Paul Gerard McDermott

The defence sought to call a forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Peter Collins, to provide expert opinion evidence on the neurobiological responses to stress and the impact of military training on decision-making.

The Crown objected, arguing the evidence was unnecessary and within the common knowledge of the jury.

The court applied the Mohan framework and the Supreme Court's guidance on self-defence from this very case, concluding that the expert evidence was necessary to help the jury assess the reasonableness of the accused's conduct and his role in the incident.

The application to admit the expert evidence was granted, subject to certain redactions.

The Crown sought to introduce expert opinion evidence from a forensic pathologist regarding the sequence of shots and the positioning of the deceased at the time of the shooting in a second degree murder trial.

The accused objected, arguing the opinion exceeded the expert's scope of expertise and would confuse the jury.

Following a voir dire, the court applied the Mohan framework and gatekeeper analysis, concluding the expert was properly qualified and the evidence was logically relevant and necessary.

The court ruled the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect and admitted the expert opinion.

Sentencing decision arising from firearm and drug offences committed after the accused was assaulted by a group of men near a downtown intersection.

The court rejected asserted mitigating circumstances that the handgun had just been taken from a robber, that the conduct was materially connected to self-defence, and that the accused intended to surrender the weapon to police.

It found as an aggravating fact that the accused attempted to fire the handgun in a crowded public area while carrying cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, proceeds of crime, and prohibited ammunition, all while subject to a lifetime firearms prohibition.

Applying denunciation, deterrence, separation, rehabilitation, parity, and totality, the court imposed a global sentence of 6.5 years' custody less 484 days' pretrial credit, together with ancillary forfeiture, DNA, and lifetime prohibition orders.

A police officer with 23 years of service pleaded guilty to theft over $5,000, breach of trust by a public officer, careless storage of firearms and ammunition, and possession of methamphetamine and oxycodone.

The offences occurred during the execution of his duties when he stole approximately $11,500 from an undercover operation and possessed various controlled substances at his residence and police locker.

The court imposed a sentence of 21 months in custody, with the theft and breach of trust charges receiving 17 months concurrent, firearm and ammunition charges receiving 6 months concurrent, methamphetamine possession receiving 9 months concurrent, and oxycodone possession receiving 4 months consecutive.

The court also imposed a 10-year firearms prohibition and ordered a DNA sample.

This criminal trial involved two Ontario Provincial Police officers, Jason Redmond and David Vogelzang, facing charges related to obstruction of justice, breach of trust, and trafficking cannabis, stemming from an undercover operation.

The court acquitted both officers on charges of attempted obstruction of justice and breach of trust concerning a meeting where they discussed a rumour about the undercover officer's identity, finding reasonable doubt regarding their intent to obstruct.

Redmond was found guilty of trafficking cannabis (Count 4, admitted) and knowingly dealing with a forged document (Count 5).

He was acquitted of a second trafficking charge (Count 3, withdrawn) and a breach of trust charge related to the forged document (Count 6), as his actions in creating the document were not connected to his official duties.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder in connection with the death of Herminder Bhandal, who was abducted, beaten, confined, and left to die in a garage as part of a drug-related dispute orchestrated by a kingpin.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter and received a sentence of 8 years and 6 months in custody after credit for pre-plea custody.

The court found the accused played a leading role in the violent attack and subsequent cover-up, warranting a sentence at the high end of the 8-10 year range despite mitigating factors including early cooperation with police and demonstrated remorse.

The applicants sought certiorari to quash their committal to stand trial for first degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code.

They argued there was no evidence that the victim was killed while being forcibly confined or regarding the role each applicant played in the killing.

They also argued they were denied natural justice because the preliminary inquiry judge relied on post-offence conduct and specific medical evidence without giving them an opportunity to make submissions.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the applications, finding that the applicants were permitted to address the evidence and were not denied natural justice.

The court further held that even if there was a breach, the applicants suffered no prejudice because a committal was inevitable based on the pre-offence and post-offence circumstantial evidence, which was sufficient to permit a jury to infer a common intention and that each applicant played a substantial and integral role in the killing.

The Crown brought an application to admit evidence of three prior incidents of discreditable conduct by the accused at his trial for arson.

The Crown argued the evidence was admissible to rebut innocent association, counter third-party propensity, corroborate an unsavoury witness, show a pattern of behaviour, and complete the narrative.

The court applied the principled approach from Handy and found that the probative value of the evidence was limited, partly due to collusion between witnesses, and was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, charged with second degree murder, conspiracy to commit arson, arson causing bodily harm, and arson with intent to defraud in relation to a fatal business fire, challenged the Crown’s attempt to introduce numerous out‑of‑court statements under the co‑conspirators’ exception to the hearsay rule.

The court reviewed the Carter three‑stage test governing admissibility and considered whether a pre‑trial voir dire was required to assess whether the statements were capable of falling within the exception and whether they satisfied the principled approach to hearsay, including necessity and reliability.

The judge held that a voir dire was appropriate where the defence raised credible concerns about whether statements were made in furtherance of a conspiracy or where the availability of declarants raised necessity issues.

Several statements were admitted as capable of meeting the Carter requirements, particularly where declarants were deceased or unavailable and the statements furthered either the alleged arson conspiracy or a post‑offence cover‑up.

Statements attributed to an available witness with significant credibility concerns were excluded because the necessity and reliability requirements of the principled approach were not met.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, reversed the onus of proof, misapprehended evidence, and resulted in an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge laid out a clear evidentiary path to the verdict based on identification evidence linking the appellant to the assault.

The court concluded there was no misapprehension of evidence or reversal of the burden of proof.

Although the Crown's case was not overwhelming, the verdict was not unreasonable.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for robbery and unlawful confinement arising from a home invasion.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the reliability of the complainant's eyewitness identification evidence and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the reliability of the recognition evidence and supporting circumstantial evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court noting the six-month sentence was lenient given the nature of the home invasion.

The appellant was detained under the Mental Health Act after police concluded she was suicidal.

While she was at the hospital, police conducted a warrantless search of her home under s. 117.04(2) of the Criminal Code and seized her properly stored firearms.

The application judge granted a forfeiture order, which was upheld by the summary conviction appeal judge.

On further appeal, the appellant argued the warrantless search was invalid and violated her s. 8 Charter rights, thereby depriving the application judge of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the possibility of danger persisted despite her hospital detention, making it impracticable to obtain a warrant.

The search was lawful and reasonable, and the forfeiture order was supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' imprisonment and 18 months' probation for two counts of robbery and related offences, including the use of a firearm.

The appeal was heard years after the sentence had been fully served.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentence was appropriate given the seriousness of the offences, which involved robbing clerks late at night with an imitation firearm and a large knife, balanced against the appellant's youth and rehabilitative prospects.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the grounds that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, the verdicts were unreasonable, and the trial judge reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons met the Sheppard requirements and that the verdicts were supported by ample circumstantial evidence.

Specifically, it was reasonable to infer that the appellant, who was seen searching the area where a gun and bullet-proof vest were found after a car crash and flight, was the driver who discarded those items.

The court also found no reversal of the burden of proof.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching of his stepdaughter.

The complainant had given birth to a child, and DNA evidence established the appellant as the father.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to give an adequate caution regarding evidence of an earlier incident of sexual touching and by failing to adequately answer a jury question about the credibility of the complainant's account.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material error in the jury charge or the trial judge's response to the jury's questions.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the complainant and the appellant.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge reasonably concluded the complainant's evidence was confirmed by another witness in critical respects, and that variations in testimony were collateral or explained by intoxication.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's treatment of a serious inconsistency in the appellant's evidence.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the appeal from sentence was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed a condition of his probation order.

The Crown conceded that condition r(8) of the probation order was not a reasonable condition.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and deleted the condition.

The appellant appealed his robbery convictions, arguing they were unreasonable because the Crown's case relied entirely on an unrecorded inculpatory statement made to police while in custody.

The appellant contended that any conviction based exclusively on an unrecorded statement should be presumptively unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal rejected this per se rule, holding that while a proper recording assists the trier of fact, its absence does not automatically render a statement inadmissible or a conviction unreasonable.

The court also dismissed arguments regarding the trial judge's failure to give specific jury cautions about the unrecorded statement and hearsay evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the conditions of his one-year conditional sentence and three-year probation order for assault causing bodily harm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the strict house arrest condition but found the restriction on family visits unreasonable, varying it to allow weekend visits with his daughter.

The court also varied the probation order to remove several conditions, including the requirement to abstain from alcohol.

The appeal was allowed in part.