Kelly A. Weeks

The accused, Nicholas Berto, was found guilty by a jury of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failing to stop at the scene of an accident.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the intentional and aggressive driving towards a crowd, the severe, life-altering injuries to an innocent bystander, and the subsequent flight from the scene to avoid liability.

Mitigating factors included the accused's youth, lack of criminal record, positive pre-sentence report, supportive family, and remorse.

The court rejected the defence's arguments regarding cognitive impairment and the weight of bail conditions.

Emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation, the court imposed a total sentence of 24 months imprisonment, a 10-year firearms prohibition, a 2-year driving prohibition, a DNA order, and a victim fine surcharge.

The offenders pleaded guilty to manslaughter and indecent interference with human remains following a joint submission.

Originally charged with first-degree murder, the Crown accepted lesser pleas due to evidentiary frailties.

The court accepted the joint submission, imposing a 10-year sentence for manslaughter and 3 years concurrent for indecent interference, with credit for pre-trial custody and Gladue factors for Aboriginal offenders.

The accused applied for a change of venue under s. 599(1)(a) of the Criminal Code in relation to charges of first-degree murder and offering an indignity to human remains.

They argued that extensive pre‑trial publicity, community hostility, and alleged inadequacies in the Sault Ste.

Marie courthouse facilities created a reasonable likelihood of juror prejudice and an unfair trial.

The court reviewed the governing jurisprudence on venue changes and the safeguards inherent in the jury selection and trial process.

It concluded that the applicants failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that community bias or prejudice could not be mitigated through those safeguards.

The court also found that the courthouse facilities were capable of accommodating the trial and that logistical concerns did not justify relocation.

The offender was sentenced following convictions on ten counts including multiple arsons, insurance fraud, identity fraud, and counselling to commit arson.

The offences involved four planned fires at residential properties and a fraudulent scheme involving a life insurance policy connected to the offender’s former spouse.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the offender’s role as the organizer who directed another vulnerable individual to set several of the fires.

After applying the principles of proportionality, totality, and parity, the court imposed a global sentence of seven years’ imprisonment with credit for pre‑sentence custody.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, a lifetime firearms prohibition, and restitution payable to an insurance company for property losses.

The applicants sought certiorari to quash their committal to stand trial for first degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code.

They argued there was no evidence that the victim was killed while being forcibly confined or regarding the role each applicant played in the killing.

They also argued they were denied natural justice because the preliminary inquiry judge relied on post-offence conduct and specific medical evidence without giving them an opportunity to make submissions.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the applications, finding that the applicants were permitted to address the evidence and were not denied natural justice.

The court further held that even if there was a breach, the applicants suffered no prejudice because a committal was inevitable based on the pre-offence and post-offence circumstantial evidence, which was sufficient to permit a jury to infer a common intention and that each applicant played a substantial and integral role in the killing.

The accused applied for disclosure of contact information for several civilian witnesses who had been interviewed during a homicide investigation but whom the Crown did not intend to call at the preliminary inquiry.

The defence argued that the information was necessary to conduct its own investigation and to prepare full answer and defence under the principles established in Stinchcombe.

The Crown refused disclosure citing specific safety concerns and evidence of intimidation, gang affiliation, and repeated breaches of non‑communication orders by the accused while in custody.

The court held that while witness contact information is generally relevant and normally disclosed, the Crown had established specific and credible security risks justifying withholding the information in this case.

Instead, the court adopted a structured procedure allowing defence counsel to interview willing witnesses at the courthouse while protecting witness safety and confidentiality.