S. Rebecca Shamai

The accused, Nathan Johnson, faced charges including child luring, communicating for sexual services, and distributing sexually explicit material.

The court heard a Charter application for a stay of proceedings due to lost evidence (chatlogs from a dating site).

The chatlogs, crucial for establishing the alleged victim's age as under 18, were deleted from the officer's device and the platform due to police inaction and delay in preservation efforts.

The court found the police officer's failure to preserve the evidence constituted unacceptable negligence, breaching the accused's Section 7 and 11(d) Charter rights to disclosure and a fair trial.

Consequently, the proceedings were stayed.

The applicant brought a third party records application seeking production of therapeutic and counselling records relating to the complainant in a human trafficking prosecution.

The applicant sought to access records from the complainant's psychiatrist, hospital, and mental health treatment facility covering the period between the complainant's arrest in April 2015 and her police interview in April 2016.

The applicant argued the records were necessary to challenge the complainant's credibility and reliability, contending she had fabricated allegations during therapy to escape prosecution.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant had failed to establish that the records were likely relevant to any issue at trial or to the competence of the witness.

Rossana Lim and her daughter Shannon Lim brought an application for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of section 11(b) (right to trial within a reasonable time).

The accused were charged with fraud-related offences and faced a trial date set for January 8, 2018, approximately 43 months and 9 days after the initial charge.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the delay exceeded the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 18 months, it was justified by defence delay, case complexity, and the transitional exceptional circumstance of good faith plea negotiations conducted under the pre-Jordan legal framework.

The accused pleaded guilty to ten property and violent offences committed between February 8 and March 13, 2016, including theft of a motor vehicle, five robberies armed with a knife, aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and administering a noxious substance.

The offences formed a crime spree in west-end Toronto.

The accused has an extensive criminal record with 21 prior sentencing events and 18.5 years of incarceration.

The court considered the accused's Aboriginal heritage (West Moberly First Nation), previously undisclosed due to fear of racism, along with systemic factors including childhood trauma, family violence, substance abuse, mental illness (multiple personality disorder and schizophrenia), and lack of support upon release from custody.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less a day in a reformatory facility plus three years probation, with credit for 27 months and one week of time served, resulting in an effective sentence of approximately four years and three months.

An appeal from a conviction under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2007 for acting as a motor vehicle dealer without being registered.

The trial was conducted ex parte in the absence of the defendant.

The appellate court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction, finding that the trial judge failed to conduct the required inquiry into whether an ex parte trial was appropriate, particularly given the prosecution's intention to seek a custodial sentence.

The court found that the procedural history demonstrated inadequate notice to the defendant and no proper consideration of the defendant's right to be present at trial, amounting to a miscarriage of justice.

An Indigenous offender pleaded guilty to heroin trafficking offences and possession of proceeds of crime.

The sentencing proceeded through a sentencing circle, a restorative justice process involving the offender's family, community members, and an Elder.

The offender had completed residential rehabilitation treatment and demonstrated significant personal transformation.

The court imposed a suspended sentence on trafficking counts with concurrent probation, one day custody on possession for purpose of trafficking (credited for time served), and a concurrent twelve-month conditional sentence on the proceeds count.

The decision emphasizes restorative justice principles, the impact of intergenerational trauma on Indigenous offenders, and the connection between remorse and rehabilitation.

The Crown applied for an order permitting a complainant in a human trafficking case to testify via closed-circuit television (CCTV) from outside the courtroom, and to have a Human Trafficking Advocate sit close to her during testimony.

The accused opposed both aspects of the application.

The court granted the CCTV order but denied the request for the advocate's close presence.

The decision addresses the evidentiary threshold under the amended Section 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code, which changed from a "necessity" test to a "facilitate" test, and considers what evidence is required to support such applications.

The defendant brought a second application under Section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to stay charges of impaired driving and "over 80" due to unreasonable delay.

The first application was dismissed in August 2016 when the anticipated trial completion was under 18 months.

By the time of the second application in February 2017, the total delay had exceeded 22 months.

The court found that the Crown failed to disclose critical evidence (an audio dispatch recording) despite repeated requests over many months, and that this disclosure failure was the primary cause of delay beyond the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown adduced no evidence of exceptional circumstances to justify the excess delay.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The applicant brought a motion under Section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging that the delay of approximately four years, nine months, and nine days between his charge and anticipated sentencing constituted an unconstitutional delay.

The applicant was charged with six counts of child pornography offences in November 2011 and was found guilty on two counts in February 2016.

The motion was brought in August 2016, following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Jordan, which established new presumptive ceilings for trial delay.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the total delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases, the delay was justified under the transitional exceptional circumstances framework established in Jordan, as the parties had relied on the law as it previously existed for the majority of the delay period.

A bartender and bar manager was charged with assault causing bodily harm after forcibly removing an intoxicated patron from a licensed establishment.

The defendant pleaded self-defence under Criminal Code section 34, arguing that the patron had made escalating threats of violence, including a death threat, after being cut off from service and asked to leave.

The court found that the defendant held a reasonable belief that force was being threatened against him, that his response was proportionate in the circumstances, and that his actions were justified both under the self-defence provision and under the Liquor Licence Act, which permits the use of necessary force to remove non-compliant patrons.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with driving with an excessive proportion of alcohol in his system (over 80 offence).

Following conviction and successful appeal, the matter proceeded to retrial.

The accused brought Charter applications alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found that the approved screening device test was administered in violation of section 8 of the Charter due to the officer's failure to comply with mandatory police procedures and guidelines regarding device calibration, self-testing, location of testing, and in-car camera system activation.

The court excluded the evidence under section 24(2) and dismissed the charge.

The appellant appealed her speeding conviction from May 29, 2014, on grounds of unreasonable delay affecting her right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The original conviction was registered on January 31, 2011, followed by an appeal and new trial.

The appellant argued that delays in obtaining trial transcripts and the timing of the appeal process constituted unreasonable delay.

The court found that the delay issue had been previously addressed in the first appeal before Justice Mocha, and that the facts regarding the delay were not clearly established.

The court also rejected allegations of misdirection, bias, and misapplication of stare decisis.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for Proceed Contrary to Sign at Intersection under Section 144(9) of the Highway Traffic Act, which was entered in her absence at an Early Resolution Meeting on March 22, 2013.

The appellant claimed she received no notice of the Early Resolution Meeting and never requested one.

Following an initial conviction on December 13, 2013, the appellant successfully applied for re-opening on January 31, 2013, after which the court directed an Early Resolution Meeting to be scheduled.

The appellant contended she was not notified of this rescheduled meeting.

The court found that absent evidence of proper notice to the appellant of the proceeding that directly affected her rights, and given her uncontested assertion that she was unaware of the proceeding, the conviction must be set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of stunt driving under the Highway Traffic Act for transporting a person in the rear storage area of a 1997 RAV 4 SUV without a seatbelt.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the storage compartment of an SUV does not constitute a "trunk" as defined in Regulation 455, and that strict construction principles should apply in favour of the defendant.

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the storage compartment of an SUV falls within the definition of "trunk" under the regulation, as it is not designed for human occupancy and lacks proper seating and structural protections.

The defendant was charged with abandoning a child under section 218 of the Criminal Code after leaving her four-and-a-half-year-old daughter sleeping in a locked car on a hot July day while she briefly entered a supermarket.

The Crown alleged the child was left unattended for approximately 30 minutes in temperatures reaching 28.6 degrees Celsius.

The court applied the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. A.D.H., which requires proof of subjective fault—specifically, awareness of the risk created by the conduct.

The court found that while the defendant's actions were unwise, the evidence did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that she had the requisite awareness of the risk.

The charge was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction under the Safe Streets Act, section 3(2)(c) for soliciting at a public transit stop, and his sentence of 90 days imprisonment imposed on an ex parte trial.

The trial justice mischaracterized the evidence regarding the appellant's hand gestures (praying motion versus cupping motion) and failed to properly establish that the conduct occurred at a "public transit stop" as required by the statute.

The court found the evidence insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and allowed the appeal, entering an acquittal.

The court also addressed sentencing principles applicable to ex parte trials, noting that the trial justice imposed a custodial sentence without justification beyond the prosecutor's position.

The offender, a 53-year-old man with a lengthy criminal record specializing in diamond theft through switching, pleaded guilty to theft of a 1.70 carat diamond and two counts of breaching a probation order that prohibited attendance at jewellery stores.

The Crown sought three to four years imprisonment; defence counsel sought 18 months.

The court imposed a sentence of four years on the theft and 18 months on the breach of probation counts, to be served consecutively to each other but concurrent with an existing sentence.

The decision addresses the application of sentencing principles for Aboriginal offenders under Section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code and the principles established in R. v. Gladue and R. v. Ipeelee.

The appellant appealed his convictions on three provincial offences: failing to have an insurance card, speeding, and failing to surrender his driver's licence.

The appellant raised 20 grounds of appeal based on idiosyncratic interpretations of constitutional law, statutory enactments, and common law, arguing that the relevant statutes did not apply to him.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the appellant's arguments were fanciful and had no air of reality.

The court confirmed the convictions and sentence, relying on binding precedent from a similar appeal involving the appellant's wife.