Dr. Peter Collins

The Ontario Review Board conducted an annual review for an accused found not criminally responsible for second-degree murder.

The accused, diagnosed with schizophrenia, had previously held extremist religious beliefs that drove the index offence.

The Board found that the accused continues to pose a significant threat to public safety but noted his clinical stability and progress.

The Board ordered a continuation of the Detention Order with the addition of indirectly supervised community privileges and the possibility of supervised community living, along with a no-contact order for the victim's family.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment after shooting an intruder outside his home.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in leaving manslaughter with the jury, and challenged the jury instructions on self-defence and out-of-court statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding an air of reality to manslaughter based on the appellant's testimony and upholding the jury instructions.

On the sentence appeal, fresh evidence revealed the trial judge misspoke and intended to impose a six-year sentence.

The Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in failing to correct his mistake immediately, and sentenced the appellant afresh to six years' imprisonment.

The accused, Kevin Barreau, was charged with five Criminal Code offences related to human trafficking and procuring.

The trial involved complex procedural issues, including an application to excuse a witness (P.C. Rice) due to PTSD and a Charter application for a stay of proceedings based on alleged police misconduct, including racial slurs and denial of counsel.

The court found the accused guilty of human trafficking, receiving material benefit from human trafficking, procuring, and advertising sexual services.

The charge of facilitating another offence was acquitted.

The Charter application for a stay was dismissed, but a s. 10(b) breach (denial of counsel) was found, entitling the accused to sentencing credit.

The defence sought to call a forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Peter Collins, to provide expert opinion evidence on the neurobiological responses to stress and the impact of military training on decision-making.

The Crown objected, arguing the evidence was unnecessary and within the common knowledge of the jury.

The court applied the Mohan framework and the Supreme Court's guidance on self-defence from this very case, concluding that the expert evidence was necessary to help the jury assess the reasonableness of the accused's conduct and his role in the incident.

The application to admit the expert evidence was granted, subject to certain redactions.

M.S., a young person, pleaded guilty to multiple terrorism-related offenses, including facilitating terrorist activity, counselling to detonate an explosive device, and making/possessing explosive substances.

The Crown initially sought an adult sentence of life imprisonment but, after extensive evidence regarding M.S.'s rehabilitation efforts, including participation in Project Reset and NORMM programs, and his diagnosis of Multiple Sclerosis, jointly submitted for a maximum youth sentence.

The court accepted the joint submission, imposing a three-year custody and supervision order (two years in custody, one year under community supervision), in addition to the three years already served in detention, emphasizing accountability, rehabilitation, and public protection under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The accused was charged with the first-degree murder of his intimate partner, whom he shot three times.

The defence argued that the accused was in a drug-induced psychosis at the time of the shooting and lacked the specific intent for murder, seeking a verdict of manslaughter.

The Crown argued the killing was planned and deliberate.

The court admitted various hearsay statements and preposterous utterances to assess the accused's state of mind.

The court rejected the defence's expert psychiatric evidence, finding the accused had the intent to kill.

However, the court found the Crown failed to prove the murder was planned and deliberate.

The accused was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence obtained from a covert search of his residence authorized by a general warrant.

The police sought to find items linking the accused to the murder, including a composition book containing a map of alleged crime scenes.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO) the general warrant lacked sufficient objective and subjective grounds, relying on stale-dated information and a conditional psychiatric opinion.

Consequently, the search violated the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the serious nature of the Charter-infringing state conduct and the significant impact on the accused's privacy interests outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The evidence was excluded.

Christopher Husbands, facing a retrial for murder and aggravated assault, asserted a Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) defence based on mental disorder automatism due to PTSD.

The defence applied to exclude expert references to Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) and to limit references to malingering.

The court dismissed both applications, ruling that ASPD could be referenced, with limitations on propensity aspects, focusing on its manipulation, malingering, and deception components relevant to the NCR defence.

The court also allowed Crown experts to refer to malingering concerns, emphasizing its relevance to the NCR issue and providing jury instructions to distinguish it from the presumption of innocence regarding the elements of the offence.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee revoking his medical licence for engaging in a sexual relationship with a former patient shortly after the termination of the doctor-patient relationship.

The Divisional Court found the penalty unreasonable because it vastly exceeded the typical range of penalties imposed in similar cases without adequate justification.

Furthermore, the Committee's finding that the appellant posed an ongoing risk to the public was not supported by clear and cogent evidence.

The appeal was granted and the matter of penalty was remitted to the Committee for reconsideration.

The applicant, charged with possession of child pornography, sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of an Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant.

The motion raised three specific areas for cross-examination: delayed report to justice, a "Branton error" in the search warrant's language, and an incorrect date in the ITO regarding the initial complaint.

The court granted leave to cross-examine on the "Branton error" and the incorrect date, finding these issues could discredit the existence of reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant.

Leave was denied for the delayed report to justice, as it occurred after the warrant's issuance and did not bear on the pre-conditions for authorization.

The appellant was convicted of making, possessing, and distributing obscene material through his websites, which featured simulated explicit sex with violence.

He appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing errors in the admission of meta-tags, hyperlinks, written stories, and expert testimony, as well as deficiencies in the jury charge and a failure to grant a stay for delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, and upholding the $28,000 fine as a fit sentence.

The Chief of Police appealed a decision of the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services (OCCPS) which reinstated a police officer who had been terminated by a Hearing Officer.

The officer, who developed a cocaine addiction and post-traumatic stress disorder while working undercover, had pled guilty to drug possession and disciplinary charges.

The employer and the officer had presented a joint submission on penalty proposing reinstatement with strict conditions, which the Hearing Officer rejected in favour of termination.

OCCPS found the Hearing Officer's decision unreasonable and substituted the joint submission.

The Divisional Court dismissed the Chief of Police's appeal, holding that OCCPS correctly applied the reasonableness standard of review and reasonably concluded that the Hearing Officer ignored relevant evidence and the employer's duty to accommodate the officer's disability.

The appellant operated a website containing audiovisual material and written stories depicting violence against women.

He was convicted of making, possessing, and distributing obscene material.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that adult nudity alone could amount to explicit sex for the purposes of obscenity.

The court ordered a new trial for the audiovisual counts but upheld the conviction for the written stories, which clearly depicted explicit sex and violence.

The sentence was varied to a $2,000 fine.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee revoking his certificate of registration for sexual and professional misconduct involving a 15-year-old vulnerable patient.

The appellant argued the penalty was unduly harsh and that the committee failed to properly weigh expert and character evidence regarding his mental disorder.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found the committee's findings and the penalty of revocation were reasonably supported by the evidence, given the overwhelming aggravating factors.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant police officer appealed findings of guilt on four counts of discreditable conduct and the resulting penalty of dismissal.

The charges stemmed from inappropriate comments and touching of a sexual nature involving four women, including members of the public and an undercover officer.

The Commission set aside one conviction involving a brief physical contact with a civilian volunteer, finding it did not amount to discreditable conduct.

However, the Commission upheld the remaining three convictions, finding the Hearing Officer's credibility assessments reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The Commission also upheld the penalty of dismissal, noting the appellant's lack of judgment, failure to accept responsibility, poor employment record, and the compelling psychiatric evidence indicating no realistic possibility of rehabilitation.

The appellant police officer appealed findings of guilt on four counts of discreditable conduct and the resulting penalty of dismissal.

The charges arose from inappropriate comments and touching of a sexual nature involving four women, including members of the public and an undercover officer.

The Commission set aside one conviction involving a civilian volunteer, finding the brief physical contact did not amount to discreditable conduct.

However, the Commission upheld the remaining three convictions, finding the hearing officer's credibility assessments were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The Commission also upheld the penalty of dismissal, noting the officer's lack of judgment, failure to accept responsibility, poor employment record, and lack of rehabilitative potential.

The appellant police officer appealed findings of guilt on four counts of discreditable conduct and the resulting penalty of dismissal.

The charges arose from inappropriate comments and touching of a sexual nature involving four women, including members of the public and an undercover officer.

The Commission set aside one conviction involving a brief physical contact with a civilian volunteer, finding it did not amount to discreditable conduct.

However, the Commission upheld the remaining three convictions, finding the hearing officer's credibility assessments were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The Commission also upheld the penalty of dismissal, noting the officer's lack of judgment, failure to accept responsibility, and poor rehabilitative prospects.

The appellant was convicted of possession of child pornography after police seized materials during the execution of a search warrant.

The warrant was partially invalid as it authorized a search for a 'pedophile collection' based only on suspicion.

The trial judge admitted the evidence under s. 489(1) of the Criminal Code and the plain view doctrine, and alternatively under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that the seizure was unlawful as it amounted to an exploratory search, violating s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2), finding the breach serious and the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The conviction was set aside and an acquittal entered.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and other offences following a shooting at his high school.

At trial, he was found fit to stand trial and did not raise a defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD).

On appeal, fresh psychiatric evidence established that the appellant suffered from severe paranoid schizophrenia and was NCRMD at the time of the offences.

However, the appellant was too mentally ill to participate in his appeal or instruct counsel.

The Court of Appeal held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal despite the appellant's incompetence, as the Criminal Code does not require an appellant to be fit to prosecute an appeal, provided procedural fairness is ensured.

The Court allowed the appeal and substituted a verdict of NCRMD, finding that a new trial was unnecessary given the conclusive fresh evidence.

The accused was charged with possession of child pornography under s. 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

He challenged the constitutionality of the provision, arguing it violated his right to freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the prohibition on possession of child pornography infringes s. 2(b), it is largely justified under s. 1 as a reasonable limit to protect children from harm.

However, the Court found the law overbroad in two peripheral applications: self-created expressive material held exclusively for personal use, and private recordings of lawful sexual activity created by or depicting the accused for private use.

The Court read in exceptions for these two categories and upheld the law, allowing the Crown's appeal and remitting the matter for trial.