John Bonin

The applicant, facing a speeding charge, brought a Charter motion alleging a s. 7 violation due to insufficient disclosure.

The applicant sought the specific manual for the radar device used, the officer's qualifications, and GPS records of device testing.

The court ordered the disclosure of the specific radar manual, finding it relevant for challenging the speed measurement's reliability.

However, the court dismissed the requests for the officer's qualifications and GPS data, deeming them speculative and irrelevant for a Part 1 speeding offence.

The court also found that s. 7 of the Charter did not apply to this minor, absolute liability offence, and that the prosecution had otherwise provided sufficient disclosure.

The Charter motion was dismissed, and the matter was set for trial.

The defendant was charged with speeding 80 km/h in a 50 km/h Community Safety Zone under the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant brought a section 7 Charter application challenging the prosecution's disclosure obligations, arguing that outstanding disclosure items were required to be provided.

The court considered the binding precedent from Region of York v. McGuigan and found that the prosecution was not obligated to disclose the requested items, as they did not constitute "fruits of the investigation" in a routine regulatory speeding offense.

The court dismissed the section 7 Charter application, finding no infringement of the defendant's rights.

The defendant was charged with failing to stop for a red light contrary to section 144(18) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The collision occurred at the intersection of Bristol Road and Hurontario Street in Mississauga when the defendant's pickup truck struck a high school student riding a bicycle in a pedestrian crosswalk.

The central issue was whether the defendant's vehicle crossed the stop line when the traffic light was red or yellow.

The court found the defendant's testimony that he crossed on a yellow light to be self-serving and incredible, and determined based on credible witness testimony and circumstantial evidence regarding traffic light timing that the defendant crossed the stop line when the light had been red for approximately 2.5 to 3.5 seconds.

The defendant was convicted.

The defendant applied for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter, alleging an infringement of section 11(b) rights (trial within a reasonable time) in a speeding charge under the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant was charged on April 24, 2011, and filed a Notice of Intention to Appear on April 29, 2011.

The central issue was whether the five-month delay in scheduling a first attendance meeting with the prosecutor should be counted as institutional delay or treated as a neutral intake period.

The court found that the defendant had voluntarily requested the first attendance meeting and was aware that a trial date would not be scheduled until after the meeting.

After deducting various neutral periods and the first attendance meeting delay, the remaining institutional delay was 6 months and 24 days, which fell below the acceptable guideline of 8 to 10 months.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with speeding (111 km/h in a 70 km/h zone) under the Highway Traffic Act, prosecuted under Part I of the Provincial Offences Act.

The defendant brought an application under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated.

The trial commenced on November 17, 2010, but was adjourned due to lack of court time.

The trial was subsequently rescheduled multiple times, with the defendant explicitly waiving his Charter rights for one period.

The court found that 15 months and 16 days of the total 23 months and 20 days of delay was attributable to unacceptable institutional delay.

The court concluded that the defendant's right to a fair trial had been prejudiced and that a stay of proceedings was the appropriate remedy.