Benjamin Goldman

The accused was charged with sexual assault after the complainant awoke to him having sexual intercourse with her.

The complainant testified she had no memory of returning to the accused's home due to intoxication and did not consent.

The accused claimed the complainant initiated the sexual activity while they were sleeping on the couch.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding the complainant lacked the capacity to consent while asleep and did not consent upon waking.

The court found no air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent and found the accused guilty.

The applicants sought to exclude evidence obtained from a search warrant, arguing insufficient grounds for the warrant and an unreasonable manner of search, violating their s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found the warrant invalid due to reliance on generalized assumptions rather than case-specific information linking firearms to the residence.

The manner of search was deemed reasonable.

Applying the Grant factors, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, thus excluding the evidence.

The defendant was charged with assault, choking with intent, sexual assault, and unlawful confinement.

The central issue was identification, with the Crown relying on the complainant's identification and DNA evidence, while the defence presented an alternative explanation for the DNA findings through witness testimony.

The court found the complainant's identification evidence unreliable due to inconsistencies and uncertainty.

Although the DNA evidence was compelling, the defence witnesses' accounts, despite minor flaws, raised a reasonable doubt regarding the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the alleged assault at the Liberty Village apartment.

The court also addressed, for completeness, the elements of sexual assault and unlawful confinement, finding the sexual assault elements met but not the unlawful confinement elements due to uncertainty regarding intent.

The defendant was found not guilty on all counts.

The Attorney General applied for a forfeiture order under the Civil Remedies Act for cash seized from the respondent during a drug trafficking investigation.

The respondent claimed the cash came from a real estate sale and a cultural deposit system, but provided inconsistent evidence and lacked supporting banking records.

The court found the cash was likely the proceeds of unlawful activity, given the presence of drug trafficking paraphernalia and the respondent's lack of a credible explanation for the funds.

The application was granted and the currency was ordered forfeited.

Sentencing decision arising from firearm and drug offences committed after the accused was assaulted by a group of men near a downtown intersection.

The court rejected asserted mitigating circumstances that the handgun had just been taken from a robber, that the conduct was materially connected to self-defence, and that the accused intended to surrender the weapon to police.

It found as an aggravating fact that the accused attempted to fire the handgun in a crowded public area while carrying cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, proceeds of crime, and prohibited ammunition, all while subject to a lifetime firearms prohibition.

Applying denunciation, deterrence, separation, rehabilitation, parity, and totality, the court imposed a global sentence of 6.5 years' custody less 484 days' pretrial credit, together with ancillary forfeiture, DNA, and lifetime prohibition orders.

Kyle Megill was found guilty by a jury of six counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking and two counts of possessing proceeds of crime.

He operated a sophisticated "drug boutique" from his penthouse, dealing in large quantities of Schedule I, II, and III drugs.

The Crown sought a six-year sentence, while the defence requested 23 months less a day, citing the offender's youth, lack of prior record, and mental health struggles.

The court considered general sentencing principles, aggravating factors (large-scale, for-profit operation, dangerous drugs), and mitigating factors (youth, first offender, family support, attempts at rehabilitation).

The court imposed a sentence of five years' imprisonment, along with a section 109 order for 10 years, a DNA order, and a victim surcharge.

The accused was charged with multiple drug and firearm offences following the execution of a search warrant at an apartment unit.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to prove the accused resided in the unit and possessed the contraband found inside, as well as marijuana found in the hallway.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework and rejected the accused's testimony, but ultimately found the Crown's circumstantial evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused resided in the unit or possessed the marijuana in the hallway.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The applicant was charged with nine drug offences arising from a search warrant executed at his residence.

He challenged the validity of the warrant under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that the warrant should not have been issued and that the search breached his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.

The applicant also argued that the warrant was a ruse or pretext to gain entry to install listening devices related to a parallel homicide investigation.

The court applied the Garofoli test and found that there was sufficient credible and reliable evidence to support the issuance of the warrant under section 11 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The court rejected the argument that the dual purpose of the warrant rendered it invalid, finding that the presence of a secondary purpose did not invalidate the resort to the statutory power.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of simple possession of cannabis marihuana.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's application of the Grant criteria for the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing that his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached.

The trial judge found a s. 10(b) breach but admitted the evidence, characterizing the breach as minimal.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred in characterizing the seriousness of the breach and in failing to properly apply the second and third Grant guidelines.

The court concluded that the deliberate nature of the officer's conduct, which encouraged self-incrimination without advising of the right to counsel, constituted a serious breach with significant impact on the appellant's Charter rights, outweighing society's interest in admitting the evidence of a minor drug offence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the Justice of the Peace erred in finding he was functus officio.

The appellant had tendered evidence of valid insurance, but the Crown introduced fresh evidence on appeal proving the insurance letter was false.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if the Justice of the Peace erred, there was no miscarriage of justice under section 120(1)(b) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The accused was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police executing a search warrant discovered over 1.3 kilograms of cocaine, cash, and trafficking paraphernalia in his apartment.

The court considered the seriousness of trafficking large quantities of cocaine and the accused’s lengthy criminal record, including prior drug and firearms offences.

Mitigating factors included efforts at rehabilitation while in custody and an early resolution following pre-trial litigation.

Applying the principles of denunciation and deterrence under the Criminal Code and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the court determined that a penitentiary sentence was required.

A total effective sentence of five and a half years’ imprisonment was imposed, with credit for pre-sentence custody.

Following a prior release order modifying bail conditions for multiple accused, the court was advised of a change in circumstances requiring further modification of the recognizances.

The court accepted that the proposed adjustments were necessary in the public interest despite limited disclosure of the underlying circumstances.

The conditions were amended to require each accused to inform the officer in charge of the address at which they would reside with their sureties and to remain amenable to household rules.

For one accused, an existing condition in the recognizance was vacated and replaced with the new residency condition, and a geographic restriction requiring the accused to remain in Ontario was removed.

The court also ordered that the addresses of the sureties not be publicly disclosed absent further court order.

The Crown applied under s. 521 of the Criminal Code to review a justice of the peace’s order granting judicial interim release to three accused charged with multiple firearms and drug trafficking offences.

The Crown argued that the justice erred in assessing the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention under s. 515(10).

The reviewing judge held that although the case involved serious allegations including possession of handguns with obliterated serial numbers, a silencer, and drugs, the justice of the peace did not commit an error in law or principle.

The strength of the prosecution’s case was uncertain due to potential Charter issues concerning warrantless access to a safe and evidentiary concerns linking some accused to the seized items.

The Crown’s request to substitute detention orders was dismissed, though several release conditions were modified to address inconsistencies and strengthen supervision.