Mary Mcewen Birdsell

The media appellants sought full, unredacted access to youth court records concerning eight young persons accused of second-degree murder, arguing that the open court principle (Dagenais-Mentuck test) should grant them presumptive access.

The Youth Court and Superior Court granted only partial, redacted access, holding that the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) statutory scheme for record access (s. 119(1)(s)) takes precedence over the common law open court principle.

The YCJA requires applicants to demonstrate a "valid interest" and that access is "desirable in the interest of the proper administration of justice," balancing public interest with the young persons' heightened privacy rights and rehabilitation goals.

The Superior Court also declined to hear the appellants' constitutional challenge to the YCJA provisions, deeming the Youth Court the more appropriate forum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the YCJA's specific statutory regime for youth record access is a valid exception to the open court principle and that the media must meet its criteria via a formal application on notice.

It also upheld the discretion not to hear the constitutional challenge at the Superior Court level.

The defendants brought motions to dismiss two separate actions for the plaintiff's failure to comply with a previous court order and for inordinate and inexcusable delay under Rules 60.12, 24.01(1), and 48.14.

The court found the plaintiff's non-compliance with the order to be complete and unequivocal, with no adequate explanation for the significant delay, particularly after an indulgence was granted.

The court determined that the delay was inordinate and inexcusable, raising a substantial risk that a fair trial would not be possible due to a presumption of prejudice that the plaintiff failed to rebut, including concerns about the availability of medical records and witnesses.

Consequently, both actions were dismissed.

The media applicants sought certiorari to quash a Youth Court judge's decision regarding access to youth court records in a high-profile murder case, arguing the judge erred in applying the Dagenais/Mentuck/Sherman Estates test and requiring a formal application.

They also sought to bring a constitutional challenge to the Youth Criminal Justice Act's access provisions.

The court dismissed the certiorari application, finding the Youth Court judge correctly applied the test by balancing the open court principle with the YCJA's privacy protections for young persons, and that a formal application is required for media access under s. 119(1)(s)(ii).

The court also declined to hear the constitutional challenge, stating it should first be heard in Youth Court where a full record is available and which has exclusive jurisdiction over YCJA access issues.

The appellant, Lydian Smith, appealed a Divisional Court decision affirming the Landlord and Tenant Board's finding that YouthLink Youth Services' transitional housing program was exempt from the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 under s. 5(k).

The Court of Appeal affirmed that s. 5(k) and the newer s. 5.1 can co-exist, and that "rehabilitative or therapeutic services" in s. 5(k) include broader support services beyond medical care.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board and Divisional Court correctly interpreted the statutory exemptions and that the YouthLink program fell within the s. 5(k) exemption.

An application by a seventeen-year-old transgender youth to change her name from her birth name to a female name.

The applicant sought an order dispensing with parental consent under the Change of Name Act, arguing that her mother did not have lawful custody of her.

The court found that the applicant's mother did not exercise physical care or control, nor did she make decisions regarding the applicant's residence, education, or medical care.

The court determined that no person had lawful custody of the applicant for purposes of the Change of Name Act, and therefore no parental consent was required.