J. De Falco

The defendant was charged with two counts of failing to remain at the scene of an accident contrary to section 200(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The prosecution sought to amend the informations to correct the dates and locations of the offences to conform with the evidence adduced at trial.

The court granted the amendment motion and found the defendant guilty of both offences based on circumstantial evidence establishing that the defendant was the driver of a vehicle involved in hit-and-run incidents on two separate dates.

This decision addresses the City of Brampton's application under s. 51 of the Provincial Offences Act to compel personal attendance of defendants represented by certain paralegals and firms accused of filing frivolous and meritless appeals to delay convictions from appearing on driving records.

The court initially ordered personal appearances to conduct proper plea inquiries but reconsidered this order, allowing statutory declarations under s. 43 of the Evidence Act in lieu of personal attendance.

The ruling extensively discusses the abuse of process and obstruction of justice doctrines, referencing prior cases including Toronto (City) v. Becerra, and highlights the ethical obligations of paralegals under the Law Society of Ontario's Rules of Conduct.

The decision underscores the importance of maintaining the integrity of the justice system and preventing misuse of appeals to "game the system."

The appellant sought to set aside his de facto guilty plea for using a hand-held wireless communication device while driving, arguing he was unaware of the resulting 3-day driver's licence suspension.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the licence suspension is a direct consequence of the Highway Traffic Act offence, not a "legally relevant collateral consequence" as defined in criminal law (R. v. Wong).

The court emphasized that licensed drivers are expected to ascertain the direct penalties for provincial offences and that the information was readily available.

The accused was charged with failing to use a crosswalk contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

Prior to entering a plea, the accused brought a motion under sections 11(b) and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings based on delay.

The Crown opposed the motion.

The court found that the accused's right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed and granted the motion, staying the proceedings.