Cindy Nadler

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter in a large project prosecution involving wiretaps, numerous accused, and voluminous disclosure.

Applying the Jordan framework, the court found that although the total delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling by 11 days, 6 weeks of delay were attributable to the defence because counsel failed to respond to repeated efforts to secure earlier trial dates.

That deduction brought the net delay below the ceiling.

In any event, the court held that the modest over-ceiling delay was justified by the particular complexity of the proceedings and that the defence had not taken meaningful steps to expedite the matter.

The court found Chi Do guilty of three counts of unauthorized transfer of a firearm, twelve counts of possession of a firearm for the purpose of trafficking, and one count of public mischief.

The case turned on the implausibility and inconsistencies in Ms. Do’s account of thefts, her financial circumstances, and the circumstantial evidence that firearms registered to her were found at a crime scene before she reported them stolen.

The court rejected her evidence and concluded that she intentionally transferred the firearms and fabricated the theft to mislead police.

The decision addresses a constitutional challenge to section 16(3) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) regarding the search of digital devices at the border.

The court finds that the provision is unconstitutional as it permits searches of digital devices without any threshold, and declares it null and void as against the applicant, Kerwin Sonny.

However, the court declines to exclude the evidence obtained from the search, applying the Grant analysis and finding that the state conduct was not serious, the impact on the applicant was substantial, but society’s interest in adjudication on the merits favoured admission.

The decision also clarifies the scope of standing for Charter challenges and the limits of remedies for third-party Charter violations.

The accused was found guilty of manslaughter following an armed home invasion that resulted in the fatal shooting of an unarmed victim.

The court found the accused was a party to the robbery and had subjective foresight that a loaded gun would be used, though it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the shooter.

Weighing the significant aggravating factors of an armed home invasion against the accused's youth, first-time adult offender status, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions due to lockdowns and COVID-19, the court imposed a sentence of 8.5 years.

After applying Summers and Duncan credits, the remaining sentence to serve was 39 months.

The applicant, a young Black man, brought a Charter application to exclude a loaded handgun found in his satchel during a search incident to an investigative detention in an apartment.

The court found that the police lacked reasonable grounds for the search, concluding that one officer's testimony about the applicant attempting to conceal the satchel was untruthful.

The court permitted cross-examination of the officer on prior judicial findings of untruthfulness and concluded that racial profiling played a substantial role in the police conduct.

Finding a serious breach of section 8 of the Charter, the court excluded the firearm under section 24(2).

The accused was tried on charges of aggravated assault and attempted murder arising from a stabbing in a residential complex.

The central issue was identity, with the Crown relying primarily on the complainant’s recognition evidence, related phone-call evidence, and observations by civilian witnesses after the stabbing.

The court rejected the accused’s evidence as not credible, but held that this did not resolve the burden on the Crown under the W.(D.) framework.

Given serious credibility concerns with the complainant, weaknesses in the recognition evidence, and significant evidentiary gaps including the absence of cell phone records and further identification procedures, the Crown failed to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

The Crown applied to have the offender designated a Dangerous Offender following his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and break and enter.

The offender broke into two homes at night, sexually assaulting a minor in one of them.

He had a lengthy criminal record including prior sexual offences and breaches of court orders.

The court found the offender met the criteria for a Dangerous Offender designation under s. 753(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, demonstrating a failure to control his sexual impulses and a likelihood of causing future harm.

Given his high risk of reoffending, anti-social personality disorder, and history of deceit with treatment providers, the court concluded there was no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public.

The offender was designated a Dangerous Offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of incarceration.

Ridwan Dalmar, a 20-year-old first offender, was sentenced on two counts of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, one count of possession of a prohibited device, and one count of careless discharge of a firearm.

The Crown sought a 5-6 year sentence, while the defence sought two years.

The court considered the gravity of the offences, the offender's background, and prevailing legal principles, including the social context of the offences and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on incarceration conditions.

The judge found the offences grave but acknowledged the offender's moral blameworthiness was influenced by his fear for safety in his community and distrust of police.

The court applied pre-trial custody credits (Summers and Duncan credits) and a 6-month reduction for collateral consequences of serving a sentence during the pandemic.

The final sentence imposed was two years less one day in a reformatory, concurrent for all charges, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The applicant, Safeer Ahmad, sought a second bail release under Section 522 of the Criminal Code, having been charged with conspiracy to commit murder.

The application was based on a change of circumstances, specifically the addition of new sureties (his mother and a cousin) to supplement previously proposed sureties.

The court, reading the reasons together with the previous ruling, found the allegations exceedingly serious, involving a gang-related shooting that resulted in one death and multiple injuries.

While acknowledging the new sureties slightly improved supervision, the court deemed their value marginal given the gravity of the offence and the strength of the Crown's case.

The application was dismissed on both the secondary ground (risk to public safety) and the tertiary ground (maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice), emphasizing the high onus on the applicant in such serious cases and the growing public intolerance for gun violence.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the accused applied for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown's case to reduce the charge to second-degree murder, arguing a lack of evidence for planning and deliberation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that evidence of the accused waiting at a restaurant, conducting reconnaissance, ambushing the victim in a washroom, and fleeing together with the murder weapon provided a prima facie case upon which a reasonable jury could find planning and deliberation.

The defence applied to re-open and re-consider an earlier ruling that admitted a Super 8 video from the day before an alleged murder.

The defence offered admissions of fact under Section 650 of the Criminal Code to obviate the need for the video.

The Crown opposed.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the video's unique visual probative value, particularly in demonstrating the accused's familiarity with the firearm and concerted action, extended beyond the offered admissions and justified any additional prejudicial effect.

The defendants were convicted by a jury of second-degree murder.

This decision sets their parole ineligibility periods.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the use of a semi-automatic assault rifle, the public nature of the killing, elements of planning, and the criminal record of one offender, as well as prior criminal conduct involving the same firearm.

Mitigating factors included youth and difficult upbringing for one offender, and being a first offender for the other.

The court also addressed the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct under Section 725(1)(c) of the Criminal Code and the weight to be given to jury recommendations.

Parole ineligibility was set at 16 years for Shamar Meredith and 12 years for Thulani Chizanga.

The accused was charged with two break-ins occurring within 900 metres of each other in Brampton on September 2, 2018.

The first involved a break and enter with theft at a residential property.

The second involved a break and enter with sexual assault of a thirteen-year-old girl.

The Crown's case relied primarily on circumstantial evidence including video surveillance footage, the complainant's testimony, probation officer identification evidence, and recovered stolen property.

The defence challenged identification and the reliability of the complainant's evidence.

The trial judge found the accused guilty on all counts based on a holistic assessment of the circumstantial evidence, rejecting the defence application to admit similar fact evidence regarding prior convictions.

The Crown applied to admit discreditable conduct evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The evidence consisted of video surveillance showing the accused in possession of a long-barrelled firearm at a motel the day before the homicide.

The court found that the evidence was highly probative of the accused's possession, concealment, and familiarity with the weapon, which was relevant to the issues of intention, planning, and deliberation.

The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, and ruled the video admissible.

The applicant challenged the validity of a search warrant issued to search his residence on the grounds of alleged violations of s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained inaccuracies and omissions that rendered the warrant invalid.

The Crown contended that the warrant was valid on both facial and subfacial analysis.

The court conducted a voir dire and examined three main areas of challenge: non-disclosure of relevant information, misdescription or omission of identification evidence, and grounds to believe items were at the premises.

The court found that despite certain inaccuracies in the ITO, the issuing justice could have properly granted the warrant based on the totality of the evidence presented.

The Crown applied for a ruling on the admissibility of opinion evidence from a probation officer regarding the identification of an unknown male recorded on home surveillance video from a residence proximate to where a break-in and sexual assault allegedly occurred.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine admissibility under the "prior acquaintance/better position" test established in Leaney.

The probation officer had supervised the accused on multiple occasions and observed his physical appearance, gait, clothing, and other characteristics.

The court found the evidence admissible, as the witness had sufficient familiarity with the accused and was in a better position than the court to identify similarities between the accused and the person in the video.

The witness testified only to consistencies and similarities, not to a positive identification.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide breath samples following a collision with a fire hydrant in Mississauga in the early hours of November 3, 2011.

The Crown established that the accused was intoxicated and in care or control of the vehicle.

The accused challenged whether the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code applied and whether the breath demand was valid.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts, determining that he was occupying the driver's seat, presenting a realistic risk of danger, and that the breath demand was valid despite the accused's refusal to comply.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown established that the accused was observed driving at excessive speeds on Highway 410, making abrupt lane changes without signalling, and displaying delayed reaction time to police emergency signals.

The accused was arrested and provided breath samples showing readings well in excess of the legal limit.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the breath evidence on the basis of a breach of the right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that language barriers prevented meaningful access to legal advice.

The court found a technical breach of the Charter right to counsel but admitted the breath evidence under section 24(2), finding that the integrity of the administration of justice would not be compromised by admission.

The court convicted the accused on both counts.