Valeria Ruoso

The applicant, a psychiatrist, sought an order to commit a 17-year-old youth, J.P., to a secure treatment program for 180 days under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The application was opposed by the Family & Children’s Services and the Office of the Children’s Lawyer representing J.P. The court dismissed the application, finding that while J.P. had a mental disorder and a history of substantial threats, the strict statutory criterion requiring evidence of serious bodily harm caused or attempted within 45 days immediately preceding the application was not met.

The court emphasized that secure treatment is an extraordinary measure with significant liberty interests at stake, and the "best interests" of the child, while paramount in general child protection proceedings, is not the test for committal to secure treatment.

The Children's Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo was ordered to pay costs to the respondent mother, J.P., following a successful motion by the mother for child placement.

While the Society's position on the underlying motion was deemed reasonable, the court found several procedural failings on its part, including inadequate information gathering regarding the father's incarceration, improper delegation of decision-making to another CAS, insufficient assessment of the proposed placement plan, and failure to disclose the father's partner's child protection involvement.

These failings were deemed "patently unfair and indefensible" justifying the costs award.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order to place two children in extended society care, with a minimum of three face-to-face access visits per year for the parents.

The parents consented to the extended society care order but the father sought more frequent access.

The court granted the summary judgment motion, finding no genuine issue for trial, and ordered extended society care with a minimum of three face-to-face visits per year for both parents, balancing the children's need for stability with their desire to maintain contact with their parents.

The court issued a supplementary endorsement to its October 25, 2019 trial decision (2019 ONSC 6096) to resolve three outstanding disagreements regarding a parenting schedule: mother's mid-week parenting time, Christmas arrangements, and treatment of school strike days.

The court agreed with the mother's proposals for flexible mid-week parenting time based on her class schedule and for alternating Christmas Eve/Day to maintain sibling bonds.

However, the court rejected the mother's request to treat strike days like professional development days due to inconsistency and short notice.

The children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to find two children in need of protection and to place them with their respective fathers.

The mother, who suffers from severe and chronic mental health issues, did not respond to the motion.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, and ordered the children placed with their fathers.

The court declined the society's request to delegate access discretion to the fathers, holding that a court cannot delegate its statutory duty to determine access based on the best interests of the children, and instead ordered supervised access with specific parameters.

The parties separated in 2014 and have a 6-year-old child.

The child has been subjected to multiple parenting regimes, including periods where each parent unilaterally withheld the child from the other.

The mother previously made an unfounded sexual abuse allegation against the father.

The father sought sole custody, while the mother sought joint custody with primary residence.

The court found both parents fit but noted significant communication issues.

The court awarded joint custody, with primary residence to the father and final decision-making authority to the father if the parties cannot agree.

The court denied both parties' claims for retroactive and prospective child support, noting the father's modest income and the mother's status as a student.

In a child protection proceeding, the maternal great-aunt brought a motion to be added as a party to seek access to the child.

The child's mother was deceased, and the child had been placed with the paternal grandmother since birth.

The Society sought a final order granting sole custody to the paternal grandmother.

The court applied the five-part test for adding a party and found that adding the great-aunt solely to pursue an access claim would unduly delay the proceeding and was not in the child's best interests, as the child required permanency.

The motion was dismissed, without prejudice to the great-aunt bringing a subsequent access claim under the Children's Law Reform Act.

A trial decision concerning custody, access, and child support of two young children following separation.

The applicant sought joint custody with a 50/50 shared residential arrangement, while the respondent sought sole custody with structured access.

The court found incidents of domestic violence by the applicant, poor communication between the parties, and the applicant's intentional underemployment.

The court awarded sole custody to the respondent with structured overnight access to the applicant, and imputed income for child support purposes based on the applicant's capacity to earn.

The appellant, convicted of a designated sexual offence, challenged the constitutionality of Christopher's Law, which mandates that sex offenders register with police.

He argued the law was ultra vires the province, rendered inoperative by federal paramountcy, and violated his rights under sections 7, 11, and 12 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the legislation was a valid exercise of provincial power aimed at community safety, did not conflict with federal law, and did not constitute punishment.

The court also held that the law did not violate section 7, as its requirements were not overbroad or grossly disproportionate to the objective of protecting the public.

The Crown appealed sentence, arguing that a conditional sentence was unfit given the seriousness of the offence and the need for denunciation.

The court held that a community-based sentence should not originally have been imposed, but declined to incarcerate the respondent because of the passage of time, hardship, remorse, rehabilitation, employment, family support, and ongoing community service.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the conditional sentence was increased to two years less one day, with the curfew extended for the full duration of the sentence.

The probation order was left undisturbed.