John S. Struthers

This decision concerns the trial of Tamaal Japp and Moses Tesfay for first-degree murder in the shooting death of Uchenna Achioso.

The court reviews the evidence, including agreed statements of fact, expert testimony, and the credibility of key witnesses.

The main issues are the identity of the accused and the extent of their criminal liability.

The court finds both accused guilty of manslaughter, not murder, concluding that while they participated in an unlawful act leading to death, the evidence does not establish the intent or planning required for murder.

The court sentenced Lance Burkhard for second-degree murder following a guilty plea after a successful appeal of his first-degree murder conviction.

The decision details the facts of the offence, the aggravating and mitigating factors, the character and rehabilitation of the offender, and the impact on the victim’s family.

The court imposed a life sentence with 12 years of parole ineligibility, considering the seriousness of the offence, Burkhard’s criminal record, his rehabilitation efforts, and the harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody, including during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The accused applied to exclude evidence of 18 kilograms of cocaine, 7 kilograms of crystal methamphetamine, and over $200,000 in cash seized during a drug trafficking investigation.

They alleged multiple Charter violations, including unreasonable search of a condominium parking garage, arbitrary arrest, warrantless entry into a dwelling, and denial of the right to counsel.

The court found that the police did not violate sections 8 or 9 of the Charter, as the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the garage and the police had reasonable grounds for arrest.

However, the court found breaches of section 10(b) due to a failure to hold off questioning and a delay in facilitating access to counsel.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute and dismissed the application.

The accused, charged with drug trafficking and firearms offences, brought a Charter motion under s. 8 and s. 24(2) to exclude evidence obtained from a general warrant and a subsequent search warrant.

The general warrant authorized covert entries into a condominium unit suspected to be a fentanyl stash house.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained unconstitutionally obtained video surveillance evidence and misleading exaggerations about the accused's pattern of behaviour.

After excising the problematic portions, the court concluded there were insufficient grounds to issue the general warrant.

Applying the Grant framework, the court found the police conduct was serious and the impact on the accused's privacy was high, warranting the exclusion of the seized evidence under s. 24(2).

The offender, a police officer, was sentenced for multiple offences including breach of trust, unauthorized use of a computer, possession of a firearm obtained by crime, and trafficking by offer.

The offences involved accessing confidential police databases for unauthorized purposes, planning to rob a fictional drug warehouse, stealing a police shotgun, and offering to traffic cocaine.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the severe breach of public trust.

The offender was sentenced to a global term of 7.5 years imprisonment.

The accused, a police officer, was found guilty of multiple offences including unauthorized use of a computer, breach of trust, possessing a stolen firearm, and drug trafficking following an undercover police corruption investigation.

The accused brought an application seeking a stay of proceedings, arguing he was entrapped by undercover officers and that the investigation amounted to an abuse of process.

The court found that the accused was entrapped into committing theft and uttering forged documents relating to a fabricated confidential informant report, as the police induced the offences without reasonable suspicion, and stayed those counts.

However, the court dismissed the entrapment application for the remaining offences, finding that reasonable suspicion existed and the accused was not induced, but rather created his own opportunities to commit the crimes.

The court also declined to grant a general stay for abuse of process.

The offenders were convicted of firearms trafficking and related offences committed in association with a criminal organization that imported firearms from the United States to Toronto.

The Crown sought sentences of 9 and 12 years, while the defence sought 4 and 6-8 years.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the severe risk firearms pose to the community, while also considering the offenders' lack of prior records and prospects for rehabilitation.

The court sentenced the first offender to 6 years and the second offender to 9 years in custody, with credit given for pre-sentence custody and stringent bail conditions.

The accused, a police officer, was targeted in an undercover corruption investigation.

He was charged with 14 offences arising from his interactions with an undercover officer posing as his partner and another undercover officer posing as a mid-level organized crime figure.

The court found the accused guilty of theft and uttering forged documents for keeping money intended for a fictitious confidential informant and forging the receipt.

He was also found guilty of unauthorized use of a computer and breach of trust for running licence plates for personal reasons and to assist the undercover drug dealer.

The accused was found guilty of possessing a firearm obtained by crime and possessing a weapon for a dangerous purpose after he stole a police shotgun in preparation for robbing a drug warehouse.

However, he was acquitted of attempted robbery because his extensive planning had not progressed beyond mere preparation.

He was also convicted of trafficking cocaine by offer and trafficking steroids to the undercover officer.

The applicant, Alden Nunes, brought an application to exclude evidence (guns, fentanyl, ecstasy) obtained via a search warrant, arguing a violation of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the search warrant lacked sufficient grounds to believe evidence would be found at the searched residence (21 Redvers Street, Whitby), as the police failed to establish Mr. Moore's current residency there or investigate beyond his outdated bail conditions.

Despite the absence of police bad faith, the Charter-infringing conduct was deemed serious due to the lack of investigation and the high expectation of privacy in a dwelling.

Applying the Grant factors, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and therefore excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was found guilty of unauthorized possession of a prohibited firearm, possession of a firearm with ammunition, and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

The court found the accused was in constructive possession of a loaded 9mm handgun found in a shared apartment.

Taking into account mitigating factors including strict bail conditions and the recent murder of the accused's brother, the court imposed a global sentence of 2 years less a day, followed by 3 years of probation.

The accused, Bill Allison and Kamar Cunningham, were charged with multiple offences related to firearms trafficking and participation in a criminal organization following a police investigation dubbed 'Project Patton'.

The Crown alleged that the accused were involved in importing firearms from the United States and distributing them in Toronto.

The court relied heavily on intercepted communications using coded language.

Mr. Allison testified, claiming he only received firearms for personal use, but his evidence was rejected.

Mr. Allison was found guilty of firearms trafficking, offering to transfer a firearm, and conspiracy.

Mr. Cunningham was found guilty of firearms trafficking, participating in a criminal organization, and possession for the purpose of transferring, but was acquitted of conspiracy due to reasonable doubt about his membership.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the Crown brought an application to admit expert evidence regarding street gangs, specifically the rivalry between 'C3' and the 'Scarlettwood Crips'.

The Crown sought to qualify a police detective as an expert to provide context and establish motive for the seemingly random shooting of an unarmed man.

The defence opposed the application, arguing the evidence was highly prejudicial and the officer was not properly qualified.

The court allowed the application, finding the evidence was logically relevant to motive, necessary to assist the jury in understanding the context of the shooting, and that the officer was qualified.

The court ruled that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, subject to specific exclusions of certain highly prejudicial videos and appropriate jury instructions.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the accused applied for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown's case to reduce the charge to second-degree murder, arguing a lack of evidence for planning and deliberation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that evidence of the accused waiting at a restaurant, conducting reconnaissance, ambushing the victim in a washroom, and fleeing together with the murder weapon provided a prima facie case upon which a reasonable jury could find planning and deliberation.

The defence applied to re-open and re-consider an earlier ruling that admitted a Super 8 video from the day before an alleged murder.

The defence offered admissions of fact under Section 650 of the Criminal Code to obviate the need for the video.

The Crown opposed.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the video's unique visual probative value, particularly in demonstrating the accused's familiarity with the firearm and concerted action, extended beyond the offered admissions and justified any additional prejudicial effect.

The defendants were convicted by a jury of second-degree murder.

This decision sets their parole ineligibility periods.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the use of a semi-automatic assault rifle, the public nature of the killing, elements of planning, and the criminal record of one offender, as well as prior criminal conduct involving the same firearm.

Mitigating factors included youth and difficult upbringing for one offender, and being a first offender for the other.

The court also addressed the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct under Section 725(1)(c) of the Criminal Code and the weight to be given to jury recommendations.

Parole ineligibility was set at 16 years for Shamar Meredith and 12 years for Thulani Chizanga.

The accused, Evans Okwara, was charged with possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and unlawfully importing heroin into Canada.

The Crown presented evidence including cell phone records showing knowledge of the shipment details and searches related to the delivery address, as well as a storage locker access card found in the accused's wallet, which contained additional heroin.

The accused's testimony denying knowledge and involvement was found to be inconsistent with the evidence.

The court applied the R. v. W.(D.) framework and found the accused guilty on both counts, concluding that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knowingly possessed and imported heroin for trafficking.

The defendant, Kevin Deonath, was charged with second-degree murder following the shooting death of Roy Khan.

The court examined whether the Crown proved the requisite intent for murder and disproved self-defence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The evidence indicated a struggle ensued after Khan pointed a loaded handgun at Deonath.

The court found that while an inference of intentional firing was available, another reasonable inference was that the gun discharged unintentionally during the struggle as Deonath defended himself.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove intent for murder and failed to disprove lawful self-defence.

Deonath was acquitted.

The Crown applied to admit discreditable conduct evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The evidence consisted of video surveillance showing the accused in possession of a long-barrelled firearm at a motel the day before the homicide.

The court found that the evidence was highly probative of the accused's possession, concealment, and familiarity with the weapon, which was relevant to the issues of intention, planning, and deliberation.

The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, and ruled the video admissible.

The accused was charged with multiple drug and firearms offences following a search of his apartment unit.

At trial, the defence challenged the validity of the search warrant and alleged violations of the accused's Charter rights.

The court upheld the validity of the search warrant based on information from two confidential sources, finding the information was compelling, credible, and reasonably corroborated.

However, the court found a serious breach of the accused's s. 10(b) right to counsel when police questioned him about hazards in the apartment after he had asserted his right to counsel.

The incriminating statement was excluded under s. 24(2).

On the substantive charges, the court found that while the circumstantial evidence could support an inference that the accused lived in the unit, there remained a reasonable and logical alternative explanation that he was merely a guest.

The court was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had the requisite knowledge and control of the contraband, and all charges were dismissed.

This criminal trial concerned charges of possession of a prohibited firearm and two prohibited extended magazines, and possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence and the testimony of two police officers, whose accounts contained critical contradictions regarding the accused's actions and the sequence of events leading to the discovery of the firearm.

The court applied principles of possession and the assessment of circumstantial evidence, particularly the guidance from R. v. Villaroman, which states that if reasonable inferences other than guilt can be drawn, the Crown has not met the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Due to the inconsistencies in police testimony, the lack of direct evidence of the accused handling the firearm, and the absence of forensic links (DNA or fingerprints), the court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew of or controlled the items.