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Court cannot order Children's Aid Society to supervise access without consent after granting final custody.
The Children's Aid Society appealed a motion judge's order that required it to supervise a mother's access to her child.
The motion judge had granted custody of the child to the paternal grandparents under section 102 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.
The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that once a section 102 custody order is made, the Society is no longer a party to the proceedings.
Under section 34(2) of the Children's Law Reform Act, a court cannot order the Society to supervise access unless it consents, which it did not in this case.
The order was varied to provide for supervised access through a local access centre.
Appeal allowed setting aside dismissal for delay as prejudice alleged was only general in nature.
The appellant appealed an order dismissing its action for delay.
The Court of Appeal found that the motions judge erred in principle in finding prejudice due to inexcusable delay, as the prejudice alleged was general in nature and there was no evidence of missing or incapacitated witnesses.
The appeal was allowed and the order set aside, but without prejudice to the respondent to move again if the appellant failed to answer undertakings within thirty days.
Costs of the appeal and motion were awarded to the respondent.