paragraph 41:
… Only two factors in the inclusive list set out at section 10(3) of Bill C-92 regarding the best interests of an Indigenous child do not already exist in the more comprehensive list of factors at section 74(3) of the CYFSA. Those two factors are 10(3)(g) regarding family violence and 10(3)(h) regarding any civil or criminal proceeding, order or measure relevant to the child. Having regard to section 4 of Bill C-92, these two factors are therefore to be added to the list of factors set out at section 74(3) of the CYFSA when analyzing the best interests of the Indigenous child in Ontario. Otherwise, the provincial legislation is not in conflict or inconsistent with the federal legislation, and therefore the thus-augmented CYFSA best interests test governs.
[25] The test therefore can be described as adding sections 10(3)(g) and 10(3)(h) of Bill C-92 to the list of factors at section 74(3) of the CYFSA (set out at Appendix “B” hereto). The list of factors for consideration for Indigenous children becomes:
a. the child’s views and wishes, accorded due weight unless they cannot be ascertained;
b. the importance of preserving an Indigenous child’s cultural identity and connection to community;
c. the child’s physical, mental and emotional needs, and the appropriate care or treatment to meet those needs;
d. the child’s physical, mental and emotional level of development;
e. the child’s personal identity characteristics;
f. the child’s cultural and linguistic heritage;
g. the importance for the child’s development of a positive relationship with a parent and a secure place as a member of a family;
h. the child’s relationships and emotional ties to his or her family and community network;
i. the importance of continuity in the child’s care and impact of a potential disruption thereto;
j. a comparison of the Plans of Care put forward by the Society and the parents;
k. the effects on the child of delay in the disposition of the case;
l. the risk of harm arising from the child’s residency whether with a parent or otherwise;
m. the degree of risk, if any, that justified the finding that the child is in need of protection;
n. any family violence and its impact on the child, including the nature of exposure and risk of harm; and
o. any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.
[26] What follows is the application of the above criteria to the undisputed facts:
a. Child’s views - Not applicable.
b. Preservation of Indigenous culture – There is no evidence that Mother participates in any Indigenous cultural expression. At just 21 months of age, Baby C. does not have her own connection to the local Indigenous community. Having said that, her sisters are also Métis, and therefore a deep connection with them may also have a cultural aspect in the longer term. Further, the Society continues to work with the Métis Nation of Ontario’s “Métis Family Wellbeing Program” on cultural issues for all four of Mother’s daughters.
c. Baby C.’s needs – There is no evidence that Baby C. is anything other than a healthy toddler at this time, although she does have the carrier gene for Cystic Fibrosis. Although it is hearsay, Colleen Graham attests in her Affidavit of February 3, 2020 that A. W. reported to her that Mother is largely disinterested in meeting Baby C.’s needs during visits supervised by him at his residence and that Baby C. garners Mother’s attention for only the first 30 minutes of each visit. Mother does not dispute Ms. Graham’s evidence.
d. Baby C.’s development – When she came into care in June of 2019, Baby C. showed no interest in her surroundings and had a flat head from laying down in one position. Testing ruled out eyesight or hearing concerns and, after two months, she began to respond to stimulus as would be expected of an infant.
e. Baby C.’s identity characteristics – Not applicable.
f. Baby C.’s cultural and linguistic heritage – See (b) above.
g. Security in family placement – The proposal put forward by the Society would see Baby C. living full time with her two older sisters, aged 8 and 6 ½. She would have the benefit of developing a deep and loving bond with them while maintaining regular access with Mother. She would benefit from the peer group that the three children provide for one another as they navigate their family constellation. Having regard to her elder sisters’ ages, their needs in A. W.’s home are less likely to conflict with Baby C.’s needs. In contrast, Mother’s attention will of necessity be divided between Baby C. and Mother’s youngest child, K. B., who is approaching six months of age.
h. Child’s relationships with others – Baby C. has been in foster care from three months of age (June 2019) through to 18 months of age (August 2020). Her primary attachments will have been to the foster parents until very recently.
i. Continuity of care – As noted, stability and continuity in Baby C.’s life have been provided primarily by her foster parents. She has now been in A. W.’s care for more than two months. A further change in placement would be a disruption, the effect of which must be weighed against any salutary effect of returning her to Mother’s care.
j. Comparison of plans of care – The Society relies upon A. W., who has successfully parented Baby C.’s two older sisters for the last eighteen months. A. W. resides with and has the support of his mother, paternal grandmother to the girls, in caring for them. A. W. is described as working co-operatively with the Society and as being “very agreeable” to allowing workers access to the two older girls. The W. family has set limits with age appropriate expectations from the two older girls, who present as happy and healthy. A. W. regularly facilitates visits between the girls and their two older half-brothers, Mother’s two eldest children, and communication between A. W. and the custodial Father of those two children appears cordial. In contrast, Mother’s plan of care centers around her ability to house Baby C. at Marillac Place, a supportive home for single mothers. It is very positive that Mother now disavows any relationship with Father and is engaged with counselling for survivors of domestic violence, but with six-month-old K. B. already in her care and significant personal work ahead of her, she will have considerably less time and energy for Baby C. than could be expended by A. W. and his mother in their shared residence. Further, the Society raises the concern that Mother may be precariously housed, as she has been cited for six violations of Marillac Place’s house rules with the expulsion limit being ten citations. While Mother is managing fairly well with K. B. in her care in a supportive environment, the situation could deteriorate quickly if she were required to leave Marillac Place. There is no order that the court could make to address Mother’s potentially precarious housing.
k. Delay – Simply stated, even taking into account the suspension of timelines arising from the COVID-19 situation, Baby C. has spent a significant amount of time in foster care. Other kin suggestions have not provided any suitable alternatives. Further delay is not in Baby C.’s best interests.
l. Degree of risk giving rise to apprehension – Expanding upon the factors noted at (j) above and the discussion of family violence at (m) below, Mother consistently lied to Society workers and other supports about her ongoing relationship with Father. She now attests that she has realized that any relationship with Father is unhealthy, but this is qualified by her statement: “I do hope that [Father] deals with his issues so that our children can have a caring and responsible father; however given his past history, that seems unlikely.” Unlikely is an understatement. Father himself is cagey with respect to his reconciliation intentions, saying only that he will respect Mother’s wish for no contact, if that continues to be her wish. This is a small but important point, as Mother has historically authorized contact from Father when given the discretion to do so through the criminal justice system. No-contact orders have already been made regarding these individuals, to no avail. The risk of harm to Baby C. both due to potential housing instability and arising from her parents’ relationship is real.
m. Risk of harm from family violence – Father has recently been released from custody and it remains to be seen whether these parents can maintain their separation from one another. Father’s violence toward Mother has been extreme. On March 31, 2019 she sustained at his hands: two black eyes; injuries suggestive of strangulation; severe bruising and swelling of her right shin and calf; and four bite marks, three of which were on her back. Father has a consistent history of violence against his partners dating back more than ten years. The risk of harm to any small child in the care of parents who have engaged in such conduct is obvious and probable.
n. Family violence – This issue has already been addressed, and I note here that section 93 of the CYFSA explicitly authorizes the Court to consider evidence of past conduct.
o. Other litigation proceedings – No evidence was presented regarding any terms or conditions of Father’s release from custody. As noted above, Father’s historic family litigation has resulted in no contact with his older children from other relationships. Mother’s historic family litigation has resulted in five of her six children being out of her primary care. No evidence was provided regarding any access that Mother may have with her two eldest children.
[27] For the Society, Ms. Ghafoor noted that her client remains open to the possibility of placement of Baby C. with Mother, but that such placement now, at Marillac Place, when Father has just been released from custody, is too much too soon. I agree. For A. W., Mr. Pass argues that he offers: (1) a secure and stable home environment; (2) a consistent record of meeting the needs of the children in his care; (3) a long record of consistent co-operation with the Society; and (4) an opportunity for Baby C. to reside with kin, including her two older sisters. The plan put forward jointly by the Society and A. W. is the least intrusive option in Baby C.’s best interests.
Order
[28] Based on all of the foregoing, Temporary Order to go:
Per paragraphs 1; 2 and 3 of the Society’s Notice of Motion at Volume 5, Tab 1 of the Continuing Record.
Matter is returnable on Thursday, November 5, 2020 at 9:30 a.m. to be spoken to (as previously scheduled), which appearance shall be by Zoom videoconference via the internet at: [Details omitted from version released for publication.]
J. Breithaupt Smith, J.
DATE: October 23, 2020
Appendix “A” – Excerpts from An act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, [R.S.C. 2019, c. 24](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/sc-2019-c-24/latest/sc-2019-c-24.html) (“Bill C-92”)
Preamble
Whereas Parliament recognizes the legacy of residential schools and the harm, including inter-generational trauma, caused to Indigenous peoples by colonial policies and procedures;
Whereas Parliament affirms the need
to take into account the unique circumstances and needs of Indigenous elders, parents, youth, children, …
to eliminate the over-representation of Indigenous children in child and family services systems,
4 For greater certainty, nothing in this Act affects the application of a provision of a provincial Act or regulation to the extent that the provision does not conflict with, or is not inconsistent with, the provisions of this Act.
8 The purpose of this Act is to … (b) set out principles applicable, on a national level, to the provision of child and family services in relation to Indigenous children;
9 (1) This Act is to be interpreted and administered in accordance with the principle of the best interests of the child.
9 (2) This Act is to be interpreted and administered in accordance with the principle of cultural continuity as reflected in the following concepts:
(a) cultural continuity is essential to the well-being of a child, a family and an Indigenous group, community or people;
(b) the transmission of the languages, cultures, practices, customs, traditions, ceremonies and knowledge of Indigenous peoples is integral to cultural continuity;
(c) a child’s best interests are often promoted when the child resides with members of his or her family and the culture of the Indigenous group, community or people to which he or she belongs is respected;
(d) child and family services provided in relation to an Indigenous child are to be provided in a manner that does not contribute to the assimilation of the Indigenous group, community or people to which the child belongs or to the destruction of the culture of that Indigenous group, community or people; and
(e) the characteristics and challenges of the region in which a child, a family or an Indigenous group, community or people is located are to be considered.
9(3) This Act is to be interpreted and administered in accordance with the principle of substantive equality as reflected in the following concepts:
(b) a child must be able to exercise his or her rights under this Act, including the right to have his or her views and preferences considered in decisions that affect him or her, and he or she must be able to do so without discrimination, including discrimination based on sex or gender identity or expression;
(c) a child’s family member must be able to exercise his or her rights under this Act, including the right to have his or her views and preferences considered in decisions that affect him or her, …
10 (1) The best interests of the child must be a primary consideration in the making of decisions or the taking of actions in the context of the provision of child and family services in relation to an Indigenous child and, in the case of decisions or actions related to child apprehension, the best interests of the child must be the paramount consideration.
10 (2) When the factors referred to in subsection (3) are being considered, primary consideration must be given to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being, as well as to the importance, for that child, of having an ongoing relationship with his or her family and with the Indigenous group, community or people to which he or she belongs and of preserving the child’s connections to his or her culture.
10 (3) To determine the best interests of an Indigenous child, all factors related to the circumstances of the child must be considered, including
(a) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage;
(b) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;
(c) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with his or her parent, the care provider and any member of his or her family who plays an important role in his or her life;
(d) the importance to the child of preserving the child’s cultural identity and connections to the language and territory of the Indigenous group, community or people to which the child belongs;
(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;
(f) any plans for the child’s care, including care in accordance with the customs or traditions of the Indigenous group, community or people to which the child belongs;
(g) any family violence and its impact on the child, including whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence as well as the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child; and
(h) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.
11 Child and family services provided in relation to an Indigenous child are to be provided in a manner that
(a) takes into account the child’s needs, including with respect to his or her physical, emotional and psycho-logical safety, security and well-being;
(b) takes into account the child’s culture;
(c) allows the child to know his or her family origins; and
(d) promotes substantive equality between the child and other children.
16 (1) The placement of an Indigenous child in the context of providing child and family services in relation to the child, to the extent that it is consistent with the best interests of the child, is to occur in the following order of priority:
(a) with one of the child’s parents;
(b) with another adult member of the child’s family;
(c) with an adult who belongs to the same Indigenous group, community or people as the child;
(d) with an adult who belongs to an Indigenous group, community or people other than the one to which the child belongs; or
(e) with any other adult.
Appendix “B” – [Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/so-2017-c-14-sch-1/latest/so-2017-c-14-sch-1.html), [section 74(3)](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/so-2017-c-14-sch-1/latest/so-2017-c-14-sch-1.html#sec74subsec3_smooth)
74 (3) Where a person is directed in this Part to make an order or determination in the best interests of a child, the person shall,
(a) consider the child’s views and wishes, given due weight in accordance with the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;
(b) in the case of a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child, consider the importance, in recognition of the uniqueness of First Nations, Inuit and Métis cultures, heritages and traditions, of preserving the child’s cultural identity and connection to community, in addition to the considerations under clauses (a) and (c); and
(c) consider any other circumstance of the case that the person considers relevant, including,
(i) the child’s physical, mental and emotional needs, and the appropriate care or treatment to meet those needs,
(ii) the child’s physical, mental and emotional level of development,
(iii) the child’s race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, family diversity, disability, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression,
(iv) the child’s cultural and linguistic heritage,
(v) the importance for the child’s development of a positive relationship with a parent and a secure place as a member of a family,
(vi) the child’s relationships and emotional ties to a parent, sibling, relative, other member of the child’s extended family or member of the child’s community,
(vii) the importance of continuity in the child’s care and the possible effect on the child of disruption of that continuity,
(viii) the merits of a plan for the child’s care proposed by a society, including a proposal that the child be placed for adoption or adopted, compared with the merits of the child remaining with or returning to a parent,
(ix) the effects on the child of delay in the disposition of the case,
(x) the risk that the child may suffer harm through being removed from, kept away from, returned to or allowed to remain in the care of a parent, and
(xi) the degree of risk, if any, that justified the finding that the child is in need of protection.
[^1]: C.A.S. v. E.B. and S.L., 2020 ONSC 3097 [^2]: Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, C. 14, Sched.1 [^3]: Text of sections can be found at: https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/17c14#BK124 retrieved on October 21, 2020. [^4]: Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.M., 2017 ONCJ 784 at paragraphs 55 – 69. [^5]: CYFSA section 1(2) and CAS v. B.D./F.T.M., 2012 ONSC 2448 at paragraphs 28 & 29.