Michael F. Robson

Several major Canadian media companies brought an application challenging the constitutionality of ss. 119(1)(s) and 129 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, arguing they unjustifiably infringe freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter by unduly limiting media access to youth court records and the ability to report on their contents.

The Superior Court found that both provisions infringe s. 2(b).

However, the court held that s. 119(1)(s), which requires the media to apply for access to records, is a reasonable limit saved by s. 1 given the pressing objective of protecting youth privacy.

Conversely, the court found that s. 129, which imposes a blanket ban on disclosing any information derived from youth records, is not minimally impairing and its deleterious effects outweigh its salutary benefits.

Section 129 was declared of no force and effect.

At a case conference, the plaintiff sought to abandon his summary judgment motion following extensive new documentary disclosure by the defendants, and instead proceed to trial.

The plaintiff also indicated an intention to amend his statement of claim and file a jury notice.

The defendants argued that the motion judge should remain seized as the trial judge or at least determine the costs of the abandoned motion.

The court held that the summary judgment motion would not proceed, directed further examinations on the newly produced documents, and deferred the issues of costs and whether the motion judge should be seized as the trial judge to a later formal motion.

The appellant, a retiree, posted comments on a community Facebook page accusing the respondent real estate developer of corrupt business tactics and bribery.

The developer sued for defamation, and the appellant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The motion judge dismissed the anti-SLAPP motion, allowing the defamation action to proceed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding grounds to believe the defamation claim had substantial merit and that the appellant had no valid defence of fair comment, as the statements could be viewed as factual assertions and there was a basis to find malice.

The Court also upheld the finding that the likelihood of serious harm to the developer outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on costs, reducing the motion judge's substantial indemnity costs award to partial indemnity.

This is a costs decision following the dismissal of a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).

The plaintiff developer sought $300,000 in damages for defamation and trespass against a local resident and engineering student who raised environmental, social, and safety concerns about a mall redevelopment.

The court dismissed the claim as a SLAPP and awarded the defendant full-indemnity costs.

This decision addresses the quantum of costs, with the defendant seeking $156,394.54 and the plaintiff arguing for a cap of $100,000.

The court awarded the full amount sought, finding it fair and reasonable given the circumstances, including the defendant's reasonable settlement offers, the plaintiff's expansion of the motion scope, and consistency with other anti-SLAPP costs awards.

This decision concerns an anti-SLAPP motion brought by Pierre Roy, a student and local resident, against Sheridan Retail Inc., a developer redeveloping Sheridan Mall in Mississauga.

The developer sued Roy for defamation, inducing breach of contract, interference with economic relations, and trespass after he raised environmental, social, and safety concerns about the redevelopment.

The court found the lawsuit to be a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) aimed at silencing Roy’s public expression.

The court dismissed the developer’s claim, refused to allow the developer to “prune” its claim to trespass only, and awarded Roy $25,000 in damages and full-indemnity costs.

This costs endorsement follows the plaintiffs' success in defeating an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss their libel action.

The court considered whether to award costs to the successful plaintiffs, referencing the discretion provided by section 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act.

Finding that the defendant's impugned words were designed to cause serious detriment to the plaintiffs and undermine their business, the court exercised its discretion to award costs.

The court settled on a compromise amount, ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs $89,000 in all-inclusive costs.

The court dismissed the defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, finding that Facebook posts made by the defendant accusing the plaintiffs of corruption and bribery were not protected as fair comment.

The posts, which followed a controversial development approval in Niagara-on-the-Lake, were found to be based on falsehoods and reckless disregard for the truth, with the defendant admitting he had “no proof” for his accusations.

The court held that the harm to the plaintiffs’ reputation and business interests outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendant’s expression, and that the posts were motivated by an ulterior motive to thwart the plaintiffs’ development project.

The appellants, Gianni Evangelisti and Freedom Pools Inc., appealed a lower court order dismissing their application for an injunction to prevent the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) from publishing a story about disputes with their customers.

The appeal raised grounds concerning the refusal of cross-examination, apprehension of bias, and dismissal of Charter claims.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's exercise of case management powers or the dismissal of the application on its merits, affirming that the conduct did not reflect bias.

The appeal was dismissed.

The media appellants sought full, unredacted access to youth court records concerning eight young persons accused of second-degree murder, arguing that the open court principle (Dagenais-Mentuck test) should grant them presumptive access.

The Youth Court and Superior Court granted only partial, redacted access, holding that the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) statutory scheme for record access (s. 119(1)(s)) takes precedence over the common law open court principle.

The YCJA requires applicants to demonstrate a "valid interest" and that access is "desirable in the interest of the proper administration of justice" balancing public interest with the young persons' heightened privacy rights and rehabilitation goals.

The Superior Court also declined to hear the appellants' constitutional challenge to the YCJA provisions, deeming the Youth Court the more appropriate forum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the YCJA's specific statutory regime for youth record access is a valid exception to the open court principle and that the media must meet its criteria via a formal application on notice.

It also upheld the discretion not to hear the constitutional challenge at the Superior Court level.

The media applicants sought certiorari to quash a Youth Court judge's decision regarding access to youth court records in a high-profile murder case, arguing the judge erred in applying the Dagenais/Mentuck/Sherman Estates test and requiring a formal application.

They also sought to bring a constitutional challenge to the Youth Criminal Justice Act's access provisions.

The court dismissed the certiorari application, finding the Youth Court judge correctly applied the test by balancing the open court principle with the YCJA's privacy protections for young persons, and that a formal application is required for media access under s. 119(1)(s)(ii).

The court also declined to hear the constitutional challenge, stating it should first be heard in Youth Court where a full record is available and which has exclusive jurisdiction over YCJA access issues.