Deborah Lynn Krick

The appellants were convicted by a jury of procuring a person to provide sexual services and receiving a material benefit from sexual services.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on the essential elements of the offences.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the jury was not properly instructed that exercising control, direction, or influence over a person's movements generally requires proof of more than an isolated act and involves an assessment of the power dynamic in the relationship.

The misdirection on the procuring counts also undermined the material benefit convictions.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso, allowed the appeals, and ordered new trials.

The appellant appealed his firearms convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in denying him leave to cross-examine the affiant of a search warrant during a Garofoli application.

The police had conducted warrantless surveillance in the underground garage of the appellant's condominium to corroborate confidential informant tips, but omitted key details about this surveillance from the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the garage and the information obtained, and that the trial judge erred in denying leave to cross-examine the affiant on the surveillance and the omissions in the ITO.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant challenged his jury conviction for sexual assault offences and a five-year penitentiary sentence, arguing the jury charge on motive was unbalanced and the sentencing judge improperly treated lack of insight or remorse as aggravating.

The court held the charge, read functionally and as a whole, accurately and sufficiently instructed the jury, including on motive to fabricate and motive to offend, and any imperfections did not create legal error.

On sentence, the court found no error in principle affecting fitness and no improper reliance on lack of remorse.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, leave to appeal sentence was granted, and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The accused was convicted by jury of the attempted murder of her infant daughter and her mother, and of aggravated assault of the daughter, following an incident in which all three were found unconscious after being injected with insulin.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial on the attempted murder count relating to the mother on the basis that the jury instructions failed to distinguish between attempted murder and the offence of aiding suicide where the mother may have self-administered the insulin.

The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, restoring the conviction, finding no air of reality to the theory that the mother voluntarily injected herself with suicidal intent.

The majority held that trial judges must only instruct on theories lacking air of reality where there is a sufficient evidentiary foundation, and that the cumulative circumstantial evidence did not support a reasonable inference that the mother intended to end her own life.

The dissent would have dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding an air of reality to the inference of autonomous self-injection and holding that the trial judge was required to instruct the jury on the legal significance of I.F.'s possible voluntary participation to the actus reus of attempted murder.

The appellant, Travis Babbington, appealed his conviction for first degree murder.

He argued that the trial judge erred in admitting his post-arrest statement to police, in instructing the jury on planning and deliberation, in failing to caution the jury about prior consistent statements, and in instructing on eyewitness identification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge’s rulings or jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Riley Kostuk’s appeal from his conviction for second degree murder.

Kostuk argued that his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter was violated, that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of prior discreditable conduct, and that evidence of his schizophrenia was improperly admitted or not properly limited.

The court found no error in the trial judge’s rulings, holding that the appellant had an operating mind when consulting counsel, that the prior conduct evidence was properly admitted for motive and identity, and that the references to mental health did not prejudice the trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The media appellants sought full, unredacted access to youth court records concerning eight young persons accused of second-degree murder, arguing that the open court principle (Dagenais-Mentuck test) should grant them presumptive access.

The Youth Court and Superior Court granted only partial, redacted access, holding that the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) statutory scheme for record access (s. 119(1)(s)) takes precedence over the common law open court principle.

The YCJA requires applicants to demonstrate a "valid interest" and that access is "desirable in the interest of the proper administration of justice" balancing public interest with the young persons' heightened privacy rights and rehabilitation goals.

The Superior Court also declined to hear the appellants' constitutional challenge to the YCJA provisions, deeming the Youth Court the more appropriate forum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the YCJA's specific statutory regime for youth record access is a valid exception to the open court principle and that the media must meet its criteria via a formal application on notice.

It also upheld the discretion not to hear the constitutional challenge at the Superior Court level.

The appellant, Nicholas Johnson, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, challenging the trial judge's refusal to qualify a proposed expert mid-trial.

The expert was intended to recover access to the appellant's Google account via his cell phone to obtain location services data.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary decision, noting the lack of a proper application and insufficient evidence regarding the expert's qualifications or the admissibility of the potential data.

The appellant, a nurse, was convicted by a jury of attempted murder of her 19-month-old daughter (E.) and her mother (I.F.) by administering insulin, and aggravated assault of E. The attempted murder of E. resulted in severe, permanent brain damage.

The appellant appealed both convictions and sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal for the attempted murder of E. and the sentence appeal, finding the life sentence for E.'s attempted murder fit given the severe harm and breach of trust.

However, the Court allowed the appeal for the attempted murder of I.F. and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in jury instructions by not sufficiently distinguishing attempted murder from aiding suicide, particularly regarding the mens rea and causal link if I.F. had self-administered the insulin.

The appellant appealed convictions for five sexual offences, including sexual assault, human trafficking, and related material benefit and advertising charges.

The appeal raised four grounds concerning the trial judge's treatment of evidence: a misapprehension of a text message, exclusion of WhatsApp messages, refusal to permit cross-examination on prior "sexual punishment" and improper reliance on two text messages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding that the trial judge's mistake regarding the text message was not essential to the reasoning, the WhatsApp messages were properly excluded under s. 276 of the Criminal Code and Canada Evidence Act due to authenticity concerns and prejudice, the refusal to permit cross-examination on prior sexual punishment was correct as it related to impermissible "twin myth" reasoning, and the reliance on the two text messages was proper.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

This case concerns the Crown's application to unseal journalistic material (unedited interview footage) obtained via a production order, which was initially sealed.

The journalist, Jamie Kastner, and an intervenor, the Canadian Association of Journalists (CAJ), opposed the unsealing, arguing for broader notice requirements and reconsideration of the production order based on the "no other way" and "public interest" tests, and the potential "chilling effect" on journalism.

The court confirmed its decision to issue the production order and granted the unsealing, finding that the information could not reasonably be obtained otherwise, no confidential sources were involved, and the public interest in prosecuting criminal offences outweighed the journalist's privacy rights, especially given the prior publication of the documentary.

The applicant brought an application under s. 680 of the Criminal Code to set aside a detention order.

Because a non-publication order under s. 517 of the Criminal Code was imposed at the bail hearing, and the decision contains information covered by that order, the Court of Appeal withheld the publication of its reasons until the ban ceases to be in effect.

Bradley MacGarvie and Thomas Nagy appealed their convictions for first- and second-degree murder, respectively.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on after-the-fact conduct evidence, failing to adequately explain its relevance and possible inferences.

For Nagy, the trial judge also incorrectly defined the mental element for party liability for murder under a common unlawful purpose and failed to provide a decision tree, leading to jury confusion.

While the provocation defence was correctly rejected for MacGarvie, and the admission of Nagy's criminal record and lay opinion evidence was upheld, the errors in jury instructions were deemed sufficiently serious to warrant a new trial for both appellants.

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder and kidnapping after a missing cocaine shipment led to the execution-style killings of two men.

On appeal, they challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding prior discreditable conduct, a Vetrovec caution, a third-party suspect defence, and the elements of aiding.

One appellant also appealed the denial of a severance application and his 23-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors in the jury instructions or the refusal to sever the trials.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the parole ineligibility period was proportionate to the gravity of the offences.

The appellants were convicted of distributing child pornography, advertising sexual services, procuring a person under 18, and receiving financial benefit from sexual services provided by a minor.

They appealed their convictions, arguing errors in Vetrovec instruction and jury misdirection on procurement.

They also sought leave to appeal their sentences, alleging the trial judge made findings of fact inconsistent with the jury's verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the Vetrovec decision or the jury instructions on procurement, noting the overwhelming evidence of control.

On the sentence appeal, the court agreed the trial judge erred by relying on violence allegations for sentencing after acquittals on related charges.

While this reduced the fit sentence for procurement, the overall global sentences remained appropriate for one appellant.

For the other appellant, fresh evidence regarding his rehabilitation and current circumstances led to a stay of execution for the remainder of his sentence.

The appellant, Pierre Aragon, appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, possessing a weapon, and uttering a threat, and his indeterminate dangerous offender sentence.

The convictions stemmed from a 2012 beating of Fernando Fernandes, a Loners Motorcycle Club associate, by members of a rival group.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the recognition evidence and extrinsic discreditable conduct evidence properly admitted.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, concluding that the sentencing judge erred in identifying aggravating factors and failed to provide sufficient reasons for several rulings, including the decision to recall witnesses and the constitutional challenge.

The sentence was set aside, and a new sentencing hearing was ordered before a different judge.

The appellant, who pleaded guilty to attempted murder, appealed a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

The original sentencing judge provided very brief and conclusory reasons for the designation, despite the appellant's consent.

The Court of Appeal found these reasons insufficient as they failed to explain why the criteria for the designation and indeterminate sentence were met, thus preventing proper appellate review.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new dangerous offender hearing was ordered.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges relating to the sale of sexual services.

The application judge had struck down sections 286.2 (material benefit), 286.3 (procuring), and 286.4 (advertising) of the Criminal Code, enacted by the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act, finding they infringed section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the provisions do not violate section 7.

The Court found that cooperative arrangements among sex workers do not constitute a 'commercial enterprise' under the material benefit provision, and that the procuring and advertising provisions are neither overbroad nor grossly disproportionate to their objectives.

The Court also rejected arguments that the provisions unjustifiably infringed sections 2(b) and 2(d) of the Charter.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision declaring certain Criminal Code provisions related to sexual services unconstitutional and sought a stay of the declaration pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal applied the tripartite test from RJR-MacDonald Inc., finding a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm to the Crown (public confusion, impact on law enforcement), and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay, especially given the short duration of the stay until the appeal hearing.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision declaring s. 286.3(2) of the Criminal Code, which imposes a mandatory minimum five-year sentence for procuring a prostitute under 18, unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, agreeing with the trial judge's finding that the mandatory minimum was grossly disproportionate for a reasonable hypothetical offender with significantly reduced moral culpability, such as a victim-offender.

The court also addressed the procedural issue of the Crown's premature notice of appeal, finding no prejudice to the respondent.