Vartan J. S. Manoukian

The Ontario Court of Justice considered a motion to quash a Part I certificate of offence charging Muhammad Butt with failing to stop at a red light contrary to section 144(18) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defence argued the certificate was defective for not including the informant’s name, relying on case law to support quashing the certificate.

The Court held that minor defects, such as the absence of the informant’s name but presence of an officer identifier ("PC 10429") and signature, do not justify quashing under the Provincial Offences Act.

The Court emphasized the broad discretion to amend certificates to ensure cases are decided on their merits rather than technicalities, citing binding precedent including R. v. Massicotte and York v. Winlow.

The motion to quash was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with failing to display two plates, having a plate not plainly visible, and failing to surrender an insurance card during a traffic stop.

The court acquitted the defendant of the obstructed plate charge, finding the plate was plainly visible despite an aftermarket cover.

However, the court convicted the defendant of failing to display a front plate, rejecting his due diligence defence, and of failing to surrender an insurance card, ruling that providing an expired card does not satisfy the statutory requirement.

The appellant sought to set aside two de facto guilty pleas for speeding tickets, arguing he was unaware of the consequences on demerit points and insurance coverage.

The court considered whether demerit points and insurance changes constitute "legally relevant collateral consequences" for an informed plea in provincial offence matters.

The court held that these are generally not legally relevant collateral consequences.

Applying the Wong analysis in the alternative, the court found the appeals failed the objective test for sufficiently serious undisclosed information.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The decision also provides guidance on affidavit requirements for future appeals seeking to vacate guilty pleas.

The appellant, Orlando Tassone, appealed his convictions for stunt driving and using improper tires under the Highway Traffic Act, alleging ineffective assistance from his paralegal who he claimed prevented him from testifying.

He sought a new trial or, alternatively, a sentence reduction.

The court found that the appellant failed to prove ineffective assistance, noting his unreliable memory and the paralegal's thorough preparation and tactical decision not to call him as a witness, which the appellant had accepted.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the original fine appropriate given the circumstances.

The defendant was charged with speeding at 135 kilometres per hour in a 100 kilometres per hour zone on the Queen Elizabeth Way in Hamilton on May 22, 2016.

The prosecution relied on lidar speed measurement evidence from a trained officer.

The defendant testified that he was traveling at approximately 90 kilometres per hour based on his constant observation of his speedometer, having limited his speed due to vehicle damage from a deer collision earlier that morning.

The court found that while the prosecution's evidence was prima facie reliable, the defendant's exculpatory evidence, when considered in the context of the totality of evidence and identified frailties in the prosecution case, raised a reasonable doubt as to guilt.

The defendant was acquitted.

Three appellants appealed dismissals of their Charter section 11(b) applications for stays of proceedings based on unreasonable delay in Part I Provincial Offences Act prosecutions.

The central issue was whether the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan applies to Part I offences or whether a lower ceiling should apply given the simplicity of such proceedings.

The court held that the 18-month ceiling applies to all provincial court matters, including Part I offences.

The court also addressed the test for demonstrating unreasonable delay below the ceiling, the requirement for meaningful steps to expedite proceedings, and the circumstances in which summary dismissal of frivolous applications is appropriate.

The appellant was convicted of stunt driving under the Highway Traffic Act for transporting a person in the rear storage area of a 1997 RAV 4 SUV without a seatbelt.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the storage compartment of an SUV does not constitute a "trunk" as defined in Regulation 455, and that strict construction principles should apply in favour of the defendant.

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the storage compartment of an SUV falls within the definition of "trunk" under the regulation, as it is not designed for human occupancy and lacks proper seating and structural protections.

The appellant appealed a conviction for Proceed Contrary to Sign at Intersection under Section 144(9) of the Highway Traffic Act, which was entered in her absence at an Early Resolution Meeting on March 22, 2013.

The appellant claimed she received no notice of the Early Resolution Meeting and never requested one.

Following an initial conviction on December 13, 2013, the appellant successfully applied for re-opening on January 31, 2013, after which the court directed an Early Resolution Meeting to be scheduled.

The appellant contended she was not notified of this rescheduled meeting.

The court found that absent evidence of proper notice to the appellant of the proceeding that directly affected her rights, and given her uncontested assertion that she was unaware of the proceeding, the conviction must be set aside and a new trial ordered.

The defendant was charged with speeding (89 km/h in a 60 km/h zone) and driving a motor vehicle with no currently validated permit.

The Crown proved the speeding charge through officer testimony regarding laser speed measurement device operation and calibration.

The defendant was convicted of speeding.

The permit charge was dismissed because Ontario Regulation 628/07 makes affixing validation evidence to the number plate mandatory but affixing it to the ownership document discretionary, rendering the charge invalid.

The appellant appealed a conviction for stunt driving imposed by a Justice of the Peace.

The appellant challenged the use of a BEE III radar device, arguing that the officer's positioning on the shoulder of the highway violated the device's manual instructions.

The court rejected this interpretation, finding that the BEE III could lawfully monitor traffic from a stationary position on the shoulder.

However, the court found the sentencing approach unfair, as the defendant was not given an opportunity to make submissions on the penalty before the fine was imposed.

The conviction was upheld but the fine was reduced from $3,000 to $800 with 12 months to pay.

The accused was charged with failing to use a crosswalk contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

Prior to entering a plea, the accused brought a motion under sections 11(b) and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings based on delay.

The Crown opposed the motion.

The court found that the accused's right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed and granted the motion, staying the proceedings.

The appellant appealed his conviction for permitting a motor vehicle to be operated without insurance contrary to s. 2(1)(b) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The Justice of the Peace convicted the appellant based on hearsay evidence regarding vehicle ownership and circumstantial evidence that the owner permitted the driver to use the vehicle.

The appellate court found that the Justice of the Peace erred in law by accepting proof of ownership that violated the best evidence rule and by drawing an unreasonable inference from circumstantial evidence.

The court allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal.

The defendant brought a motion to stay proceedings on the grounds that his right to a trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms had been violated.

The charge was for failing to stop at a stop sign contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.

The overall delay from charge to trial was 20 months and 7 days.

Applying the guidelines from R. v. Morin, the court deducted an intake period of 2 months, delays attributable to the defendant's actions and requests for adjournment, and neutral institutional delay.

The remaining delay of 7 months and 15 days fell within acceptable guidelines.

The motion to stay was denied.

The Crown appealed a Justice of the Peace's decision dismissing a charge against the respondent for permitting a motor vehicle to be operated without insurance under s. 2(1)(b) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The Crown argued the Justice of the Peace failed to consider circumstantial evidence.

The appeal judge held that the offence is one of strict liability, not requiring proof of mens rea.

However, even considering the circumstantial evidence, the evidence was insufficient to prove the respondent permitted the vehicle to be driven.

The appeal was dismissed.