J. Stewart

The media applicants sought certiorari to quash a Youth Court judge's decision regarding access to youth court records in a high-profile murder case, arguing the judge erred in applying the Dagenais/Mentuck/Sherman Estates test and requiring a formal application.

They also sought to bring a constitutional challenge to the Youth Criminal Justice Act's access provisions.

The court dismissed the certiorari application, finding the Youth Court judge correctly applied the test by balancing the open court principle with the YCJA's privacy protections for young persons, and that a formal application is required for media access under s. 119(1)(s)(ii).

The court also declined to hear the constitutional challenge, stating it should first be heard in Youth Court where a full record is available and which has exclusive jurisdiction over YCJA access issues.

Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC) sought certiorari to quash a Youth Court decision that denied TCHC access to a young person's (R.V.) criminal justice records.

TCHC intended to use these records to commence eviction proceedings against R.V. and his family at the Landlord and Tenant Board on grounds of "illegality" and "community safety." The Youth Court had denied access, prioritizing R.V.'s privacy, rehabilitation, and reintegration under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

By the time the certiorari application reached the Superior Court, R.V. had withdrawn from the proceedings, and TCHC had decided not to pursue eviction, rendering the matter moot.

The Superior Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot application, finding no persisting adversarial context, no significant public interest that would justify hearing a hypothetical case, and that the issue of "desirable in the interest of the proper administration of justice" under s.119 of the YCJA was fact-driven and best left to the Youth Court's expertise.

The defendant was charged with holding a handheld communication device while driving contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

During trial, the defendant moved to exclude the charging officer's electronic notes on the grounds that the officer could not attest to the security of the notes or confirm that no one else had access to alter them while they were outside his personal possession.

The court ruled that the officer could use the notes to refresh his memory, finding that while the officer lacked knowledge of the technical security features of the electronic system, the absence of evidence of actual alteration, combined with the officer's independent recollection and the disclosure of the notes to the defence, was sufficient to permit their use as a memory aid.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while holding or using a hand-held wireless communication device, contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

A police officer testified that he observed the defendant holding a cell phone in his left hand while driving on the Queen Elizabeth Way.

The defendant testified that his cell phone was mounted on a magnetic holder on the dashboard and that he did not hold it while driving.

The court applied the W.(D.) credibility test and found that the defendant's evidence, considered in the context of the totality of the evidence, raised a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with speeding at 105 km/h in a posted 60 km/h zone on Dundas Street in Oakville.

The prosecution relied on Lidar speed measurements taken by a trained police officer.

The defendant testified she was traveling at approximately 40 km/h due to traffic lights and her vehicle's standard transmission limitations.

The court found the defendant guilty of the included offence of speeding at 95 km/h in a posted 60 km/h zone, accepting the officer's evidence regarding the speed readings near Meadowridge Drive while finding reasonable doubt regarding the initial 105 km/h reading near Prince Michael Drive.

The defendant was charged with driving while holding a hand-held communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The sole issue at trial was whether the black-coloured object observed in the defendant's hand was a cell phone.

A police officer testified that he observed the defendant holding what he identified as a cell phone while driving on the QEW.

The court found that while the prosecution established the defendant was holding an object on a balance of probabilities, it failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the object was a cell phone.

The officer's lay opinion was equivocal, lacking sufficient factual basis and containing internal inconsistencies.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with speeding 139 km/h in a posted 100 km/h zone on Highway 407 on October 12, 2014.

Following the prosecution's case, the defendant moved for a non-suit, arguing that the prosecution had failed to establish a prima facie case regarding the speed element of the offence, specifically challenging the reliability of the laser speed measurement device and the officer's testimony regarding its operation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the prosecution had met its evidential burden by presenting direct evidence of all essential elements of the offence, including the speed measurement obtained through a properly calibrated and operated laser device by a trained officer.

The appellant, an Aboriginal offender with three prior drinking and driving convictions, appealed his sentence of 45 days intermittent incarceration and 18 months' probation for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content over 80mg.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately consider his Aboriginal heritage, overemphasized deterrence, and erred in denying a conditional sentence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge applied correct principles, properly considered the Gladue factors, and imposed a sentence that was not clearly excessive given the aggravating circumstances.

The defendant was charged with speeding 82 kilometres per hour in a posted 60 kilometres per hour zone on Tremaine Road in Milton, Ontario on January 24, 2014.

The prosecution relied on radar speed measurement evidence obtained by a qualified police officer using a Genesis II Select radar device.

The defendant challenged the accuracy of the radar reading, arguing that adverse winter weather conditions with blowing snow caused a false reading.

The court found that the prosecution established all essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, including the existence of the posted speed limit and the defendant's speed as measured by radar.

The defendant's theory regarding weather-induced radar error was found to be speculative and unsupported by expert evidence or effective cross-examination.

The defendant was charged with failing to stop at a red traffic light contrary to section 144(18) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The central issue was whether the defendant entered an intersection while facing a red light or a green light.

The prosecution presented four witnesses who testified that the defendant ran a red light, while the defendant testified that he faced a green light.

The court applied the credibility assessment principles from R. v. W.(D.) and found the prosecution witnesses credible and reliable, particularly an independent witness who had an optimal vantage point to observe both traffic signals.

The defendant's testimony was found to be unreliable and inconsistent with the preponderance of prosecution evidence.

The court convicted the defendant.

The defendant was charged with disobeying a stop sign contrary to section 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The prosecution alleged that the defendant failed to bring his vehicle to a complete stop at a marked stop line at the intersection of Scott Boulevard and Pringle Avenue in Milton on September 11, 2012.

The defendant denied the allegation and testified that he did stop his vehicle before the stop line.

The court found that while the prosecution established the actus reus on a balance of probabilities, it failed to meet the higher standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant's testimony, when considered in the context of the totality of evidence, raised a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with failing to stop at a stop sign contrary to section 136(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The prosecution presented evidence from a police officer who observed the defendant's vehicle pass through a stop sign at approximately 5-7 km/h without coming to a complete stop.

The defendant testified that he stopped his vehicle behind the marked stop line before proceeding through the intersection.

The court found that while the offence is one of absolute liability requiring only proof of the actus reus, the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt due to significant uncertainty regarding the officer's vantage point (possibly 50 metres or more from the intersection rather than the stated 10 metres) and the credible, consistent testimony of the defendant.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with disobeying a stop sign by failing to stop at the intersection of Leighland Avenue and Kent Avenue in Oakville on February 9, 2011.

The prosecution relied on the testimony of Police Officer Ross Amore, who observed the defendant's vehicle entering the intersection at approximately 15 kilometres per hour without stopping.

The defendant testified that he stopped properly at the stop sign, and his passenger corroborated this account.

The court found that while the officer's testimony was genuine, it lacked significant reliability due to equivocal responses regarding other vehicles at the intersection and a lack of detail regarding the defendant's vehicle's approach to the marked stop line.

The court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant failed to stop at the marked stop line as required by the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with speeding (111 km/h in a 70 km/h zone) under the Highway Traffic Act, prosecuted under Part I of the Provincial Offences Act.

The defendant brought an application under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

The trial commenced on November 17, 2010, but was adjourned due to lack of court time.

The trial was subsequently rescheduled multiple times, with the defendant explicitly waiving his Charter rights for one period.

The court found that 15 months and 16 days of the total 23 months and 20 days of delay was attributable to unacceptable institutional delay.

The court concluded that the defendant's right to a fair trial had been prejudiced and that a stay of proceedings was the appropriate remedy.

The defendant was charged with careless driving under the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial was delayed multiple times, primarily due to the unavailability of a court-appointed Punjabi interpreter, resulting in a total delay of over 26 months.

The defendant brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time was infringed.

The court applied the Morin framework, finding 16 months of institutional delay attributable to the Crown.

The court inferred prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial and granted a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter.