Richard Quon, J.P.

In a regulatory prosecution arising from the sale and attempted sale of 11 damaged or rebuilt vehicles, the court held that the defendants acted as unregistered motor vehicle dealers on most of the impugned transactions and, in several instances, engaged in unfair practices by false, misleading, or deceptive representations to consumers.

Applying the strict liability framework, the court found that the prosecution proved the actus reus of 17 of 40 counts and that the defendants failed to establish the s. 5 personal use exemption for 10 of the 11 vehicles.

The court relied on a pattern of short ownership periods, minimal odometer changes, lack of licence plates, repeated purchases from a salvage-oriented seller, simultaneous advertisements, and misleading sale circumstances as indicia of curbsiding.

Only one vehicle fell within the personal use exemption because it had a registered plate, substantial mileage during ownership, and a lengthy ownership period.

Due diligence and mistake of fact defences were rejected.

Regulatory prosecution under s. 149(1) of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997 arising from statements made in support of a workplace injury benefits claim.

The court found that surveillance evidence showing the defendant driving beyond stated limits and lifting objects far in excess of reported restrictions contradicted his statements to the WSIB and to health professionals that he had not improved and remained unable to return to work.

The court rejected the defence contention that the absence of an Arabic interpreter undermined the reliability of the communications, finding the defendant had sufficient English proficiency and had not unequivocally requested an interpreter.

The court also rejected a mistake of fact theory that the activity was only a one-time test of abilities, finding it lacked an air of reality and appeared to be a recent fabrication.

Conviction entered.

The defendant was charged with two counts of failing to remain at the scene of an accident contrary to section 200(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The prosecution sought to amend the informations to correct the dates and locations of the offences to conform with the evidence adduced at trial.

The court granted the amendment motion and found the defendant guilty of both offences based on circumstantial evidence establishing that the defendant was the driver of a vehicle involved in hit-and-run incidents on two separate dates.

This decision addresses the City of Brampton's application under s. 51 of the Provincial Offences Act to compel personal attendance of defendants represented by certain paralegals and firms accused of filing frivolous and meritless appeals to delay convictions from appearing on driving records.

The court initially ordered personal appearances to conduct proper plea inquiries but reconsidered this order, allowing statutory declarations under s. 43 of the Evidence Act in lieu of personal attendance.

The ruling extensively discusses the abuse of process and obstruction of justice doctrines, referencing prior cases including Toronto (City) v. Becerra, and highlights the ethical obligations of paralegals under the Law Society of Ontario's Rules of Conduct.

The decision underscores the importance of maintaining the integrity of the justice system and preventing misuse of appeals to "game the system."

The defendant was charged under the Trespass to Property Act for failing to leave a commercial plaza when directed by police during an unsanctioned public celebration.

The police had written authorization from the property manager to enforce trespass laws on the property.

Despite multiple clear directions from an officer to leave, the defendant remained on the premises to challenge the officer's authority and was subsequently arrested.

The Ontario Court of Justice found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, concluding that he did not leave the property immediately as required.

However, because the arrest itself was considered sufficiently punitive, the court declined to impose the standard fifty-dollar fine.

The defendants, members of the Mohawk Nation of the Grand River, were charged with offences under the Highway Traffic Act.

They brought 18 pre-trial motions, primarily arguing that the Provincial Offences Court lacked jurisdiction because the alleged offences occurred on the sovereign territory of the Mohawk Nation, as granted by the Haldimand Proclamation of 1784.

The court dismissed all 18 motions, finding that it was bound by the Court of Appeal for Ontario's precedent that the Haldimand Proclamation did not grant fee simple ownership or absolute title to the Six Nations Confederacy.

The court also held that as a statutory court, it lacked the jurisdiction to grant the various prerogative writs and equitable remedies sought by the defendants, such as mandamus, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief.

The defendant was charged with having care or control of a vehicle with cannabis readily available after a police officer found her asleep in the driver's seat of her running vehicle parked on her private driveway.

The officer had entered the driveway to investigate a suspected impaired driving call.

After the prosecution closed its case, the court initiated a non-suit motion to consider whether the officer lawfully entered the private property, whether the defendant had care or control, and whether the officer's observation of cannabis violated section 8 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the non-suit motion, finding the officer acted lawfully under common law ancillary powers, there was evidence of care or control, and the plain view observation of cannabis did not violate the Charter.

The Ministry charged a construction company, its director, and its representative with multiple strict liability offences under the Consumer Protection Act, 2002, following a consumer complaint about an abandoned basement renovation.

The court found that the defendants failed to provide a proper direct agreement, engaged in unfair practices by making false representations about returning to work, and failed to refund the consumer after the agreement was cancelled.

The defendants' due diligence defence, which relied on claims of contracting COVID-19 and government stay-at-home orders, was rejected.

Convictions were entered on all remaining counts.

The defendant was charged with driving while suspended after a police officer found him passed out in the driver's seat of a running vehicle that was stopped partially on a private driveway and partially on a public roadway.

The court considered whether the officer's entry onto the private property was lawful in light of the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. McColman.

The court held that the officer was acting lawfully under common law duties to protect life and property.

The court further found that the vehicle was on a 'highway' because its rear tires were on the public roadway, and that the defendant was 'driving' despite being asleep.

The defendant was found guilty in an ex-parte trial.

The corporate defendant, a furniture store, and its two directors were charged with multiple offences under the Consumer Protection Act, 2002, following complaints from two consumers.

One consumer received incorrect and defective furniture and the store failed to replace it.

The other consumer paid for a bed on a lay-away plan but the store refused to deliver it, demanding further payments for a separate item, and failed to refund the money upon cancellation.

The court found the corporate defendant guilty of failing to provide a proper future performance agreement, engaging in unfair practices, and failing to provide a refund.

The directors were found guilty of failing to prevent the corporation from committing these offences.

The offender was convicted of failing to yield to a pedestrian and driving while under suspension under the Highway Traffic Act after striking and killing an 85-year-old pedestrian in a crosswalk.

The offender had a lengthy history of driving while suspended for unpaid fines.

The court emphasized deterrence and denunciation for regulatory offences, sentencing the offender to 15 days of intermittent imprisonment, 12 months of probation, and a $500 fine.

The court considered a non-suit motion in a stunt driving case under the Highway Traffic Act, where the alleged offence occurred in a private parking lot.

The central issue was whether the stunt driving provision (s. 172(1) H.T.A.), which explicitly refers to "highway" applies to private property.

The court reviewed the common law "general rule" that H.T.A. provisions are limited to highways unless otherwise specified.

However, it found that s. 1.1 of the H.T.A. empowers the Lieutenant Governor in Council to extend H.T.A. provisions to non-highways via regulation.

Specifically, O. Reg. 455/07, as amended by O. Reg. 598/21 (effective September 12, 2021), explicitly states that s. 172 applies to "specified places" including public and private parking lots.

Applying the principle of legislative paramountcy, the regulation supersedes the common law "general rule." The court ruled that the stunt driving offence under s. 172(1) H.T.A. applies to private parking lots, effectively denying the non-suit motion.

The defendant was charged with failing to yield to a pedestrian and driving while under suspension after a black pickup truck struck an elderly woman on a mobility scooter in a crosswalk.

The central issue was the identity of the driver, as no witness saw the defendant actually driving or sitting in the driver's seat.

Relying on circumstantial evidence, including witness descriptions of a shirtless, nervous man who exited the driver's side and called 9-1-1, and police identification of the defendant at the scene, the court found the only reasonable inference was that the defendant was the driver.

The court also held that the defendant was deemed to have received notice of his licence suspension under the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant was found guilty of both offences.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle without insurance.

The vehicle was registered to his wife.

The prosecution argued the defendant was a 'common law owner' because he paid for and cancelled the insurance, and had contingent rights under the Family Law Act.

The court held that while paying insurance and being married to the registered owner are indicia of common law ownership, they were insufficient alone to prove ownership beyond a reasonable doubt without evidence of exclusive or predominant use.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant, a Canadian citizen, returned to Canada by air during the COVID-19 pandemic and was charged under the Quarantine Act for failing to book a mandatory 3-day stay at a government-approved hotel and refusing to undergo a Day 1 COVID-19 molecular test at the airport.

The defendant raised a mistake of fact defence, arguing she believed she had complied with the entry requirements and that the additional requirements violated her Charter rights.

The court found that the prosecution proved the actus reus of the strict liability offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court rejected the mistake of fact defence, holding that the defendant's mistaken beliefs were actually mistakes of law, which is not a valid defence, and that her beliefs were not objectively reasonable.

The defendant was convicted of both offences.

The defendants were charged with zoning bylaw offences under a provision that contained a drafting error, using the word 'personal' instead of 'person'.

The court considered whether it had the jurisdiction to correct the legislative drafting mistake by reading in the correct word.

Applying the principles of statutory interpretation, the court found that while the provision was a manifest absurdity and had an obvious correction, there was no traceable error.

The court declined to usurp the municipal council's legislative role to fix the bylaw.

Consequently, the information was quashed because the defective provision did not relate to an offence known in law.

The defendants, charged with zoning bylaw infractions, brought several in-trial motions.

They sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, arguing their s. 11(a) rights were infringed because the counts lacked an essential averment specifying the 'wrongful use' of the land, and the prosecution refused to provide formal particulars.

The court dismissed the Charter motion and the alternative motion for particulars, finding the defendants were sufficiently informed of the specific offence through disclosure and pre-trial discussions.

The court also dismissed a motion to quash count #1 for being laid outside the 6-month limitation period, noting the limitation period was suspended by O. Reg. 73/20 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Finally, the court addressed disclosure requests, ordering the prosecution to review and provide McNeil disclosure if relevant, and to provide redacted notes of the complaint, while denying requests for the investigator's CV and the complainant's name based on informer privilege.

The defendant was convicted of eight regulatory offences under three Ontario professional accounting statutes for unlawfully using foreign professional accounting designations and holding himself out as a member of professional accounting bodies without being a member.

The offences occurred between March 1, 2017 and June 30, 2018.

The court imposed fines totalling $16,000, a two-year probation order with statutory conditions, and ordered the defendant to pay $10,000 in reasonable legal costs to the Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario.

The court found the defendant had the ability to pay despite his claims of financial hardship, noting his employment income of approximately $90,000 annually and home ownership.

The court also considered the defendant's improper conduct during proceedings, including frivolous adjournment applications and unmeritorious Charter claims, which prolonged the litigation and increased costs.

A foreign-trained Chartered Accountant from India was charged with eight regulatory offences under three Ontario accounting statutes for unlawfully using professional accounting designations and initials (CPA, CA, CMA, FCA, FCMA) on multiple websites and social media platforms while not being a member of the Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario.

The defendant was a student of CPA Ontario who failed the Common Final Examination three times and was deregistered.

Despite receiving a cease-and-desist letter in March 2017, the defendant continued to publicly display his foreign designations on websites, LinkedIn, Kijiji advertisements, and other platforms, implying he was qualified to practice accounting in Ontario.

The court found the defendant guilty on all eight counts after determining the prosecution proved the actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant failed to establish a due diligence defence.

The court also dismissed the defendant's Charter application challenging the constitutionality of the prohibitions, finding that while the restrictions infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b), they were reasonable limits justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The defendants, as registered owners of a residential property in Brampton, were charged with two offences: (1) using or permitting the use of lands for purposes not permitted by the City of Brampton Zoning By-law by establishing an illegal second dwelling unit in their basement, contrary to the Planning Act; and (2) failing to register their two-unit house with the City of Brampton as required by the Second Unit Registration By-law.

The court found that the defendants had established a self-contained basement apartment with separate kitchen, bathroom, and sleeping areas, which constituted a second unit.

The prosecution was not required to prove the existence of a tenant or a stove in the basement kitchen to establish the existence of a second unit.

The defendants were convicted on both counts.