Mary Mcewen Birdsell

The media appellants sought full, unredacted access to youth court records concerning eight young persons accused of second-degree murder, arguing that the open court principle (Dagenais-Mentuck test) should grant them presumptive access.

The Youth Court and Superior Court granted only partial, redacted access, holding that the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) statutory scheme for record access (s. 119(1)(s)) takes precedence over the common law open court principle.

The YCJA requires applicants to demonstrate a "valid interest" and that access is "desirable in the interest of the proper administration of justice" balancing public interest with the young persons' heightened privacy rights and rehabilitation goals.

The Superior Court also declined to hear the appellants' constitutional challenge to the YCJA provisions, deeming the Youth Court the more appropriate forum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the YCJA's specific statutory regime for youth record access is a valid exception to the open court principle and that the media must meet its criteria via a formal application on notice.

It also upheld the discretion not to hear the constitutional challenge at the Superior Court level.

The defendants brought motions to dismiss two separate actions for the plaintiff's failure to comply with a previous court order and for inordinate and inexcusable delay under Rules 60.12, 24.01(1), and 48.14.

The court found the plaintiff's non-compliance with the order to be complete and unequivocal, with no adequate explanation for the significant delay, particularly after an indulgence was granted.

The court determined that the delay was inordinate and inexcusable, raising a substantial risk that a fair trial would not be possible due to a presumption of prejudice that the plaintiff failed to rebut, including concerns about the availability of medical records and witnesses.

Consequently, both actions were dismissed.

Justice for Children and Youth (JFCY) brought a motion for leave to intervene in the Law Society of Ontario's application for judicial review of a decision finding the respondent to be of good character but imposing a condition that he not meet alone with minor children.

The respondent opposed the motion, arguing JFCY lacked a unique perspective, would augment the record, and was in a conflict of interest.

The court granted JFCY leave to intervene on the issues of whether the condition is consistent with Charter values or international law, and whether the Law Society's duty to regulate in the public interest includes protecting children.

The court found no conflict of interest and restricted JFCY from augmenting the evidentiary record or taking a position on the disposition.

The media applicants sought certiorari to quash a Youth Court judge's decision regarding access to youth court records in a high-profile murder case, arguing the judge erred in applying the Dagenais/Mentuck/Sherman Estates test and requiring a formal application.

They also sought to bring a constitutional challenge to the Youth Criminal Justice Act's access provisions.

The court dismissed the certiorari application, finding the Youth Court judge correctly applied the test by balancing the open court principle with the YCJA's privacy protections for young persons, and that a formal application is required for media access under s. 119(1)(s)(ii).

The court also declined to hear the constitutional challenge, stating it should first be heard in Youth Court where a full record is available and which has exclusive jurisdiction over YCJA access issues.

The appellant, Lydian Smith, appealed a Divisional Court decision affirming the Landlord and Tenant Board's finding that YouthLink Youth Services' transitional housing program was exempt from the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 under s. 5(k).

The Court of Appeal affirmed that s. 5(k) and the newer s. 5.1 can co-exist, and that "rehabilitative or therapeutic services" in s. 5(k) include broader support services beyond medical care.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board and Divisional Court correctly interpreted the statutory exemptions and that the YouthLink program fell within the s. 5(k) exemption.

The appellant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision finding that the respondent's transitional youth housing program was exempt from the Residential Tenancies Act under section 5(k).

The appellant argued that the introduction of section 5.1, which specifically regulates transitional housing, meant the respondent could no longer rely on section 5(k) without meeting section 5.1's prescriptive requirements.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that section 5.1(5) explicitly preserves other exemptions, and the Board made no error of law in finding the respondent's program met the requirements for the section 5(k) exemption.

The child, who was the subject of a high-conflict custody and child protection dispute, ran away and sought assistance from a legal clinic.

The father obtained an urgent motion order restraining the legal clinic and its lawyer from representing or contacting the child.

The legal clinic and the child appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by conflating a child's right to standing in a proceeding with their fundamental right to seek independent legal advice.

The court held that children are entitled to seek legal advice without permission from their parents or the court.

The court issued a case management endorsement setting the schedule and procedural directions for an appeal from the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The appeal was scheduled to be heard by a three-judge panel of the Divisional Court via videoconference.

Directions were provided regarding the service of materials, electronic filing via a drop box, and the use of compendiums.

An application by a seventeen-year-old transgender youth to change her name from her birth name to a female name.

The applicant sought an order dispensing with parental consent under the Change of Name Act, arguing that her mother did not have lawful custody of her.

The court found that the applicant's mother did not exercise physical care or control, nor did she make decisions regarding the applicant's residence, education, or medical care.

The court determined that no person had lawful custody of the applicant for purposes of the Change of Name Act, and therefore no parental consent was required.

The applicant, the Toronto Star, sought access to pre-sentence reports and a victim impact statement filed as exhibits in three youth court proceedings where the young persons were found guilty of serious criminal offences.

The applicant argued that access was necessary under the open court principle and freedom of the press.

The provincial Crown and amicus curiae opposed the application, arguing that access should be denied to protect the privacy and rehabilitation of the young persons under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, the court found that denying access was necessary to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice, specifically the privacy and rehabilitation of the young persons.

The court concluded that the salutary effects of denying access outweighed the deleterious effects on freedom of the press.

The application was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of offences under the Safe Streets Act and the Highway Traffic Act for squeegeeing and soliciting money from drivers of stopped vehicles on roadways.

They appealed their convictions, arguing that the legislation was unconstitutional because it was ultra vires the province as criminal law, and that it violated their rights under sections 2(b), 7, and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the legislation was a valid exercise of provincial power to regulate roadways.

While the provisions infringed freedom of expression under section 2(b), the infringement was justified under section 1.

The court also found no violations of sections 7 or 15.