COURT FILE NO.: 7393/13

DATE: 2014-10-08

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

GAY LYNN OVERLAND

Defendant

D. Kirk/K.Weeks, for the Crown

E. McCooeye, for the Defendant

HEARD: September 12, October 3, 2014

reasons for sentence

JUSTICE E. GAREAU:

[1] After a trial, Gay Lynn Overland was convicted of 10 counts in a 12-count indictment. The convictions are on counts 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 of the indictment. Four of the counts involve the charge of arson contrary to s. 434 of the Criminal Code of Canada. These charges involved four separate fires at four separate residences. There was a finding that Ms. Overland set the barn fire at 817 Goulais Avenue (count 1) and that she directed and instructed a third person, Grant Morden, to set the fires at 181 Andrew Street (count 2), at the garage at 817 Goulais Avenue (count 5) and at 113 Cathcart Street (count 6). Count 3 involves the receipt of funds from the Andrew Street fire and count 7 involves the receipt of funds from the Cathcart Street fire. Counts 8, 9, and 10 involve an insurance fraud scheme involving a life insurance policy held by Ms. Overland’s former spouse, Donald Bijowski, with the Equitable Life Insurance Company. Count 8 is a charge of fraud, count 9 is a charge of acting on a forged document. Count 10 is a charge of identity fraud in which Ms. Overland impersonated Donald Bijowski with respect to a life insurance policy with the Equitable Life Insurance Company.

[2] Count 12 is an offence of counselling to commit arson and relates to Gay Overland’s counselling of the undercover police officer Carrie Kerfoot in relation to a garage located at 627 Queen Street, West, Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario.

[3] A finding of guilt and a registration of conviction with regard to the aforementioned counts was made by the court on July 25, 2014. Submissions by counsel as to sentence were put over to September 12, 2014.

[4] The sentencing hearing was commenced on September 12, 2014, but not completed and this matter was adjourned to October 3, 2014 for further submissions. The matter was then adjourned to today’s date, October 8, 2014, for decision.

[5] The court has considered the submissions of counsel, has reviewed the authorities submitted and is now in a position to impose sentence on Gay Overland.

[6] Gay Overland has served almost 31 months of pre-sentence custody with respect to these offences. There is agreement by the defence and crown counsel that Ms. Overland should receive a 1 to 1.5 credit for those days in custody. Using that formula, this gives Ms. Overland a credit of 46 months or 3 years and 10 months against any aggregate sentence imposed by the court for the offences for which she has been convicted.

[7] The position taken by the crown is that for the four arsons, the insurance fraud relating to the arsons, the offences relating to the Equitable Life Insurance Company, and the offence of counselling to commit arson, an appropriate global sentence taking into account the totality principle, is 9 years imprisonment less time served for pre-sentence custody.

[8] Mr. McCooeye, in his submissions to the court on behalf of Ms. Overland, suggested a sentence range between 3 to 4 years less time served for pre-sentence custody. Taking into account that Ms. Overland has served 46 months in pre-sentence custody, after applying the 1 to 1.5 ratio, the defence suggested the appropriate net sentence is time served.

[9] The factual background with respect to the criminal offences for which Gay Overland has been convicted are fully detailed in my written Reasons for Judgment dated July 25, 2014. It is a fair assessment of the facts to say that Overland was motivated to commit these offences by greed, financial gain and a desire to extract revenge or retribution against her former spouse, Donald Bijowski. There was a great deal of animus held by Overland against Bijowski and it is clear that she wanted to extract retribution and hardship upon him both financial and personal. These criminal acts were also not spontaneous or spur of the moment actions. The setting of the fires at the four different locations were thought out and planned out. For three of the fires, Ms. Overland preyed upon an individual to do her dirty work for her. To say that Grant Morden was a vulnerable person, easily preyed upon by a schemer, is an understatement. Mr. Morden, during the time in question, had a dependency on drugs and alcohol that left him virtually homeless and looking for ways to secure funds to feed his drug addiction. In Grant Morden, Gay Overland had the perfect dupe, who would set the fires for her on her instruction and direction, receiving very little in return.

[10] This court is given the responsibility of deciding what is a just, proper and fit sentence for Gay Overland for the 10 criminal offences she has been convicted of. Sentencing an offender is not a science, but rather more of an art, where several factors have to be weighed and delicately balanced.

[11] In doing so, the court is guided by the provisions of the Criminal Code of Canada and the jurisprudence. The court is particularly guided by s. 718 of the Criminal Code of Canada which sets out a list of principles and objectives that the court must consider when determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed. Section 718 reads as follows:

718. The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:

(a) to denounce unlawful conduct;

(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;

(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;

(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;

(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and

(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims and to the community.

[12] Further sentencing principles are set out in s. 718.1 and s. 718.2 of the Criminal Code of Canada. Section 718.1 reads as follows:

“A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.”

This provision reiterates the comments by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. L.M., [2008] 2 S.C.R. at paragraph 22. Of particular interest in the case at bar is s. 718.2(c) of the Criminal Code of Canada, which reads as follows:

“(c) Where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh.”

[13] These principles of proportionality set out in s. 718.1 and totality, as set out in s. 718.2(c) of the Criminal Code of Canada are subject to comment in the 8th Edition of Ruby on Sentencing, published in June, 2012, at paragraph 2:63 as follows:

“The totality principle is a particular application of the general principle of proportionality. It requires a sentencing judge who orders an offender to serve consecutive sentences for multiple offences to ensure that the cumulative sentence rendered does not exceed the overall culpability of the offender.”

Further on in that paragraph, it is noted that:

“The totality principle requires an assessment of the total impact of the sentence being imposed in relation to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.”

As the English Court of Appeal said in Bocsker:

“When consecutive sentences are imposed, the final duty of the sentence is to make sure that the totality of consecutive sentences is not excessive.”

[14] As a result of the involvement of Grant Morden in setting the fires in counts 2, 5, and 6 at the direction of Gay Overland, s. 718.2(b) of the Criminal Code of Canada comes into play. This section commonly referred to as the “parity” section or “disparity” section, depending on how it is approached, reads as follows:

“A sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances.”

[15] In separate proceedings before the Honourable Madam Justice M. Dunn in the Ontario Court of Justice on January 13, 2014, Mr. Morden entered pleas of guilty to three counts of arson, pertaining to the fires at 181 Andrew Street, the garage at 817 Goulais Avenue and 113 Cathcart Street. These are the fires set out in counts 2, 5, and 6 pertaining to Gay Overland before this court. With respect to his involvement in those fires, Mr. Morden received sentences of four months consecutive on each, for a total sentence of 12 months. This was by way of a joint submission put forward to the court after pleas of guilt were entered by Grant Morden. A transcript of the sentencing proceeding for Mr. Morden was entered as Exhibit S-1 at Ms. Overland’s sentencing hearing.

[16] The position taken by counsel for Ms. Overland is that based on the parity principle and the application of s. 718.2(b) of the Criminal Code of Canada, there should not be a substantial difference in sentence between that received by Grant Morden and that to be received by Gay Overland as it pertains to the fires at 181 Andrew Street, the garage at 817 Goulais Avenue and 113 Cathcart Street, which is counts 2, 5, and 6 of the indictment.

[17] The position advanced by the crown with respect to counts 2, 5, and 6 is that there are differences between Overland and Morden sufficient to impose what would otherwise be an appropriate sentence for Gay Overland. The crown takes the position that Overland is the instigator and planner of the fires and therefore assumes a higher degree of culpability for the fires than Grant Morden who set them on Overland’s request and direction. As the crown put it, if not for Gay Overland, there would have been no fires set by Mr. Morden at 181 Andrew Street, at the garage at 817 Goulais Avenue, or at 113 Cathcart Street.

[18] The crown’s position is that parity is but one factor to consider and is not a factor that overrides or trumps the other factors and principles of sentencing applicable to Gay Overland.

[19] In the case of R. v. Roks, 2011 ONCA 618, [2011] O.J. No. 4266, the Ontario Court of Appeal dealt with the parity principle in a case of arson which resulted in a death and a charge of manslaughter. Speaking for the court, Mr. Justice Watt makes the following observations at paragraphs 14 to 17 inclusive:

[14] The paramount sentencing objectives at work in this case are denunciation and deterrence. That said, since I am sentencing a first offender, I must not lose sight of the prospect of rehabilitation. The sentence I impose must be proportionate to the gravity of the appellant’s offence, and the degree of his responsibility.

[15] The principle of parity expressed in s. 718.2(b) of the Criminal Code requires us to take into consideration that a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances.

[16] “Parity is not equivalence, nor is similar, identical. Crucial to the parity principle expressed in s. 718.2(b) are the cumulative requirements of:

• similar offences
• similar offenders
• similar circumstances

Similar offenders should receive similar sentences for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. When the similarities begin to fall away, however, so does the principle. Offenders may be at different ages and stages, have different antecedents and realistic prospects for rehabilitation, and greater or lesser involvement in or responsibility for an offence. Some plead guilty and co-operate with authorities. A discount may follow in their cases. Others plead not guilty and have a trial. They don’t get the discount.

[17] The principle of parity does not require that the sentences imposed on everyone involved in the scheme to burn down the Woodbine building and collect the insurance proceeds be the same. Fire-setters, prime movers and middlemen have different roles. Some are first offenders, others dedicated recidivists. Some plead guilty and provide evidence for the prosecution, while others keep their own counsel. Some suffer life‑threatening and permanently disfiguring injuries, but others don’t. The arsonist and the middleman are not similar offenders with similar roles in this offence.”

[20] As is noted in R. v. Miller, [2002] O.J. No. 3589, a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, at paragraph 9:

“Parity is only one of a number of principles that must be taken into consideration in imposing an appropriate sentence and it cannot in and of itself dictate the result in all cases involving similar offenders committing similar cases.”

The court goes on to consider the comments of Lamer, C.J.C. of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. M. (C.A.) (1966), 1996 230 (SCC), 105 C.C.C. (3d) 327 at paragraph 92 where he states:

“Sentencing is an inherently individualized process and the search for a single appropriate sentence for a similar offender and a similar crime will frequently be a fruitless exercise of academic abstraction.”

[21] As noted in the case of R. v. Davis, [1991] O.J. No. 141, the Ontario Court of Appeal has clearly indicated that a sentencing court is not bound to repeat what it considers to be an overly lenient sentence on the basis of applying the parity principle. As noted at paragraph 41 in R. v. Scott:

“In any event, if anything, Chen’s sentence was overly lenient and the parity principle does not require the court to impose equally inappropriate sentence on the appellants.”

This principle was repeated by the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench in R. v. A.A., 2011 ABQB 598, [2011] A.J. No. 1036 where at paragraph 98 the court states:

“Further, the imposition of an excessively lenient sentence on a co-accused by one trial court will not bind another trial court in sentencing a second co-accused. If a sentence imposed by one court is too lenient, it should be disregarded.”

[22] My view is that there are two significant dissimilarities between Grant Morden and Gay Overland that reflects the court’s ability to impose a more substantial sentence on Ms. Overland than 12 months imprisonment on counts 2, 5, and 6. Firstly, Mr. Morden entered pleas of guilt. This, in my view, reflects a degree of remorse for the crimes, which is not present in the case of Overland. The fact that Ms. Overland required a trial is not a factor to be held against her, but rather it is not a mitigating factor in sentence that Mr. Morden had available to him. As expressed by Mr. Justice Watt, in R. v. Roks, at paragraph 16:

“Some plead guilty and co-operate with authorities. A discount may follow in their cases. Others plead not guilty and have a trial. They do not get the discount.”

[23] In my view, another significant distinguishing feature between Ms. Overland and Mr. Morden is that Ms. Overland is the mastermind, the planner of the arsons and Mr. Morden is the dupe who carries them out. In the circumstances of this case, there is an increased degree of culpability in the actions of Ms. Overland who plans and organizes the arsons. There is much truth to the statement, “If not for Gay Overland, there would have been no fires at 181 Andrew Street, the garage at 817 Goulais Avenue and at 113 Cathcart Street.”

[24] Having said this, the court must still apply s. 718.2(b) of the Criminal Code and the principle of parity as but one factor in determining a fit and appropriate sentence for Gay Overland with respect to counts 2, 5, and 6 of the indictment. The sentence imposed on Grant Morden provides a guide to the sentence to be received by Gay Overland, but Ms. Overland’s sentence is justified in being greater in light of the differentiating factors between them as set out in the preceding paragraphs.

[25] The crown argues that there are no mitigating factors to consider with respect to the sentence of Gay Overland. The defence argues that there are many mitigating factors at play. In reality, there are very few, if any, mitigating factors, but if there are any to be found, it is in the criminal record of Gay Overland. The record of Gay Overland was entered as Exhibit S-4 on the sentencing hearing. This record reflects a conviction in 1985 for theft; a conviction in 1997 for fraud; a conviction in 2000 for failure to appear; and on November 7, 2011, two convictions, for fail to comply with a recognisance and a conviction for assault. This record has large gaps in it and reflects the fact that Gay Overland has not been sentenced to any significant time in custody. The only custodial sentence reflected in her record is a sentence of one day in jail, reflecting 10 days of pre-sentence custody for the conviction of fail to comply with recognisance on November 7, 2011.

[26] Balanced against this sole mitigating factor are many aggravating factors, which can be summarized as follows:

(a) the fact that Ms. Overland actually set the barn fire at 817 Goulais Avenue and was the mastermind and chief planner for the fires at 181 Andrew Street, the garage at 817 Goulais Avenue and the fire at 113 Cathcart Street;

(b) the fact that these fires were well planned out and thought out;

(c) the fact that the fires were motivated by greed and the desire to extract revenge on someone else, namely, Donald Bijowski;

(d) the fact that the intercept tapes of conversations between Gay Overland and Carrie Kerfoot indicate that Ms. Overland has a proclivity and propensity to engage in criminal activity. These intercept tapes reflect the fact that Ms. Overland has a criminal mind and is looking for ways to enact her criminal schemes. This is particularly evident in count 12, the counselling to commit arson offence, where Ms. Overland is counselling Carrie Kerfoot to burn down the garage at 627 Queen Street, West with specific and exact instruction and direction.

(e) The nature of an arson itself has the potential of putting firefighters and other members of the community in peril and jeopardy. Every time that a firefighter responds to a fire, he or she puts their life in harm’s way. Some of the fires were at locations where houses were close together and could have been caught on fire by the arson orchestrated by Ms. Overland.

[27] Arson is a very serious criminal offence and it is not surprising that the case law has reflected this by indicating that deterrence, denunciation and the protection of the public are the paramount factors to be considered in sentencing for this type of offence. In R. v. Magno, [2011] O.J. No. 4401, Mr. Justice Ducharme of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice was sentencing an accused for manslaughter, conspiracy to commit an arson, arson causing bodily harm and arson with intent to defraud. At paragraph 47 of his judgment, Justice Ducharme notes:

“In this case, an appropriate sentence must denounce criminal conduct that endangers the lives and safety of others, particularly when that conduct is committed for financial gain.”

[28] In the case of R. v. Power, [1992] O.J. No. 2005, the accused pleaded guilty to having intentionally set fire to his own rooming house. The court, in that case, speaks of a sentence that protects the public and notes that “Deterrence to others, therefore, is the principle that must receive emphasis in this case.”

[29] In the case of R. v. Quigley, [1998] B.C.J. No. 561, the British Columbia Court of Appeal reviewed the sentence of 8 years for causing damage to a property by fire or explosion. On appeal, the 8-year sentence was reduced to 5 years. At paragraph 15 of its decision, the court indicates that a 5-year sentence “would satisfy the necessary requirements of deterrence and denunciation and ensure the public safety.”

[30] The themes of deterrence, denunciation and the protection of the public was repeated in R. v. Young, [1997] O.J. No. 6214. At paragraph 23 in this arson case, the sentencing judge states:

“It is necessary in the best interests of the administration of criminal justice, and for the protection of society in general, as well as the people of this particular community, that the sentence imposed on this conviction for arson clearly indicate society’s denunciation of this conduct. In addition, it must be capable of deterring the perpetrator and anyone else in the general public so minded or capable of becoming so minded in the future.”

[31] Clearly, the principles of deterrence, denunciation and protection of the public are to be given effect in sentencing Gay Overland for the type of offences which she has been found guilty of. The range of sentence appropriate to reflect these sentencing principles is not easy for a sentencing court to ascertain simply due to the fact that the cases reflect a wide range of sentences that have been imposed for the offence of arson. As noted by Justice Corrick in R. v. Johnston, [2014] O.J. No. 3590, in paragraph 15:

“Finally, I must consider sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. It is those that I now consider. Ms. Goldenberg has referred me to eleven cases that deal with the appropriate sentence for arson. The sentences imposed vary widely from nine months in prison in R. v. Murphy 1998 27920 (MB CA), [1998] M.J. No. 104 (Man. C.A.) to five years in R. v. Pruner [1979] O.J. No. 882 (Ont. C.A.). Cases in which sentences at the upper end of the range were imposed typically involved fires set to defraud insurance companies or to exact revenge on a landlord who terminated the tenancy of the fire-setter: see for example R. v. Quigley [1998] B.C.J. No. 561 (B.C.C.A.) and R. v. Singh [1993] O.J. No. 2156 (C.A.). Cases in which sentences at the middle or low end of the range were imposed often involved offenders who were suffering from sort of mental illness or were under the influence of drugs or alcohol: see R. v. Renaud, [2001] O.J. No. 3974 (S.C.J.); R. v. Murphy, [1998] M.J. No. 104 (Man. C.A.).”

[32] In R. v. Magno, Justice Ducharme notes at paragraph 88 that:

“the cases from the Ontario Court of Appeal reveal a range from 18 months to four years with respect to offences of arson.”

[33] Gay Overland is 56 years of age. She comes before the court without an extensive criminal record and certainly without having served any substantial time in custody for any criminal offences. Ms. Overland comes before the court on very serious criminal offences, including four counts of arson involving four separate fires and one count involving counselling a person to commit an arson. These are the more serious offences in relation to the insurance fraud offences and the sentence of the court must reflect the principles of denunciation and deterrence, both general and specific.

[34] Having reviewed the statutory provisions of the Criminal Code, and the principles of sentencing set out in these provisions, and in particular the provisions of proportionality, totality and parity, and having considered the aggravating and mitigating factors and the ranges of sentence imposed by courts for similar offences, I have reached the conclusion that a fit sentence is a total sentence of 7 years imprisonment with respect to counts 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 of the indictment. This sentence shall be broken down as follows:

(1) Count 1 – fire at the barn at 817 Goulais Avenue – 2 years incarceration;

(2) Count 2 – fire at 181 Andrew Street – 8 months consecutive;

(3) Count 3 – defrauding Algoma Mutual Insurance relating to the fire at Andrew Street – 6 months consecutive;

(4) Count 5 – fire at the garage at 817 Goulais Avenue – 8 months consecutive;

(5) Count 6 – fire at 113 Cathcart Street – 8 months consecutive;

(6) Count 7 – defrauding Algoma Mutual Insurance in the sum of $76,751.25 relating to the fire at 113 Cathcart Street – 6 months consecutive;

(7) Count 8 – defrauding Equitable Life Insurance – relating to the insurance policy on the life of Donald Bijowski – 1 year consecutive;

(8) Count 9 – acting on a forged document – relating to the insurance policy on the life of Donald Bijowski – 6 months concurrent;

(9) Count 10 – fraudulently personate Donald Bijowski with respect to the life insurance policy with Equitable Life Insurance – 6 months concurrent;

(10) Count 12 – counselling Carrie Kerfoot to commit arson – 1 year consecutive.

[35] This sentence amounts to a sentence of 84 months. Gay Overland is to receive credit for the pre-sentence time she has served in custody, which results in a credit to her of 46 months. The net result is that there remains a sentence of 38 months, or 3 years and 2 months, to be served.

Ancillary Orders:

[36] The crown has requested that ancillary orders be made including a DNA order, a mandatory firearms prohibition under s. 109 of the Criminal Code of Canada and an order for restitution. The order for DNA and prohibition of firearms for life shall be granted. As to restitution, filed as Exhibit S-3 on the sentencing was a document brief setting out the sums owing to Algoma Mutual Insurance Company as follows:

(a) 113 Cathcart Street, Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario

Damage to building, contents $75,551.25
Insurance adjusting costs 4,644.20
Expert costs 7,347.46
Legal costs 5,233.00

$92,775.91

(b) 181 Andrew Street, Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario

Damage to building $40,000.00
Insurance adjusting costs 2,337.75

$42,337.75

The total relating to 113 Cathcart Street and 181 Andrew Street, as set out in Exhibit S-3, is $135,113.66.

[37] In the text “Sentencing” by Clayton Ruby (8th Edition) it is noted at paragraph 19:44:

“A court’s power to make a restitution order as part of the sentencing process is discretionary. The case law has recognized that this discretion is to be exercised with regard to certain objectives and factors and not as ‘mechanical afterthought to a sentence of imprisonment.’”

[38] In R. v. Devgan, 1999 2412 (ON CA), 136 C.C.C. (3d) 238, a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, the court sets out a list of factors for a sentencing court to consider in deciding whether a restitution order is appropriate:

(1) An order for compensation should be made with restraint and caution;

(2) The concept of compensation is essential to the sentencing process:

(i) it emphasizes the sanction imposed upon the offender;

(ii) it makes the accused responsible for making restitution to the victim;

(3) A sentencing judge should consider:

(i) the purpose of the aggrieved person in invoking s. 725(1);

(ii) whether civil proceedings have been initiated and are being pursued; and

(iii) the means of the offender.

(4) A compensation order should not be used as a substitute for civil proceedings. Parliament did not intend that compensation orders would displace the civil remedies necessary to ensure full compensation to victims;

(5) A compensation order is not the appropriate mechanism to unravel involved commercial transactions;

(6) A compensation order should not be granted when it would require the criminal court to interpret written documents to determine the amount of money sought through the order. The loss should be capable of ready calculation.

(7) A compensation order should not be granted if the effect of provincial legislation would have to be considered in order to determine what order should be made;

(8) Any serious contest on legal or factual issues should signal a denial of recourse to an order;

(9) Double recovery can be prevented by the jurisdiction of the civil courts to require proper accounting of all sums recovered; and

(10) A compensation order may be appropriate where a related civil judgment has been rendered unenforceable as a result of bankruptcy.

[39] The claim for restitution set out in Exhibit S-1 includes not only the damage to building and contents, but other costs such as insurance adjusting costs, expert costs and legal expenses. In the case of 113 Cathcart Street, these additional costs total $17,224.66. In the case of 181 Andrew Street, these additional costs total $2,337.75. Section 738(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada, dealing with restitution to victims of offences provides that, in subsection (a):

“In the case of damage to, or the loss or destruction of, the property of any person as a result of the commission of the offence or the arrest or attempted arrest of the offender, by paying to the person an amount not exceeding the replacement value of the property as of the date the order is imposed, less the value of any property that is returned to that person as of the date it was returned, where the amount is readily attainable.”

The pertinent words in that section have been highlighted.

[40] In R. v. Devgan, referred to above, the court dealt with the predecessor to this section, s. 275(1) dealing with restitution orders which read in part:

“…order the accused to pay to that person an amount by way of satisfaction or compensation for loss of or damage to property suffered by that person as a result of the commission of an offence.”

In R. v. Devgan, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that that section did not permit the making of a compensation order for legal costs incurred to recover property lost or damaged as a result of a criminal offence. The court held that a restitution order under that section was limited to an amount representing the actual loss of the property.

[41] Section 738(1)(a) of the Criminal Code has similar wording to the previous s. 275(1) of the Criminal Code in that they both refer to the restitution amount being tied to the amount of the loss or the value lost and do not refer to an order covering any other type