Dr. S. Parekh

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision denying her catastrophic impairment designation and a special award under s. 10 of Regulation 664.

The Divisional Court found the LAT erred in law by concluding it lacked jurisdiction to make a special award for benefits the insurer had delayed but ultimately agreed to pay before the hearing.

The Court also held the LAT breached procedural fairness by admitting and relying on the report of the insurer's psychiatric expert, who refused to attend the hearing for cross-examination.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to a differently constituted tribunal.

The Applicant sought a determination that he sustained a catastrophic impairment and was entitled to ongoing income replacement benefits following a 2017 motor vehicle accident.

The Respondent brought a preliminary motion to strike the Applicant's catastrophic impairment report, arguing it was not conducted by a physician as required by section 45(2)1 of the Schedule.

The Tribunal dismissed the motion, finding the report was directed by a physician and compliant with the Schedule.

On the merits, the Tribunal preferred the Applicant's expert evidence, concluding he suffered a marked impairment in all four areas of functioning due to somatic symptom disorder and major depressive disorder.

The Tribunal found the Applicant catastrophically impaired and completely unable to engage in suitable employment, granting entitlement to income replacement benefits and interest.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a rear-end motor vehicle accident, claiming she sustained a catastrophic impairment under criterion 8 (mental or behavioural impairment).

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that the applicant did not meet the threshold for catastrophic impairment, as she did not demonstrate a marked impairment in at least three of the four spheres of functioning.

The Tribunal also denied the applicant's claims for attendant care benefits, finding she had not incurred the expenses and did not require the care, as well as various treatment plans and assessments.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, a psychiatrist, sought an order to commit a 17-year-old youth, J.P., to a secure treatment program for 180 days under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The application was opposed by the Family & Children’s Services and the Office of the Children’s Lawyer representing J.P. The court dismissed the application, finding that while J.P. had a mental disorder and a history of substantial threats, the strict statutory criterion requiring evidence of serious bodily harm caused or attempted within 45 days immediately preceding the application was not met.

The court emphasized that secure treatment is an extraordinary measure with significant liberty interests at stake, and the "best interests" of the child, while paramount in general child protection proceedings, is not the test for committal to secure treatment.