Douglas R. Lent

The defendant was convicted at trial of three counts of operating a conveyance while prohibited contrary to s. 320.18.

The Crown sought the maximum custodial sentence of 2 years less 1 day based on seven prior convictions for the same offence and eleven prior convictions for failing to comply with court orders.

The defence argued for a conditional sentence of 6-12 months, citing the jump principle and the defendant's indigenous background.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of 15 months concurrent on all counts, finding that despite the serious criminal history and need for deterrence, the defendant had demonstrated positive change and rehabilitation potential, particularly following drug counselling in 2023 and the absence of further offences in the 20 months since the subject offences.

The offender was convicted of impaired operation of a conveyance and operation with blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg%.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 45 to 60 days, an 18-month driving prohibition, and two years probation.

The defence sought an elevated fine, an 18-month driving prohibition, and probation if necessary.

The court imposed a two-month conditional sentence order with home confinement for the first month, an 18-month driving prohibition, and no probation order.

The court balanced the seriousness of the offence—involving extremely high blood alcohol levels (310 and 290 mg%), running a red light, and significant property damage—against the offender's first-time status, demonstrated rehabilitation through residential treatment and sustained sobriety, strong family support, and low risk of reoffending.

This decision addresses the legality of a vehicle stop in a private hotel parking lot under the Highway Traffic Act (HTA) and the application of a Criminal Code driving prohibition order to such a location.

The court found that the HTA section prohibiting use of unauthorized plates applies in private parking lots and that the Best Western hotel parking lot constituted a "public place" under s 320.24(8) of the Criminal Code.

The accused’s right to counsel was breached technically by not repeating the right to counsel advice at the roadside upon arrest for driving while prohibited, but the breach was minor and did not justify exclusion of evidence.

The possession charge was dismissed due to insufficient evidence, but the remaining charges were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

This decision addresses a Charter application challenging the admissibility of breathalyzer evidence and other related evidence in a case involving impaired driving, operation with blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 ml, and dangerous driving.

The court carefully analyzed the issues of identity of the driver, the reliability of the alcohol screening device (ASD) fail result considering residual mouth alcohol, the lawfulness of detention in the police cruiser during the alcohol screening demand, and the timing of the right to counsel.

The court found no breach of sections 8 or 9 of the Charter but did find a minor breach of section 10(b) due to a brief delay in providing the right to counsel.

The breathalyzer evidence was admitted, and the accused was found guilty of the "80 plus" offence but not guilty of impaired driving or dangerous driving.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting breathalyzer results despite alleged Charter breaches and in failing to find a s. 10(b) breach regarding his need for an interpreter.

The summary conviction appeal court found no ss. 8, 9, or 10(b) Charter breaches and held the evidence was admissible.

However, the appeal court found the trial judge erred by taking judicial notice that the appellant's blood alcohol concentration proved impairment without giving the parties notice.

Consequently, the impaired driving conviction was quashed, but the conditional stay on the 'over-80' charge was lifted, a conviction was entered, and the same sentence of a $1,500 fine and a one-year driving prohibition was imposed.

The defendant, Peter De Pinto, brought an application under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay in his trial for three driving-related offences.

The total delay from the laying of the information to the last scheduled trial date was 42 months.

The court applied the R. v. Jordan framework, calculating defence waivers and defence-caused delay, which amounted to 22.8 months.

This resulted in a net delay of 19.2 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The court then considered whether the sudden death of the original trial judge constituted an exceptional circumstance.

It found that the judge's death was an unforeseen and unavoidable exceptional circumstance, and that the justice system had reasonably mitigated its impact.

A deduction of 6.65 months was made for this exceptional circumstance, bringing the remaining delay to 12.55 months, which is below the presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed, and the trial was ordered to proceed.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving (excess blood alcohol).

On appeal, the sole issue was whether her s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel of choice was violated.

The appellant had twice asked to call her husband after being advised of her rights, but the arresting officer denied the request, stating she could only speak to a lawyer.

The trial judge found that the appellant did not communicate that she wanted to call her husband to obtain a lawyer's name, and that it was not obvious to the police.

The Superior Court, sitting as a summary conviction appeal court, upheld the trial judge's factual finding as reasonable and affirmed that a detainee has an obligation to explicitly state the reason for wanting to contact a third party to facilitate access to counsel.

The court found no Charter breach and dismissed the appeal.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and 'over 80'.

The court found the defendant was the driver and impaired based on pre-arrest observations.

However, significant breaches of the defendant's Charter right to counsel (s. 10(b)) occurred at the police detachment, including insufficient explanation of counsel options, failure to address dissatisfaction with duty counsel, lack of a Prosper warning, and delayed facilitation of counsel access during breath testing.

Applying the Grant criteria, the court excluded the breathalyzer readings for the 'over 80' charge, resulting in an acquittal on that count.

The evidence for impaired care and control, obtained prior to the Charter breaches, was not excluded, leading to a conviction on that charge.

Rajvinder Singh appealed his conviction for operating a conveyance while impaired by alcohol.

At trial, he was acquitted of the over 80 mg charge due to a Charter violation (s. 10(b) right to counsel in Punjabi).

On appeal, Singh argued the trial judge erred in finding him impaired, primarily by challenging credibility assessments of witnesses and alleging misapprehension of evidence, including video recordings.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were reasonable and well-supported by the evidence, and that no palpable or overriding errors in credibility findings or factual assessments were demonstrated.

The court reiterated the high standard for appellate intervention on factual findings and credibility.

Matthew Salciccia was found asleep at the wheel of his truck with the engine running.

He was arrested for impaired driving and having excess blood alcohol.

He challenged the admissibility of evidence, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under s. 8 (unreasonable search/seizure) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found that the police had reasonable grounds for arrest and that there was no breach of his s. 10(b) rights, as he had waived his right to counsel at the roadside, and the police were not obligated to facilitate counsel of choice after he declined.

The court emphasized the need for specificity in Charter applications.

Salciccia was found guilty of both charges.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and having an excess blood alcohol concentration (BAC).

He brought a Charter application to exclude breath test results, alleging violations of his ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found that the initial arrest for failing to remain at the scene of an accident was unlawful, constituting a s. 9 Charter violation, as the offence was not legally applicable to the facts.

A s. 10(b) violation also occurred due to the police's inadvertent failure to fully advise Duty Counsel of all charges, delaying the defendant's ability to receive complete legal advice.

Applying the R. v. Grant test, the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct and the impact on the defendant's Charter-protected interests strongly favoured exclusion of the breath test results.

Without the breath readings, the excess BAC charge could not be proven.

The court also found insufficient evidence to establish impaired operation beyond a reasonable doubt.

Consequently, both remaining charges were dismissed.

The defendant was charged with failing to provide a suitable breath sample for an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand after being found asleep in his vehicle.

The Crown and defence disputed the reasonable suspicion for the ASD demand and the mens rea standard for the offence.

The court found that the officer's ASD demand was within the 'forthwith window'.

However, the central issue was whether the Crown proved the failure to provide a suitable sample beyond a reasonable doubt.

Due to insufficient and inaccurate details provided by the administering officer regarding the multiple failed tests, the court found a reasonable doubt remained and dismissed the charge.

The defendant, Robert Cairney, was charged with "over 79" contrary to section 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter, seeking a stay or exclusion of breath readings.

The court found no section 8 violation regarding the immediacy of the ASD demand or residual mouth alcohol.

However, it found a minor section 10(b) breach due to a 3-5 minute delay in providing rights to counsel and a section 9 breach due to an approximate two-hour overholding caused by paperwork delays.

Despite these breaches, the court declined to stay the charges under section 24(1) or exclude the breath samples under section 24(2), finding the breaches to be of low seriousness and low impact, and that admission of evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant, John Zdichavsky, was charged with having an excess blood alcohol concentration.

The trial proceeded alongside a Charter application to exclude breath sample results, alleging violations of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter, with s. 10 allegations later abandoned.

The court found the initial traffic stop, the subsequent detention, and the arrest based on an Approved Screening Device (ASD) "fail" result to be lawful.

The judge rejected arguments that the officer lacked subjective belief or objective grounds, or that the ASD was unreliable due to lack of self-testing, waiting periods, or calibration records.

Finding no Charter violations, the court dismissed the Charter application and admitted the breath test results.

Consequently, the defendant was found guilty as charged.

Her Majesty the Queen appealed the acquittal of Nicholas Bennett on a charge of driving with over 80 milligrams of alcohol.

The trial judge had excluded breath test results, finding a breach of the respondent's s. 10(b) Charter rights due to the police's failure to provide a Prosper warning.

The respondent had initially invoked his right to counsel, but police conduct led him to believe further attempts to contact a lawyer would be futile.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's finding of a Charter breach and the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2), concluding that the seriousness of the police conduct, which effectively rendered the right to counsel meaningless, outweighed other factors, notwithstanding the minimally intrusive nature of breath samples.

The appeal was dismissed, and the acquittal was affirmed.

The defendant, Lenny Alexandre, was charged with operating a conveyance while prohibited.

The defence challenged the Crown's proof of identity, the connection of the license suspension to a criminal conviction, and argued that the Crown must prove the defendant was not registered in an ignition interlock program.

The court found that identity was proven by circumstantial evidence, the license suspension was sufficiently connected to a prior criminal conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol, and that registration in an interlock program is a defence, not an element of the offence, placing an evidentiary burden on the defendant.

The defendant was found guilty.

The appellant appealed her conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over 80mg.

She argued the trial judge erred in allowing the Crown to recall a witness, in finding she was the driver, and in finding reasonable and probable grounds for her arrest.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's procedural discretion, factual findings on identification, or conclusion that objective grounds existed for the arrest.

The court also upheld the trial judge's alternative finding that the breath samples would be admissible under section 24(2) of the Charter even if a breach had occurred.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay drinking and driving charges against the respondent due to a breach of her right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The appeal judge found that the trial judge erred in failing to attribute certain scheduling delays—specifically the time taken to schedule a Crown pre-trial and a judicial pre-trial—to the defence.

When these periods of defence delay were deducted from the total delay, the remaining time fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The appeal was allowed, the stay of proceedings was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him, and in failing to exclude evidence after finding a breach of his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's factual findings regarding impairment were entitled to deference.

The court further held that the trial judge actually erred in finding a s. 10(b) breach, as the police properly offered duty counsel when the appellant's counsel of choice was unavailable, and that police observations made during the hold-off period are admissible.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of impaired driving and 'over 80'.

The trial judge had excluded the respondent's roadside admission of driving, finding it was statutorily compelled, and subsequently excluded the breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by allowing the respondent to testify only on the Charter voir dire after allegedly agreeing to a blended trial, and challenged the findings on statutory compulsion, adequacy of reasons, and the s. 24(2) analysis.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings or application of the law.