Mareike Noona Godbout Newhouse

Kevin Barreau was convicted after trial of human trafficking, receiving a material benefit from human trafficking, procuring, and advertising sexual services.

The sentencing judgment details the circumstances of the offences, the severe impact on the victim (A.D.), and the offender's personal history, including the influence of systemic anti-Black racism as presented in an Impact of Race and Culture Assessment (IRCA).

The court considered aggravating factors such as the victim's youth and the lasting impact of the offences, alongside mitigating factors including the offender's youth at the time of the offences, lack of prior criminal record, expressed remorse, strong rehabilitation prospects, and the contextualizing role of systemic racism.

The Crown sought a global sentence of seven years, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of two years less a day with restitution.

The court imposed a global sentence of 40 months imprisonment, applying a two-month credit for a Charter breach (denial of access to counsel).

Ancillary orders included restitution to the victim, forfeiture of seized items, a non-communication order, and a 10-year firearms prohibition.

The applicant, Roger Boissé, sought to exclude DNA evidence and/or stay proceedings under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 10(b), 15, and 16.

The core of the application concerned the validity of his consent to provide a DNA sample, arguing it was not informed or voluntary due to linguistic issues (English consent form for a French speaker) and alleged police coercion.

The court found that the Crown successfully demonstrated that the consent was informed and voluntary, and that no Charter rights were violated.

Specifically, the court determined that the applicant was not detained, had prior legal counsel, and understood his rights despite the language challenges.

Consequently, the application was dismissed, and the DNA evidence was deemed admissible for trial.

The accused, Kevin Barreau, was charged with five Criminal Code offences related to human trafficking and procuring.

The trial involved complex procedural issues, including an application to excuse a witness (P.C. Rice) due to PTSD and a Charter application for a stay of proceedings based on alleged police misconduct, including racial slurs and denial of counsel.

The court found the accused guilty of human trafficking, receiving material benefit from human trafficking, procuring, and advertising sexual services.

The charge of facilitating another offence was acquitted.

The Charter application for a stay was dismissed, but a s. 10(b) breach (denial of counsel) was found, entitling the accused to sentencing credit.

During a jury trial for procuring and related offences, the Crown sought leave to introduce portions of the complainant's prior consistent statements during re-examination to rehabilitate her credibility after cross-examination.

The court applied the test from R. v. Murray and denied the request, finding that the complainant had not claimed her prior statements were lies, but rather offered explanations for inconsistencies.

The court held that admitting the statements would violate the general rule against prior consistent statements and cause prejudice to the accused.

This criminal trial concerned a single count of sexual assault against B.B., based on his daughter T.B.'s recovered memory of an incident from her childhood.

T.B. experienced a "flashback" in 2018, recalling her father touching her nipples when she was around 11 years old.

The court meticulously assessed the reliability of T.B.'s recovered memory, noting the absence of independent corroborating evidence and the potential for confabulation, despite T.B.'s sincere belief in its truth.

The judge also considered B.B.'s exculpatory statements and the complex family communications surrounding the allegation.

Ultimately, the court found that the Crown did not prove B.B.'s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal.

In a sexual assault trial arising from an encounter after online communications and discussions of possible sexual activity, the central issue was consent.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework and found that, although the accused had credibility problems and lied on some points, his account retained an air of reality when assessed against the whole of the evidence.

The complainant's evidence contained significant reliability and credibility concerns, including inconsistencies about how the encounter began and ended, uncertainty about parts of the event, and evidentiary gaps relating to physical exhibits.

The Crown therefore failed to prove the absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused was acquitted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The incident occurred after the appellant, the complainant, and her partner returned to a residence after drinking.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's testimony as illogical and accepted the complainant's evidence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) principles, assessing credibility, and refusing an adjournment for a Seaboyer application.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's factual conclusions were supported by the evidence and there were no errors of law.

The accused responded to an online escort advertisement placed by an undercover police officer posing as a sex worker.

During text communications the officer disclosed that the escort was under 18, yet the accused negotiated sexual acts, price, and arranged a meeting at a hotel while bringing cash and a drink requested in the messages.

The accused testified that his intention was only to conduct research for a book about self-esteem and sex trade workers and that he suffered from erectile dysfunction.

The court rejected the accused’s explanation as not credible, finding the communications and conduct demonstrated a clear sexual purpose.

The accused was convicted of child luring under s.172.1(2) and communicating to obtain sexual services from a person under 18 under s.286.1(2), while the sexual exploitation count under s.153 was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with multiple sexual offences, applied for a stay of proceedings alleging abuse of process.

He argued that the Crown improperly adjourned his bail hearing, police violated his right to silence, and a correctional officer directed another inmate to assault him while in pre-trial custody.

The court found that while the bail adjournment was improper, it was done in good faith and did not warrant a stay.

The court also found no violation of the right to silence and insufficient evidence that the correctional officer directed the assault.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused brought a motion alleging a violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time under the Charter.

The information was sworn on July 31, 2017, and trial was scheduled to conclude on July 10, 2020, representing a total elapsed time of two years, eleven months, and eleven days.

The Crown argued that the defence caused significant delays, including the accused's failure to return to Toronto (approximately 18 months) and the defence's refusal to attend a pre-trial meeting due to incomplete disclosure (seven months).

The court found that the police made reasonable efforts to locate the accused and rejected the Crown's characterization of the accused as having fled.

The court also found that the defence's insistence on complete disclosure was justified based on the trial judge's notes.

After deducting the time attributable to police efforts to locate the accused, the remaining delay was one year, seven months, and eleven days, which falls below the presumptive ceiling of 18 months.

The court found that the defence had taken useful steps demonstrating sustained effort to expedite the proceedings, but was not satisfied that the trial took substantially longer than it reasonably should have.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused brought an application to question potential jurors for cause, arguing that the "Me Too" Movement had potentially affected juror impartiality, making them more likely to convict in sexual assault cases.

The Crown opposed, asserting this constituted an impermissible offence-based challenge.

The court dismissed the application, reaffirming that strong public opinions or views about a type of crime do not automatically translate into juror partiality against an accused.

The court emphasized that the trial process, including juror oaths and judicial instructions, is designed to ensure impartiality, and that the "Me Too" Movement, by raising awareness, reinforces the seriousness of such offences rather than undermining the rule of law.

The offender was convicted of possession of child pornography and luring a child under section 172.1 of the Criminal Code.

The offences occurred between August 1 and September 9, 2011, involving online sexual communications with a 13-year-old child.

The offender, an Aboriginal man with a history of childhood sexual abuse and bullying, claimed he intended to help the child avoid similar victimization.

The sentencing decision balanced denunciation and deterrence against principles of restraint and restorative justice, particularly given the offender's Aboriginal status and the relatively limited nature of the offences compared to typical child exploitation cases.

The applicant brought a motion under Section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging that the delay of approximately four years, nine months, and nine days between his charge and anticipated sentencing constituted an unconstitutional delay.

The applicant was charged with six counts of child pornography offences in November 2011 and was found guilty on two counts in February 2016.

The motion was brought in August 2016, following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Jordan, which established new presumptive ceilings for trial delay.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the total delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases, the delay was justified under the transitional exceptional circumstances framework established in Jordan, as the parties had relied on the law as it previously existed for the majority of the delay period.

The applicant, Timothy Hewton, sought an order for separate trials on two sets of charges: prostitution-related counts and firearm-related counts.

Hewton argued that a joint trial would prejudice his fair trial interests due to the risk of propensity reasoning and his intention to testify on the prostitution counts but not the firearm counts.

The Crown opposed, asserting a factual and legal nexus between the charges and concerns about increased court time and a vulnerable witness testifying twice.

Applying the principles from R. v. Last, the court found that the interests of justice required separate trials, primarily due to the danger of propensity reasoning and the objective reasonableness of the applicant's testimonial intention.

The defendant, Michael Campbell, challenged the constitutionality of section 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, specifically the 'misconduct exception' which limits pre-sentence custody credit to a 1:1 ratio when an offender is denied bail under section 524(4) or (8).

The court found this provision to be overbroad and in violation of section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, declaring it of no force and effect.

Consequently, the defendant was granted enhanced pre-trial custody credit at a 1.5:1 ratio, along with additional credit for harsh institutional conditions and successful house arrest.

The court then proceeded to sentence the defendant for exercising control over a prostitute and possessing a prohibited firearm, imposing a total sentence of 45 months imprisonment, reduced by the enhanced pre-trial credit, followed by two years of probation and ancillary orders.

The accused was charged with sexually abusing his step-daughter over a six-year period beginning when she was eight years old.

The abuse included sexual touching, forced anal intercourse, and other sexual acts.

The accused initially could not plead guilty due to alcohol-induced blackouts preventing him from recalling the offences, but he accepted the victim's evidence as truthful and credible.

The court found him guilty of sexual touching of a child under sixteen.

At sentencing, the court imposed a six-year custodial sentence, balancing significant aggravating factors including the breach of trust, the victim's young age, the prolonged nature of the abuse, and the serious harm suffered by the victim, against mitigating factors including the accused's difficult childhood, his remorse, his steps toward rehabilitation, and his decision to accept responsibility without requiring the victim to testify at trial.

The defendant, A.S., was found guilty of criminal negligence causing bodily harm (and failure to provide necessaries of life, which was judicially stayed).

The case involved her failure to protect her nine-year-old daughter, I.B., from protracted sexual abuse by her stepfather, J.K., despite having clear knowledge of the abuse for nearly a year.

The court considered sentencing principles, including denunciation and deterrence for offences against children, and aggravating factors such as breach of parental trust and significant victim impact.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record and a low risk of re-offending, though remorse was deemed tepid.

The court granted six months credit for pre-trial custody and stringent bail conditions.

A penitentiary sentence of three years was imposed, reduced to two years and six months after credit.

Ancillary orders included a DNA sample, firearm prohibitions, communication prohibitions with the victim and abuser, and a victim surcharge.

The accused was charged after failing to protect her young daughter from prolonged sexual abuse and exploitation by the accused's partner in the family home.

The court held that the accused had specific knowledge, by at least April 2013, of sexualized conduct and prior abuse, yet chose not to report it or remove the child from danger.

Applying the objective fault standards for s. 215 and criminal negligence, the court found the omission was both a marked departure and a marked and substantial departure from the conduct of a reasonably prudent parent.

Convictions were entered for failure to provide the necessaries of life and criminal negligence causing bodily harm, but the count of permitting prohibited sexual activity failed because the Crown did not prove the accused knowingly permitted the child to be on the premises for that purpose.

The accused was charged with assault on a peace officer, escape from lawful custody, and failing to comply with recognizance.

The court considered a Charter application to exclude fingerprint evidence obtained during a traffic stop that evolved into an investigative detention.

The accused argued violations of sections 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that while the initial detention and pat-down search were justified, the officer's attempt to handcuff the accused without reasonable grounds constituted an arbitrary detention in violation of section 9.

However, the fingerprint evidence was admitted under section 24(2) as the breach was minor and technical, the impact on the accused's liberty interest was minimal, and the evidence was vital to the truth-finding process.

On a voir dire in a prosecution arising from an alleged failure to protect a child from sexual abuse, the court considered the voluntariness of statements made by the accused mother to police and a child protection worker.

Applying the contextual voluntariness analysis and the law governing when a witness becomes a suspect requiring a full caution, the court held that the February 11 interview remained admissible despite the absence of a full suspect caution until the accused admitted knowledge of abuse in April 2013.

The accused was then objectively implicated, but the surrounding circumstances still established voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt for that interview.

By contrast, the February 12 interview was focused on the accused's own conduct, no caution was given at the outset, and police minimized the jeopardy by describing it as a Children's Aid discussion.

The court found reasonable doubt about voluntariness and excluded all February 12 utterances and statements.