S. Rebecca Shamai

The appellant was convicted of stunt driving under the Highway Traffic Act for transporting a person in the rear storage area of a 1997 RAV 4 SUV without a seatbelt.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the storage compartment of an SUV does not constitute a "trunk" as defined in Regulation 455, and that strict construction principles should apply in favour of the defendant.

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the storage compartment of an SUV falls within the definition of "trunk" under the regulation, as it is not designed for human occupancy and lacks proper seating and structural protections.

The defendant was charged with abandoning a child under section 218 of the Criminal Code after leaving her four-and-a-half-year-old daughter sleeping in a locked car on a hot July day while she briefly entered a supermarket.

The Crown alleged the child was left unattended for approximately 30 minutes in temperatures reaching 28.6 degrees Celsius.

The court applied the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. A.D.H., which requires proof of subjective fault—specifically, awareness of the risk created by the conduct.

The court found that while the defendant's actions were unwise, the evidence did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that she had the requisite awareness of the risk.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with abandoning her four-and-a-half-year-old child after leaving her sleeping in a locked car on a hot July day while she went into a supermarket.

The court applied the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. A.D.H., which requires proof of subjective fault for the offence.

The court found that while the accused's actions were extremely unwise, the Crown failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she had the requisite awareness of the risk to which she was exposing her child.

The charge was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction under the Safe Streets Act, section 3(2)(c) for soliciting at a public transit stop, and his sentence of 90 days imprisonment imposed on an ex parte trial.

The trial justice mischaracterized the evidence regarding the appellant's hand gestures (praying motion versus cupping motion) and failed to properly establish that the conduct occurred at a "public transit stop" as required by the statute.

The court found the evidence insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and allowed the appeal, entering an acquittal.

The court also addressed sentencing principles applicable to ex parte trials, noting that the trial justice imposed a custodial sentence without justification beyond the prosecutor's position.

The offender, a 53-year-old man with a lengthy criminal record specializing in diamond theft through switching, pleaded guilty to theft of a 1.70 carat diamond and two counts of breaching a probation order that prohibited attendance at jewellery stores.

The Crown sought three to four years imprisonment; defence counsel sought 18 months.

The court imposed a sentence of four years on the theft and 18 months on the breach of probation counts, to be served consecutively to each other but concurrent with an existing sentence.

The decision addresses the application of sentencing principles for Aboriginal offenders under Section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code and the principles established in R. v. Gladue and R. v. Ipeelee.

The appellant appealed his convictions on three provincial offences: failing to have an insurance card, speeding, and failing to surrender his driver's licence.

The appellant raised 20 grounds of appeal based on idiosyncratic interpretations of constitutional law, statutory enactments, and common law, arguing that the relevant statutes did not apply to him.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the appellant's arguments were fanciful and had no air of reality.

The court confirmed the convictions and sentence, relying on binding precedent from a similar appeal involving the appellant's wife.